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 ABSTRACT  
This thesis analyses whether the movement towards privatisation (through various phases 
of corporatisation, changes in management and operation) has been associated with an 
improvement in the performance (efficiency, effectiveness, and quality) of the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) public hospitals in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), 1979 to 2014. 
The study argues that changes in management and operational framework, in different 
corporatisation phases, would be associated with the performance of hospitals. 
Accordingly, the study tests whether the alleged theoretical benefits of corporatisation 
identified in the literature were reflected in the data gathered. Research questions are 
addressed by developing deductively and testing hypotheses via econometric models. The 
data identifies which KSA hospital management/corporatisation phase is generally more 
efficient, and which provides the best overall performance indicators across the study 
period. The econometric methods employed are Data Envelope Analysis, Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis, Panel Data analysis, and Least Squares Regression Analysis. The 
findings suggest that, taking into account the efficiency, effectiveness, and quality aspects 
of hospital performance, fully corporatised hospitals (on average) achieve relatively 
better overall performance. However large hospital efficiencies may be inapplicable to 
small rural hospitals and each hospital should be considered on a case-by-case basis in 
additional to being part of an overall programme at the national level. Despite this caveat, 
broad recommendations are proposed which may help to increase the performance of 
hospitals in the KSA. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and Structure of Chapter 
The objective of this study is to analyse whether the movement towards 
privatisation (through various phases of corporatisation, changes in management and 
operation) has been associated with an improvement in the performance (efficiency, 
effectiveness, and quality) of the Ministry of Health (MoH) public hospitals in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), 1979 to 2014. This investigation may provide the 
framework for the analysis of subsequent efforts by the KSA to go beyond corporatisation 
to privatisation, since corporatisation is an intermediate phase of movement towards 
privatisation, sharing all of the characteristics of privatisation, apart from private 
ownership. There is no theory of corporatisation as such, and this is a gap that this thesis 
addresses. It is therefore argued that the theoretical and empirical literatures on the 
effectiveness (or otherwise) of privatisation are relevant to the research questions posed 
here. Corporatisation (including hospitals) has been found in the National Transformation 
Program 2020 (NTP) & Vision (2030), to encourage investment in the private sector, and 
thus, arguably, productivity. 
This introductory chapter starts with the form and function of hospitals. Particular 
attention is paid to providing an understanding of the general background to the thesis, 
including overviews of the structure of the KSA government, and the healthcare (HC) 
sector (sections 1.3, 1.3.1, and 1.3.2). In addition, an overview of the economic 
performance of the KSA is provided and its potential implications on demand for HC 
provision in the Kingdom (section 1.3.3). Section 1.4, represents an overview of the 
corporatisation reforms that represent movement towards privatisation within MoH 






hospitals in KSA in recent decades, specifically 1979 to 2014. The chapter is concluded 
with research questions which proposed in the summary of this chapter (section 1.5).   
1.2 Form and Function of Hospitals 
Generally, a hospital provides a variety of medical services for those that require 
them but in specific cases it may focus on one particular specialism. Whatever the breadth 
of form and function, a hospital is supportive of three main groups of stakeholders. Firstly, 
it has an obligation to its patients. This is achieved by making available suitable patient 
accommodations, catering for particular dietary needs, in addition to providing access to 
spaces for receiving both short and longer-term treatments. A hospital provides patient 
access to the health benefits facilitated by the medical, surgical and technological 
equipment held within the hospital through controlled access to medically trained service 
providers. 
Secondly, there are the providers of medical and administrative services and 
equipment (for example clinical and non-clinical practitioners who provide treatments, 
therapies, technical and administrative support, companies that provide technologies for 
surgical procedures, pharmacies and pharmaceutical suppliers, catering and facility 
maintenance companies, office and IT equipment suppliers, etc.) that need to be 
considered and accommodated. The hospital often provides a place for continuous 24-
hour access to patients/users of the service offerings and technologies being offered.  
The hospital may also be a formal place of medical practice and affords the 
providers with the infrastructure and conditions needed to carry out procedures and 
treatments on the patients that are within the scope of the services offered by the hospital. 
In some cases, the providers of medical services are also supported by advances in 
research and medical science, where the hospital also acts as a teaching and research 






institution. The services provided by (and within) the hospital infrastructure, should 
comply as far as possible with ideal conditions, as determined by the overarching health 
strategy, national and international standards.  
Thirdly, governmental and public bodies may also have a vested interest in the 
hospital as a consolidated operation, through the interactions between service user 
(patient) and organisation (HC provider). The performance of these interactions results in 
health and wellbeing outcomes for the nation and services must be available and ready to 
serve their community in times of peace, epidemic, or disaster.  
Hospitals are often an integral part of the wider HC system of a nation and cannot 
be considered in isolation. The health outcomes that are delivered through the operation 
of the hospital are a key factor that impacts on the overall economic and demographic 
growth and stability of the nation concerned. Conversely, the nation’s demographic, 
epidemiological, economic and governmental context will also shape the provision of HC 
across a nation introducing a cyclic relationship with a hospital’s form, function, 
operating model and overall performance expectations. 
1.3 Environmental Context 
The purpose of this section is to present a contextual account of the KSA’s national 
environment, i.e., all the environmental factors and changes that may influence hospital 
performance for all stakeholders, as it is stated by the MoH that the “health care system 
is different from one country to another, depending on their development and economic 
conditions, demographic and geographic characteristics, information and communication 
potentialities.” (Ministry of Health, 2010, p.121). 






1.3.1 Origins and Structure 
The modern KSA state was established in 1932 by King Abdul-Aziz bin 
Abdurrahman Al-Saud. Historically, the roots of the country can be traced back many 
centuries to its Bedouin origins, but the pace of change has accelerated over recent 
decades, transforming a desert nation into one of the fastest growing countries in the 
world. There are several views on the structure of the KSA, but Viola (1986) seems to 
provide the best description that encapsulates the spirit of the nation. According to Viola 
(1986, p.xxiv) “Saudi Arabia is a unique blend of religious law and tribal custom held 
together by a royal family, with strong roots in both religious and tribal history”. This 
ethos and how this relates to the administrative processes of the government is an 
important factor that may be associated with the county’s HC provision (positively or 
negatively).  
Looking back, the development of administration processes in the KSA can be 
divided into three stages starting with the creation of the kingdom between 1902 to 1953, 
moving on to the building of the central administration between 1953 to 1969, and the 
on-going administrative developments from 1970 to the present, with a desire for a more 
regionally-based structure as indicated in the current development plan. Whilst the early 
stages are of historical interest, the last stage is more relevant to current hospital 
performance, as the rate of change accelerated in response to the demands of both internal 
needs and international commerce. 
Today, there are approximately one million employees supporting the 
governmental administration of the country, including the Civil Service, health, 
education, and law employees. The management and control of such a large organisation 
is a major challenge in ensuring that performance and efficiencies within the structure are 
maintained. According to McKinsey report (2015), Saudi Arabian economic 






transformation relies heavily on a bigger private sector involvement in achieving faster 
economic growth and in maintaining the well being of society. The increasing size and 
associated bureaucracy of the public sector has been regarded as a negative phenomenon. 
Furthermore, specific to the MoH, there is a perceived resistance by some employees to 
changing existing processes which depend on ‘paper work and long routine procedures’ 
to a paperless environment (Ministry of Health, 2010). The ability to negotiate these new 
ways of working to increase productivity and performance is a challenge facing the MoH 
today.  
The remaining part of this section provides an outline of the major bodies of control 
for public services within the KSA, which influence both the inputs and outputs of the 
health system. 
(i) Head of State. The modern KSA is ruled by the family of Al-Saud, with the 
King of KSA as its sovereign monarch. In 1992, by royal decree (King Fahd) introduced 
three major laws (The Consultative Council Law, the Regional Law, and the Basic System 
of Governance). These laws altered the domestic political environment with the ‘Basic 
Law for the System of Government’, identifying the KSA as an Arab and Islamic state, 
with Islam as its religion and the Qur'an as its constitution. Furthermore, the King is the 
ultimate authority over all state authorities, including the legislative authority, which 
consists of two bodies, the Shura Council and the Council of Ministers. 
(ii) The Shura Council. This Consultative Council sits within the framework of 
The Consultative Council Law and currently consists of 150 members. The Shura Council 
includes of 13 sub-committees, the Committee on Health and Environmental Affairs is 
one of them. In general, the purpose of this Council is to consider and debate suggestions 
submitted by the Council of Ministers, in line with Islamic law and the principles held 
within the Qur'an from which it is derived. The government of KSA often issues rules 






and regulations with the objective of supplementing Islamic law when it is needed (Shura 
Council, 2015). However, in case of conflict between the governmental regulations and 
Islamic law, Islamic law dominates. The Committee on Health and Environmental Affairs 
specialises in studying issues related to health and environmental affairs, including public 
health, hospitals and HC centres, medicines, health awareness, etc. Muslims believe that 
illness is a test from God, so often accompanied by meditation, patience, and prayers. 
According to Prophet Mohammed, upholding a healthy body is an individual’s duty, thus 
Muslims are urged to seek treatment where it is needed. Islam considers people's health 
as a collective social responsibility, where the supreme objective of Islamic law is to 
protect people's life and caring about sick people especially vulnerable group1. 
(iii) Council of Ministers. The purpose of the Council of Ministers is to 
concurrently undertake both legislative and executive functions. It shares the legislative 
function with the King and the Shura Council. Ministers have the right to propose draft 
laws or regulations related to the internal, external, economic, financial, and general 
affairs of the country. There are 24 government ministries of which the MoH is one. 
(iv) Agencies. Aligned with the Ministries are independent and quasi-independent 
administrative agencies that have been created to deal with social, economic, and 
administrative challenges. These agencies differ extensively in their function, structure 
and power, each of which is defined by the agency's establishing decree. They can be 
classified as: economic, educational training and consulting investment and financial and 
social welfare agencies (for example the Pension Services Agency, the Saudi Red 
Crescent, and the Social Security Administration). 
(v) Regional and Local Government. At a regional and local government level the 
Provincial Council Systems (framed within the Regional Law) divides the Kingdom into 
 
1 https://www.cairchicago.org/s/CAIR-Healthcare-Provider-Guide.pdf 






13 provinces (regions) each with a major city where the governmental offices (Emirates) 
sit. Each region has a Regional Governor who is responsible to the Minister of the Interior. 
(vi) MoH. The organisational structure of the MoH is currently constituted by a 
Deputy Ministry of Executive Affairs and a Deputy Ministry of Planning and 
Development, under which several specialisms fall, such as therapeutic medicine, 
preventive medicine, development of workforce, planning, research, laboratories, blood 
banks, information technology, quality assurance, organising the provision of health 
services as well as supervising health utilities provided through the private sector and 
others (Ministry of Health, 2017a). The MoH is represented through thirteen general and 
seven specialised directorates of health affairs, which are distributed amongst key 
administrative areas of the Kingdom. The MoH provides services of primary care through 
a wide network of primary HC centres distributed throughout the country. Additionally, 
it provides specialised care at all levels through its public hospitals, specialty hospitals, 
and medical cities (Ministry of Health, 2017a).   
Currently, the MoH is solely responsible for providing approximately 60 per cent 
of the country’s health services, including more than 274 hospitals with a capacity that 
exceeds 41,985 beds, in addition to 2,361 centres for primary HC. Furthermore, the MoH 
is responsible for granting the necessary licenses and regulation for more than 2,000 
dispensaries and clinics, 158 private hospitals and 8,720 pharmacies in the private sector 
(Ministry of Health, 2017b). The MoH also cooperates with and coordinates other 
governmental entities such as the HC Services Board, the Health Insurance Board and the 
Saudi Food and Drug Authority to monitor the latest medical advances and develop laws 
governing these areas (Al-Ateeq, 2002).  
Other governmental health entities which are “managed according to the concepts 
of public administration and not for profit” (Al-Ateeq, 2002, p.1) include the following: 






• Armed Forces Medical Services;  
• Medical Services of the Ministry of Interior;  
• National Guards Health Affairs;  
• University Hospitals;  
• King Faisal Specialty Hospital in Riyadh and Jeddah;  
• Hospitals of Royal Authority of Jubail and Yanbu;  
• Hospitals of ARAMCO Saudi Company; and  
• Health Utilities of the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Affairs.  
These agencies are organisationally independent of the MoH in that they have their 
own budgetary allocations, supervise their health facilities’ administration, and recruit 
their medical personnel. 
Although the scope of this thesis is focused on examining the efficiencies and 
performance of MoH public hospitals, there are many external institutions that may 
impact on this. By considering the overall administrative structure, it is obvious that the 
MoH’s administrative and financial procedures are closely connected with many other 
governmental entities. For example, budgetary responsibility for health services is shared 
between the MoH and the Ministry of Finance and may be dependent on the Ministry of 
the Civil Service for the recruitment of human resources (Ministry of Health, 2010). This 
complexity of command and inherent bureaucracy may have a potentially limiting effect 
on improving performance, through the capability to accelerate or initiate new procedures 
also depend on areas outside of the MoH’s authority. 
1.3.2 Topology and Demographics 
Appendix 1.A presents a map of the KSA showing the regions. The KSA is the 
largest state in the Middle East, covering approximately 850,000 square miles and 






occupying the majority of the Arabian Peninsula. The terrain on the whole is not habitable 
and is almost entirely arid desert with mountain ranges to the west, although serious 
flooding and monsoon rains in some areas can be expected. The size of the KSA is a 
major challenge when providing equitable and high-quality service performance to all 
health service users. 
Additionally, rural-urban migration has been an essential feature of the Saudi 
population, as currently there is a major population concentration in the main big cities 
such as Dhahran, Madinah, Riyadh, and Jeddah. This concentration of population in urban 
areas has highlighted the need for additional capacity and capabilities to support the 
increasing number of residents in major towns and cities to maintain timely access to 
health services without degradation of health service performance. Conversely many 
villages and towns are located in remote areas of the Kingdom and longer-term statistics 
suggest increasing populations as the rural-urban migration trend reverses.  
The key issue here seems to be the lack of a suitable environment (e.g., schools and 
entertainment) to attract qualified medical staff (either national or contracting) to work in 
remote and rural areas. Indeed, a shortage of health workforce outside the urban areas is 
a global phenomenon2. The high turnover of rural health workers has significant direct 
and indirect impacts on rural health services and community health outcomes (Cosgrave, 
et al., 2019), and obviously impacts on the quality of treatments and medical performance 
for all citizens, irrespective of their location (Ministry of Health, 2013). It is worth noting 
that a high percentage of medical staff are non-Saudi nationals employed under out-
sourced and contracted agreements which may impact on the cost performance of those 
services which need to attract non-resident qualified staff. The number of foreign 
 
2 Florida (2002) has mentioned the features of regions and cities that satisfy the consumption tastes of 
creative class experts and professionals through the provision of certain leisure facilities. 






nationals working in the Kingdom, the strain of the fast-growing population, in addition 
to more demanding and educated national patients is putting greater performance 
pressures on the largely state-funded Saudi Health system (Oxford Business Group, 
2007).  
Appendix 1.B shows key national economic indicators. The KSA has a total 
population of 32.6 million inhabitants (General Authority for Statistics, 2018) of which 
approximately 12 million are non-Saudi nationals. The population is projected to reach 
45 million by 2025 (United Nations, 2017). During 1998 and 2008 the annual population 
growth rate in average was 2.5 per cent, mainly due to the decline in the mortality rate 
(MR) and the high fertility rate that has been achieved through the health provisions of 
the past (Ministry of Health, 2010). However, the latest figures for 2017 show that the 
population growth rate is increased by 2.52 per cent per annum (General Authority for 
Statistics, 2018), suggesting the need for an increased number of hospitals, beds, and 
medical staff currently and in the future. Ceteris paribus (i.e., holding constant income, 
cost of care, new treatments and technology, etc.), if additional facilities are not in line 
with this population growth, then the performance of the HC sector may decline. At the 
same time the costs of building new infrastructure and acquiring new staff may put 
additional pressure on the financial performance of the hospitals.  
Reductions in MR and a growing population also reflect an ageing population that 
provides additional pressure for health service provision. Rising affluence is boosting life 
expectancy and resulting in a higher demand for HC. Analysts predict that the over-65 
segment in the KSA will grow to over 2 million by 2020 (Oxford Business Group, 2007), 
which will result in an increased demand for HC services related to treatments of different 
ageing diseases (Ministry of Health, 2010). 






Diseases associated with developed societies, such as diabetes, obesity, 
cardiovascular conditions, and cancers are already prevalent in the Kingdom. Albejaidi 
(2010) suggests these problems are blamed on attitudinal changes. Whatever the case, 
there is a perceived relationship between the cultural considerations of an international 
society, the growing demand for more sophisticated health treatments and the new types 
of treatments that the health system needs to accommodate due to diseases associated 
with lifestyles. All these developments will affect the performance of the hospital, if the 
incorrect services are provided for the demographic changes. 
Religious tourism also has a large impact on the performance of the health service 
provision. In particular, Hajj and Umrah pilgrims cause a substantial influx and peaking 
of transient visitors to the KSA that needs to be supported by medical services. The MoH 
carries the responsibility of offering pilgrims without charge all the needed curative and 
preventive health services. For example, Hajj pilgrims arriving from outside KSA in 2014 
were estimated at 1,389,053 individuals (Ministry of Health, 2015) focused on the holy 
city of Mecca over a 5-day period alone. With Hajj and Umrah pilgrims accounting for 
9,036,898 individuals per annum, accounting 50.3 per cent of the total inbound tourism 
(Bokhari, 2018). 
Visitors, raising the population level by an additional 50 per cent, obviously have 
an enormous impact on HC requirements. The mobilisation of over 25,000 health workers 
to support religious festivals to accommodate this large influx of visitors over short peak 
periods (for example Hajj’s 5-day centres in the holy city of Mecca) needs appropriate 
capacities (beds, treatments and medical ambulatory services). In order to ensure high 
quality health services for pilgrims, the MoH has equipped 25 hospitals, and a further 173 
permanent and seasonal health centres, distributed all over the holy places (Mecca, 
Mashaer areas, and Madinah) (Ministry of Health, 2016). These peaks of additional 






service user demand mean that there is potential for under- (or over-) utilisation of 
resources over the year. This wide fluctuation of demand may affect the overall efficiency 
and performance potential of the system to accommodate these peak demands.   
Peak demand problems have been analysed in a number of regulated/unregulated 
contexts, e.g., electricity supply and public transport provision. Responses can include 
peak load pricing or compensation for peak demand provision (Crew, et al., 1995). 
However, in the case of health services in the KSA, the country is firmly committed to 
free health service provision for all pilgrims. This has significant consequences for the 
measured efficiency of health services in certain towns, a topic which is re-visited below 
in section 4.2.2, where it is explained that the number of pilgrims is a control variable.   
1.3.3 Economy 
The KSA is mostly an oil-driven economy and at a national level is sensitive to 
market forces. In 2018, oil accounts for more than 78.7 per cent of the country’s exports 
and nearly 67.9 per cent of government revenues (SAMA, 2019). Where government 
expenditure (on health and other social services) is financed mostly through oil revenues, 
it is affected by oil price fluctuations. Therefore, fluctuations in global oil prices have 
prompted the diversification of the economy, and have been the focus of the country’s 
economic and financial concerns within the KSA 5-year development plans, and recently, 
in the NTP 2020 and the latest long-term development plan (Vision 2030; Bokhari, 2017). 
These plans are the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy and Planning and provide 
professional social and economic development policy direction to the government and 
the public on as a whole. For example, during the implementation of the 6th Development 
Plan (Ministry of Planning, 1995) there were rapid changes in global economic 






conditions, which created significant challenges for the national economy and influenced 
some key plan targets. 
After three consecutive years of accelerating economic growth, in 1998, oil prices 
declined (by 38 per cent), resulting in an increase in the Saudi budget deficit by 9.6 per 
cent, and by 6.41 per cent in 1999, and these fluctuations affected the balance of payments 
and government budget (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2000). Consequently, the 
government implemented several measures during 1999-2000, targeting reduced 
expenditures, increasing its non-oil revenues and other structural reforms to alleviate the 
impact of oil price fluctuations (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2000). During the 
7th development plan, in 2000, as a result of rapid growth of the oil sector, the budget 
deficit turned into surplus (of 3.5 per cent) and, GDP grew (from SAR 603.6 billion to 
SAR 714.9 billion) (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2005). Oil prices continued to 
increase until 20143, but by mid-2014, global oil prices declined again, prompting a 
number of austerity measures, with a freeze on government spending in 2015, which 
remained for two years. By 2017, the KSA government focused again on limiting the 
impact of oil and commodity fluctuations through diversification, increasing private 
sector contributions to the economy (up to 65 per cent of GDP) and reductions in the Civil 
Service workforce (by 20 per cent). Although the private sector share of GDP rose (to 
48.2 per cent) in 2017, the benefits of this growth need to be considered against future 
changes in the value of oil and in the wider petrochemical sector (Oxford Business Group, 
2018). 
The proportion of foreign workers in the country and local Saudi unemployment is 
another key challenge. For example, in the manufacturing sectors in 2017, 95.4 per cent 
 
3 Except for 2009, when oil prices fall sharply as a result of the global financial crisis. This decline 
reduced the country’s revenues by 54 per cent. 






of new jobs were filled by non-Saudis, although more generally this figure is around 60 
per cent across all sectors. Labour costs vary between employing Saudi workers and those 
from overseas. Before the new regulations of 2017, foreign workers were favoured as 
they accept lower wages. Within the country’s new strategies, however, fees on the 
dependents of foreign workers have been imposed. In 2016, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) noted that if the Saudi government wish to restrict the employment of foreign 
workers in certain sectors and to reduce unemployment among Saudis, higher fees or 
limits on visas may be helpful to narrow the salary gap between foreign and Saudi workers 
(International Monetary Fund, 2016). Applying increased visa fees led to a massive 
departure of foreigners. Yet, the labor market did not absorb the surplus of Saudi 
workforce by replacing the foreign labor force exiting the market, and the unemployment 
rate among Saudis rose from 11.6 per cent in 2016 to 12.7 per cent in 2018 (SAMA, 
2019). 
1.4 Reform movement towards privatisation within MoH hospitals in KSA 
The KSA is a welfare state, in which its government is obliged to offer free HC 
services to all Saudis (Article 31 of the Saudi constitution), and the state is committed to 
a ‘Health for All (HFA)’ goal. The Saudi government aims to provide free medical care 
for all citizens, expatriates, and pilgrims (Al Otaibi, 2017). 
Prior to the discovery of oil, Saudi society was traditional, isolated, and relatively 
poor. At that time, there was no regulated HC system, based for the most part on 
traditional practices and medicines. In 1926, the KSA under King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud 
declared the establishment of a ‘Health Department’ (Mufti, 2000). This declaration 
denoted a milestone in the development of the KSA, arguably the beginning of the 
modernisation and emergence of an organised HC system. The complete transformation 






of the KSA’s health sector, in the real sense of the word, started in 1954, with the 
establishment of the MoH (Al-Mazrou, et al., 1995), which is responsible for supervision 
of all HC facilities, in the public and private sectors.  
Before 1979 all public hospitals followed what could be described as a ‘Self-
Operating System’ in which all hospitals in the KSA were totally run and managed by the 
MoH. The responsibility and authority for the operating, managing, and hiring of hospital 
staff were under the control of the Civil Service. From 2000 to date, a rather different 
operating model applies, known as the ‘New Public Self-Operating System’, involving a 
lower degree of corporatisation by giving a bigger role to the MoH again. Corporatisation 
is similar to privatisation in all its features, with one notable exception that in 
corporatisation, assets remain state-owned (Klien, 2012). It is argued that corporatisation 
represents movement towards privatisation, and that much of the theoretical and empirical 
research on privatisation is to some extent relevant to the KSA HC sector. To understand 
how this change in the degree of corporatisation emerged, it is worth looking at reforms 
undertaken by the MoH, 1979-2014.   
In 1978, the concept of primary HC was adopted as a means to achieve the HFA 
goal (Al-Ateeq, 2002) followed by Ministerial Resolution No. 50/1459/257 (issued in 
1980). The Saudi government’s strategy within the 2nd National Development Plan 
(Ministry of Planning, 1975) was to increase the private sector’s opportunities to manage, 
operate, and maintain projects within a free market framework.  
By 1979, a number of factors had led to the transformation from the ‘Self-Operating 
System’ to the ‘Corporate Operating System’ based on the participation of the private 
sector in operating the public hospitals. Five new large and modern high-tech hospitals in 
Jeddah, Jizan, Hofuf, Madinah, and Al Khobar were created to support this strategy. This 
transitional phase was based on the success of an earlier corporatisation experiment run 






by the Ministry of Defence and Aviation to operate a number of military hospitals 
affiliated with it (Al-Ateeq, 2002).  
 Unfortunately, qualified human resources capable of managing and operating these 
new facilities were not available within the current staff. This challenge with the desire 
to increase private sector opportunities led to the gradual shift from the ‘Self-Operating 
System’ phase to a ‘Comprehensive Operating System’ phase, in which total 
responsibility (but not ownership) was handed over to a single private company (i.e., 
fuller corporatisation, seen as a step towards privatisation. However, the move from the 
original Self-Operating System phase to the Comprehensive Operating System was not 
instantaneous.  
According to (Al-Ateeq, 2002), the transition to the Comprehensive Operating 
System can be divided into three transitional phases moving towards full corporatisation, 
and away from the original Ministry-based model, namely:  
(i) Bilateral cooperation agreements phase (1979 – 1982). involved prominent 
cooperation between the KSA and Chinese, Danish, and German governments in some 
hospitals, to import the qualified human resources.  
(ii) Partial Operating System phase (1983 – 1987). whereby the MoH contracted 
out non-medical operations (e.g., catering and maintenance) and some medical aspects to 
specialised operating companies (usually from Western Europe and North America) 
under multiple contracts.  
(iii) Comprehensive Operating System phase. involved two overlapping stages. 
a. Stage 1 - In 1988 the first stage started which called the Comprehensive 
Operating System, where corporatisation began, assigning some medical, and all non-
medical, operations to one company, to mitigate the challenges of managing multiple 






contracts. This involved the MoH running the hospital in partnership with a private 
company. 
b. Stage 2 - In 1990 the second stage started, the Full Operating System, which 
involved the transfer of the management and operation of all medical and non-medical 
operations to a single company under a ‘formal contract’, with the MoH taking a 
supervisory role only.  
For the purpose of this study, and largely because of the essential overlaps in the 
regimes (Appendix 1.C and 1.D), Stages 1 and 2 are considered under a single phase 
called the ‘Comprehensive Operating System’ phase implemented during the period 1988 
– 1999.   
(iv) New Public Self-Operating System (2000 – 2014). known elsewhere as the 
‘Self- operating system via programs’ (Al-Ateeq, 2002). This phase came into force as a 
result of a governmental policy change in the 6th Development Plan (Ministry of Economy 
and Planning, 1995) that might be related to the increasing in the oil prices (see section 
1.6). Under this phase, the MoH (again) took greater responsibility for the operation and 
management of local hospitals, in addition to responsibility for the employment of 
professional technical staff (e.g.,doctors, nurses, technicians, and the appropriate 
administrative staff), and supervising all other work (e.g., nutrition, hygiene, and 
maintenance of medical equipment) assigned to specialised contractors in those areas. 
It is under this New Public Self-Operating System model that the MoH still operates 
today. The implementation of Council of Ministers Resolution No. 72 of 2007 provides 
expansion of partnership contracts between the public sector and the private sector for 
implementing infrastructure projects and improving socioeconomic and environmental 
development through a productive partnership and investments between the national and 
foreign private sectors and the public sector (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2010). 






In 2009, to improve management practices and the quality of service further, the 
MoH issued new regulations for self-operating public hospitals, giving hospitals more 
autonomy to help with the transition towards the privatisation of public hospitals 
(Almalki, et al., 2011). Within the MoH a ‘self-employment programme’ (Ministry of 
Health, 2013) was introduced to create a new mode of employment (for national and 
international) resources through ‘self-employment contracts’, although HC employees 
were also considered to be government servants under the MoH (Khadr, 2014). To some 
extent, this new structure may have cancelled out perceived ‘agency problems’ in the 
system by reducing the role of the Civil Service in the process of hiring staff. Khadr also 
notes that, ‘self- implementation’ is a programme that is running the MoH hospitals 
programmes’ independent budget, and based on the principle of financial flexibility and 
attracting qualified personnel to provide health services to all patients. There are now 
approximately 48,000 personnel employed under this programme across 90 MoH public 
hospitals. What is also of note is the publication of the national strategy for HC in 2009, 
implemented by the MoH in cooperation with other HC providers and supervised by 'The 
Council of Health Services' with 20-year timeframe. 
Moving on, Almasabi (2013) notes the introduction of Quality Initiatives in the 
KSA in 2003, with the creation of an accredited body in 2006 - The Central Board of 
Accreditation for the HC Institute (CBAHI). These initiatives and the independent body 
were a response to the General Directorate of Quality Assurance which was created in 
2000 within the MoH (Minister Memo No. 1523/11 of July 1 2000). CBAHI goals support 
HC institutions toward continuous improvements in the quality of health services, 
resulting in better patient outcomes and satisfaction. The Hospitals Accreditation 
Programme, with the first edition of the National Hospital Standards released in 2006, 
relates directly to the infrastructure components that must be available in any hospital to 






ensure quality HC delivery. There is also a Certification Programme for HC Operation 
and Management Firms, which has specific standards to regulate the work inside such 
companies (with respect to proper financial, administrative and human resource systems) 
(CBAHI, 2015).  
Table 1.1 summarises changes in modes of management and operational 
responsibility in the MoH’s Hospitals, 1979 – 2014, based on firstly, a “Conceptual 
Framework for the Organizational Reform of Hospitals” proposed by Harding and Preker 
(2003) for the World Bank, where the components of the different reform phases are 
identified, including the allocation of decision rights, distribution of residual claimant, 
degree of market exposure and accountability, which will be explained in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
Secondly, the summary in Table 1.1 is based on slightly modified concepts of the 
reform phases from Al-Ateeq (2002), where the four phases of HC reform in KSA are 
examples of different stages of corporatisation, not privatisation. Although there has been 
no transfer of HC ownership in the KSA from the public to the private sector, 
corporatisation and privatisation are otherwise the same. Preker and Harding (2003, p.55) 
emphasise that, “In practice, when a hospital is corporatised, it is often established as a 
private corporation, though still publicly owned.” 
Figure 1.1 goes deeper into explaining the identified reform phases and their coding 
by combining the World Bank’s components of reform with a slightly modified version 
of the phases of corporatisation reform identified by Al-Ateeq (2002), taking account of 
minor variations in the description of phases explained below.  





Table 1.1 - Changes in Operation and Administration of Hospitals by Phases 






Figure 1 1.1 - Relative movements of KSA phases towards privatisation





In Table 1.1, the horizontal rows comprise the World Bank’s ‘Components of 
Organisational Reform’ (Harding and Preker, 2003, pp.44-45). With little autonomy over 
the operation of the Bilateral cooperation agreements phase in KSA, the first column 
represents ‘Baseline Budgetary Organizations’ as public hospitals run as government 
department. This follows Harding and Preker (2003, p.52) who suggest, “Let us begin 
with a budgetary unit such as a hospital run as a government department, where the 
hospital manager is essentially an administrator. The government’s hierarchy of officials 
and rules controls all strategic issues and determines most day-to-day decisions related to 
production and delivery of services—from staff mix, staff size, and salaries to services 
offered, technology used, and accounting and financial management methods.  
Usually, the government determines the hospital’s revenue through a direct budget 
allocation, based on historical norms. Other revenues are controlled as well, since the 
government also controls services rendered, patients served, and permissible copayments. 
Any “excess revenues” belong to the public sector—and must either be returned to a 
superior agency or spent as directed. Any “excess losses” are covered by the public purse. 
In this sense, the public sector is the residual claimant of the hospital operating as a 
budgetary unit”.  
From the World Bank’s analysis of reform components leading through 
corporatisation towards privatisation (Harding and Preker, 2003), the KSA’s different 
‘reform modalities’ (or phases) (Harding and Preker, 2003, p.52) are coded as they move 
away from the Baseline ‘Budgetary Organization’ (coded zero) through corporatisation 
towards privatisation. The single World Bank phase ‘Corporatized Organization’ is too 
broad for application to HC reforms in KSA. Consequently, we split this stage into three 
phases developed from Al-Ateeq (2002), namely the Partial Operating System (1983-
1987) coded 1, the Comprehensive Operating System (1988-1999), coded 2, and New 





Public Self-Operating System (2000-2014), coded 1, as shown in Figure 1.1. Apart from 
the uncontroversial coding of the baseline structure as ‘zero’, the other codes do involve 
a degree of judgement but are designed to indicate the broad degree of movement in 
patterns of reform over time. These judgements are explained by reference to the ellipses 
in Figure 1.1.   
For example, the World Bank phase ‘Autonomized Organization’ is identified in 
KSA as the Partial Operating System phase (1983-1987), coded 1, as movement towards 
full corporatisation and ultimately privatisation. The identification of this Partial 
Operating System in Figure 1.1 as the first phase for corporatisation is based on the 
coloured ellipses in that Figure, i.e., the ‘centre of gravity’ (or ‘balance’) of the four 
orange-coloured shapes corresponding to the four World Bank reform components that 
represent the Partial Operating System can be seen to lie slightly in favour of the central 
column, i.e., the first phase of corporatisation coded 1.   
From Figure 1.1, the Comprehensive Operating System phase involves a similar 
judgment involving ‘balance’ since three of its components (represented by the turquoise 
ellipses) lie in the right-hand corporatisation column coded 2. This phase is therefore 
judged to have achieved the greatest movement towards privatisation, being the most 
corporatised of the four KSA phases: it has greater autonomy over key decisions 
(management, operation, recruitment, and supervision) and it also has higher degree of 
market exposure, whereby the MoH contracted out all non-medical and medical 
operations to one single company under formal contract. In addition, the residual claimant 
in this phase is a private company. However, this phase is still accountable to the MoH, 
though it has less accountability compared to the New Public Self-Operating System.  
Subsequently, the New Public Self-Operating System (2000-2014) is judged to 
represent a policy reverse, a change of direction away from movement towards 





privatisation, diluting corporatisation in the sense that the MoH and their managers took 
over operational control and the MoH again became the residual claimant. It can be seen 
from the blue shapes in Figure 1.1 that this new reform phase closely resembled the earlier 
Partial Operating System phase (1983-1987), and is therefore not represented as a 
separate column in Figure 1.1. To emphasise this reversion to an earlier stage, the New 
Public Self-Operating System (2000-2014) is also coded 1, therefore, broadly equivalent 
to the earlier Partial Operating System phase.  
The final World Bank phase of reform is shown as ‘Privatised Organization’, 
involving the private ownership of all assets. This phase that has not been achieved in 
KSA and is therefore omitted from Table 1.1 and included in Figure 1.1 only as a 
‘memorandum item’ in the right-hand, shaded column.  
It should be noted that one of the key challenges in defining the different 
corporatisation stages in terms of phasing, and modes of management and operation of 
the hospitals that support this movement towards privatisation, has been the lack of a 
standard terminology across primary and secondary sources literature and articles. For 
example, in some cases these corporatisation movements, and associated actions, are also 
known as a ‘company operating system’ or ‘contractual operating system’ (Al-Ateeq, 
2002). Yet in all cases these various changes in corporatisation (however named) have 
taken many discrete forms depending on the degree of integration and collaboration 
between the parties involved.  
This period 1979-1999 with different corporatisation phases arguably led to major 
benefits introduced in the KSA health system (Al-Ateeq, 2002). These included the 
introduction of modern strategies in the field of management, enhanced operation and 
maintenance of hospitals by importing the qualified human resources in various fields, 
reduction of the administrative burden on the government sector and the MoH’s focus on 





a supervisory role (Al-Ateeq, 2002). Due to some obstacles, there were also outcomes 
which were not as successful as initially expected. These obstacles included the absence 
of specialists in the accurate identification and drafting of contracts. In addition to the 
weakness of technical control over these contracts, there was a lack of qualified 
companies bidding for the MoH’s tenders compared to other government sectors that 
provide health services for their employees such as the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. 
This could be considered due to the lack of funds for operation, and the intervention in 
the responsibilities of operating companies by some specialists in other government 
agencies, as mentioned in 1.3.1 (vi). 
Al-Ateeq (2002) considers two rationales for the move back to HC operation by the 
MoH. Firstly, he suggests that the need for corporatisation had actually disappeared 
because of the lessons learned from the previous experiments and phases. Secondly, new 
strategic priorities emerged, including the ‘Saudisation’ (a vernacular term for increasing 
the percentage of nationals employed within government bodies in specialised positions) 
of the workforce, which had been poorly represented under the Comprehensive Operating 
System phase. Al-Ateeq (2002) also notes the weaknesses in the implementation of 
previous contractual frameworks. 
At a national level, the current government is also looking to the future with the 
most recent Vision 2030 including a privatisation strategy to move to the formation of 
government- led private companies to introduce corporatisation (CEDA, 2018). 
To conclude this section, with the current KSA development plan and MoH 
strategy, together with previous experiences with different corporatisation reforms, there 
is still some support evident for movement towards privatisation to achieve efficiency, 
effective outcomes, and quality improvements throughout the KSA HC system.  





Nevertheless, despite the results of the previous efforts and the continued strategic 
intent at a national level to privatise, the share of the private sector in the provision of HC 
services is insignificant when compared with the public sector. According to Adams, et 
al. (2006), investing in public–private partnerships (PPPs) may also improve efficiency 
and effectiveness in the public sector, where he stated that “the private sector is better 
able to provide services to a higher level of efficiency and effectiveness than the public 
sector which is typically hindered by its bureaucratic, mechanistic and politicised method 
of operation” (Adams, et al., 2006, p.385). In addition, movement towards the 
privatisation of HC facilities arguably may improve performance and operating margins, 
reducing bureaucracy, and decreasing inpatients’ lengths of stay (Villa and Kane, 2013). 
In contrast, studies show that moves towards the privatisation of HC may conceivably 
also increase some costs and concurrently increase inequalities in access to HC of low-
income citizens (Basu, et al., 2012). 
1.5 Chapter Summary 
To summarise the main points of this chapter, it can be observed that the 
environmental landscape of the KSA is unique, with many local characteristics. Although 
there has been major population and economic growth within the country over the years, 
the variations in population size due to religious tourism is a factor that must be 
considered at a localised level when determining hospital performance requirements and 
may affect the efficiencies, effectiveness and quality aspects of inputs, output and 
outcomes.  
The underlying structure of the KSA has remained relatively stable and true to its 
cultural and ideological beliefs, with patronage based on social and family networks still 
embraced by society as a whole. This social context interacts with a complex and 
somewhat bureaucratic institutional framework, supported by inter-relations between 





legislative and judicial controls, which are unique to the KSA. These social and 
institutional factors are considered by some to interfere with the ability to carry out 
business effectively in the KSA (The Economist, 2009) and may have a particular 
relevance to hospital corporatisation efficiencies and performance (see section 1.4).  
The economic strategy is currently formed and directed from a centralised function 
and embedded within the KSA’s National Development Plans. Although there is a desire 
to localise control, this change is progressing slowly. A number of different 
corporatisation experiments towards privatisation (defined in terms of management and 
operations of the hospitals), gradually increased from less to more corporatisation, and 
then returned to a lower level of corporatisation in the final phase. It could be assumed 
that if an ideal corporatisation model had been identified for HC services, then this would 
have become the de facto ‘solution’. Yet this does not seem to be the case in Table 1.1, 
which shows the variety of governance changes across different operating 
responsibilities.  
To repeat the first paragraph of this thesis, the purpose of this study is to analyse 
whether movement towards privatisation (through various phases of corporatisation) has 
been associated with an improvement in the performance of MoH’s hospitals, an 
investigation that may provide the framework for a subsequent analysis of any efforts of 
the KSA to go beyond corporatisation to privatisation. Corporatisation is an intermediate 
phase of movement towards privatisation, sharing all of the characteristics of privatisation 
apart from private ownership. It is therefore argued that the theoretical and empirical 
literatures on the effectiveness (or otherwise) of privatisation are relevant to the research 
questions posed below.  





Current governmental strategies (Vision 2030) (again) involve the adoption of a 
more corporatised model of hospital operation, and this leads us to the following research 
questions:  
RQ1 - Have different forms of corporatisation generated the gains that may be 
associated with the movement of reforms towards privatisation? 
RQ2 - Have HC quality considerations (or effectiveness) modified conclusions 
relating to the efficiency of different HC governance systems? 
The next chapter, (Chapter 2) will contain a review of the existing literature, 
paradigms and theories that provide a variety of perspectives that could be applied to 
MoH hospital movement towards privatisations over the period under consideration 
1979-2014, taking into account the aforementioned KSA environmental context and the 
MoH’s governance structures. Chapter 3 will then present a conceptual framework, 
clarifying the key stages and processes of a corporatisation/privatisation strategy, from 
initial motivations to assessing the performance of the entity. Chapter 4 will present the 
methodology employed in this study, and Chapter 5 will show the results from the 
different econometric approaches to efficiency measurement, outlined in Chapter 4. 
Finally, Chapter 6 will comprise a discussion and interpretation of results within the 
context of the theoretical and empirical literature, and contributes to the conclusions and 











CHAPTER 2   
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporatisation and privatisation are imprecise concepts that have a variety of 
subtle interpretations, depending on the ideological ‘lens’ that is used. A basic Internet 
search provides thousands of academic and practitioners papers, articles and books on the 
subject, each with a specific orientation depending on the political, social, and economic 
context within which the topic is considered. This ambiguity affects the theories, forms, 
implementation approach, motivations, measurable effects, and outcomes that have 
emerged in relation to various privatisations across the developed and developing world. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to review, examine and contextualise both the 
theory and empirical studies on corporatisation/privatisation which may provide the 
framework for a subsequent analysis of the efforts by the KSA to move hospitals towards 
privatisation (see sections 1.1 and 1.5). However, the purpose of this study is to analyse 
whether movement towards privatisation (through various phases of corporatisation) has 
been associated with an improvement in the performance of MoH’s hospitals. 
The first section outlines the concepts of efficiency, corporatisation and 
privatisation used within the context of this study. Section 2 of this Literature Review 
takes a theoretical approach to consider the objectives and rationales of corporatisation, 
partial and full privatisation from political, consumer/social and economic perspectives.  
Section 3 considers the different dimensions of hospital performance, followed by Section 
4 which moves on to examine previous empirical research on the corporatisation and 
privatisation of entities, including meta-analyses and regional/country studies, finishing 
with a particular focus on HC sector studies. Finally, to conclude this chapter, a summary 





of the main points identified is provided, together with the identification of research gaps 
and a re-statement of the research questions of the thesis. 
2.2 Defining efficiency 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm proposes that industry 
concentration facilitates collusion, i.e., firms in concentrated industries will use restrictive 
conduct and generate higher returns than those operating in less concentrated industries, 
regardless of their efficiency. If follows that prices may come closer to marginal cost if 
concentration decreases (Boru and Kuhil, 2018). In contrast, the Efficiency hypothesis 
developed by Demsetz (1973) and supported by Peltzman (1977) predicts that higher 
profits may not arise because of collusive activities and monopolistic returns, as the 
traditional SCP paradigm would suggest. The Efficiency hypothesis predicts that under 
the pressure of market competition, efficient firms (with low cost structures, superior 
management or capabilities, production technologies etc.) win the competitive battle, 
develop, grow, achieve greater market shares, and therefore earn higher profits. On this 
Efficiency view, firms have two paths to higher profits: either keeping price low and 
reducing firm size, or by decreasing price and expanding firm size, Consequently, higher 
profits are created by large firms as a result of their superior efficiency (Boru and Kuhil, 
2018). It could be argued that SCP implies breaking up monopolies (including state 
monopolies, i.e., privatisation). 
 As noted by (Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987), it is assumed that 
many factors may affect competitive behaviour, e.g., entry or exit barriers and the general 
contestability of the market (which may be a competitive threat, even in highly 
concentrated industries). The threat of potential new entrants can force the larger firms to 
price their products in a competitively, see 2.4.4 below.  





From the above it is clear that there may be some link between concentration, 
competition, and efficiency, therefore, economic efficiency will be defined and explained 
in the next section.  
2.2.1 Defining economic efficiency 
In economic terms, based on the seminal work of Farrell (1957), Productive 
Efficiency (PE) is a measure of how well inputs are converted into outputs in physical 
terms (Productivity Commission, 2013). It is at its maximum, (i.e., an economy or 
industry is on its efficiency frontier) where points on the frontier represent marginal rates 
of transformation. In Figure 2.1 below, an improvement in PE can be achieved as the 
firm’s production possibilities move from A to B or C or D on the Production Possibilities 
Frontier (PPF) (Productivity Commission, 2013).  
In empirical studies, it is difficult to separate PE from allocative efficiency (AE). 
AE refers to the ability of the firm to convert the value of inputs (i.e., scarce resources) 
into the value of outputs, which is one measure of utility to buyers. AE requires that firms 
should produce goods and services that are most in demand (mix and quality), at the 
lowest possible cost, subject to constraints. As shown in Figure 2.1 below, the move from 
B to C reflects the improvement in AE. In other words, AE is achieved when marginal 
cost is equal to the price (marginal benefits), where social surplus is assumed to be 
maximised. 
 These two measures (PE and AE) combined provide a measure of (overall) static 
efficiency, which relates to the combination of resources at a given point in time 
comprising both the PE position on the PPF, and AE choice of point on that 
PPF. Dynamic efficiency refers to “the extent to which resources can be used to produce 
more output over time and the extent to which production can be altered quickly and at 
low cost in response to changes in economic circumstances” (Productivity Commission, 





1999, p.13). As shown in Figure 2.1, dynamic efficiency presents an outward shift of the 
original PPF, as technologies and production change over time to meet the current and 








Figure 2.1- Production Possibility Frontier (Productivity Commission, 2013) 
2.2.2 Defining efficiency in a HC setting 
Defining efficiency in HC terms and aligning to hospital performance, within the 
context of HC delivery, is considered problematic (Burgess, 2012) where economic 
efficiency may not be the predominant driver for clinical resources and the distinct 
features of the HC industry (Hollingsworth, et al., 1998). Furthermore, Hollingsworth, et 
al. (1998) emphasise the need to use appropriate and well-defined models, use appropriate 
inputs and outputs, and use accurate data in order to achieve accuracy of performance 
measurement. Whilst the traditional economic definitions of efficiencies noted above 
provide a reasonably comprehensive lens through which to view the association between 
inputs and outputs for most organisations, the other challenge in HC is understanding the 
importance of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of care as HC outcomes (ISO 9000, 
2015).  
Palmer and Torgerson (1999) provide a HC-orientated definition of economic 
efficiency which suggests that PE (in a HC setting) refers to the physical relation between 





resources (inputs), interventions (which could be described as clinical procedures, tests or 
protocols), and health outcomes, where an intervention is deemed technically inefficient 
if the same physical outcome can be achieved with less physical input, thus ‘using 
resources to maximum advantage’. Alternative approaches to efficiency measurement 
would put valuations on inputs and outputs, i.e., they would consider the value of health 
outcomes for a given cost, or costs for a given value of outcome. However, this approach 
would conflate PE and AE. It is explained at 4.4 (i) below that these two approaches 
(physical vs price-based measures of efficiency) have been the subject of a longstanding 
debate (e.g., Jacobs, 2000; Ozcan, 1992). 
This study relying entirely on physical in a HC setting, without prices on inputs and 
outputs, follows many precedents, e.g., Cherchye, et al. (2010) and Russell (1984).  
The next sub-section considers this concept of efficiency (PE) in relation to 
governance reforms. 
2.3 Governance Reforms- Overview 
Theoretically, and from the perspective of practical implementations, market-
oriented governance reforms can take three main forms, namely, corporatisation, partial 
privatisation, and full privatisation. Understanding these different types of reform is 
important because the implementation strategy employed by the government may affect 
the outcomes. This is largely because the incentive effects may vary according the 
governance reform. 
        The three main forms of market-based governance reform are dominated by the 
experience of countries with privatisation from 1980 through to 1990s across the world 
(Armstrong, et al., 1997). Moreover, the different forms of privatisation are distinguished 
by the level of ownership (from zero to 100 per cent) transferred to the private sector, and 





whether management of the firm is also transferred to the private sector. Figure 2.2 (based 
on Armstrong, et al., 1997; Investopedia, 2019) below describes the three main forms of 
market-related governance reform. 
 
Figure 2.2 - Forms of Market-Related Governance Reform 
 
2.3.1 Corporatisation  
A corporatisation strategy is intended to address a number of HC outcomes (for 
example, improving performance through more PE, AE and dynamic efficiency where 
corporatisation is defined as a movement towards full or partial privatisation (Harding 
and Preker, 2000). This movement towards privatisation can comprise a number of key 
components (Harding and Preker, 2000), as shown in Figure 2.3 (based on Preker and 
Harding, 2003) below. According to Preker and Harding, (2003), corporatisation may 
increase efficiency (PE and AE) through market exposure by ensuring greater 
accountability to the governing body, supervisory boards, and/or stakeholders/patients. 
This may be achieved (Preker and Harding, 2003) through enhanced quality management, 
in addition to allocating decision rights (autonomy) and distribution of residual claims to 
a local hospital level (see section 1.4).  
Separation of ownership and management. The government retains 
full ownership shareholding but transfers management of the firm 
to the private sector.
Corporatisation
The government transfers a minority ownership shareholding (less 
than 50%) to the private sector and retains management of the firm. Partial Privatisation
The government transfers all or majority of ownership shareholding 
(at least 50%) and management to the private sector.
Full Privatisation






Figure 2.3 - Analytic framework for corporatisation 
 
To increase the level of autonomy, in some cases hospitals have been turned into 
public corporations but are not privately owned listed entities. Evans (2006) proposed 
that health service delivery could be more efficient if some of the logic of the marketplace 
is introduced, whilst still recognising that the public health framework has many attractive 
characteristics that should be retained. In this case, corporatisation (contracting) is a 
mechanism that formalises the relationships and obligations between the different actors 
(or to more clearly, between government and private sector (Evans, 2006, p.850; Preker 
and Harding, 2003, pp.7-8)) in a HC system, though it clearly may not be limited to 
medical practices. Evans (2006, p.850) also suggests that many people see contracting as 
a tool to be used primarily for the management of non-medical services in the HC system, 
for example, services such as cleaning or food catering in hospitals, or even overall 
management. However, its potential uses may be much broader. For example, it has been 
used to encourage private providers to participate in the treatment of tuberculosis. The 
overall aim of the corporatisation reform is to improve health system performance by 
clearly specifying the obligations and expectations of the different actors in the health 
system.  





However, Vaithianathan (1999) criticises a number of studies finding less 
successful corporatisations because much of their analysis is ethnographic, based on 
assumption and ideology rather than empirical results, and suggests that this is due mainly 
to misalignment between the autonomy, operational authority, and desire to achieve 
excellence in quality of care held by clinical resources irrespective of cost, as opposed to 
the management objectives held by budget holders, corporate management and 
government to achieve economic efficiencies within the hospital system. These two 
opposing arguments (i.e., Evans, 2006 versus Vaithianathan, 1999) for HC reform 
through corporatisation are examined by Wagstaff and Bales (2012) and Braithwaite, et 
al. (2011) with both studies concluding that the arguments to promote either position are 
predominately ideological, rather than evidence-based. However, Wagstaff and Bales 
(2012) further conclude that for corporatisation framework to achieve the benefits 
proposed the main components (i.e., decision rights, residual claims, market exposure and 
accountability) have to be ‘mutually coherent’, suggesting that it is not enough to focus 
on efficiency alone.   
As shown in Figure 2.2, corporatisation as an implementation strategy involves the 
separation (Fama and Jensen, 1983) of the ownership of the firm from the management. 
Specifically, in corporatisation, the government transfers only the management of the firm 
to the private sector, whilst it retains all ownership (Shirley, 1999), though corporatisation 
can be used to precede partial or full privatisation.  
Corporatisation may be seen as a necessary first step towards privatisation in the 
presence of the complexities or constraints involved in full privatisation, and may provide 
an option when the government wants to remove the effects of political interference or 
bureaucracies on how firms are managed, which could affect firm performance.  





Corporatisation can take the form of management contracts, where a private firm is 
contracted to manage a public firm. In terms of incentive effects, however, managerial 
incentives are likely to be limited with corporatisation. According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) as cited in Klien (2012, p.2), the consequences of corporatisation are related to the 
extent of political interference under different governance structures. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) predict that moving control rights to the managers instead of politicians may 
decrease political influence even if the economic incentives do not change.  
In relation to corporatisation, Braithwaite, et al. (2011) identify five arguments for 
this movement away from a government owned and operated hospital sector: the 
introduction of competition to improve efficiency, quality and consumer choice; more 
autonomy for hospital managers; enhanced reward system for hospitals to perform well; 
reduced government bureaucracy; and greater service choice for the public. 
However, in contrast, under corporatisation, managers make decisions about assets 
they do not own, which can lead to various forms of moral hazard. The success of 
corporatisation may be dependent on the maturity of the market place. In developing 
countries, it can be shown that any form of corporatisation may not increase performance 
(Olajide, 2005), while in more mature markets there may be different issues to contend 
with. For example, in the US, where the HC market is highly competitive, there is a risk 
that resources may be orientated towards market priorities, rather than patient HC 
(Wynne, 2004). Wynne further notes concerns in relation to cutting back on staff to 
maximise profit, allegations of fraud and medical malpractice due to corporate 
imperatives, highlighting one of the key dilemmas facing the HC industry in terms of the 
tension between serving the patient’s wellbeing and the satisfaction of stakeholders and 
the corporation. These types of behaviour within the HC industry are also noted by Rama, 





Edwards, Dalton and Green (2010) who highlight the potentially damaging consequences 
of the decentralisation of decision-making and residual claims to the local level. 
2.3.2 Partial privatisation 
Partial privatisation is another stage of governance reform. It involves the transfer 
of a minority of ownership (less than 50 per cent) to the private sector, whilst the 
government retains the majority, and management.  
A key issue in partial privatisation is the level of share ownership to be transferred 
to the private sector, which influences whether a partially privatised entity and its 
managers behave as a fully privatised entity without political intervention. Clarke, et al. 
(2005) argue that privatisation should not be done partially. Governments holding 
majority shares in SOEs may result in those firms performing poorly by conventional 
accounting measures. In addition, Jiang and Yao (2011) have argued against partial 
privatisation and government interference which might prohibit and delay the success of 
reforms.  
On the other hand, partial privatisation may be undertaken in order to raise financial 
resources from the capital market to improve the operations of the firm (or sector) and at 
a microeconomic level, privatisation has been considered to have “positive effects on 
profitability and efficiency” (Sheshinski and López-Calva, 2003, p.440).   
The relationship between public sector financial health, the volatility of country’s 
GDP and total instability tend to act as drivers towards partial privatisation (Sheshinski 
and López-Calva, 2003). Nevertheless, when taking a wider macroeconomic view, the 
impact of external factors, for example changes in taxation, trading agreements, and 
globalisation efforts cloud the evidence available to totally isolate the benefits of partial 
privatisations. However, at a microeconomic level, Sheshinkski and López-Calva (2003, 
p.450) suggest “that publicly owned enterprises in competitive environments would not 





perform better than privately owned companies in the same circumstances in terms of 
profitability, and may perform worse.” 
2.3.3 Full privatisation 
In contrast to partial privatisation, full privatisation encompasses a complete 
transfer of both ownership and management from the government to the private sector. In 
general, there are four objectives of privatisation programmes (Sheshinki and López-
Calva, 2003) being the achievement of higher AE and PE, strengthening the role of the 
private sector, improvements in the public sector’s financial health, and reallocation of 
resources. Criticisms of privatisation (e.g., Wynne, 2004; Rama, et al., 2010) usually 
consider the social impact and expense to the welfare of individuals through the burden 
of any increased costs, and the reduced demand for labour.  
Whilst it should be noted that, to some extent, the incentive effects of ownership 
vary according to the level of private ownership shareholding, any reform short of full 
privatisation may induce moral hazard problems. There is an asymmetry of information 
between controllers and operators (Holmstrom, 1979, p.74), e.g., less than 50 per cent of 
cost savings may be enjoyed by part-owners, so there is less incentive to cut costs. If a 
private entity does not wholly own the assets, private incentives are constrained, 
particularly relating to maximising profit, perhaps at the expense of business practices 
such as investment programmes, or building maintenance and hiring decisions.   
In contrast, full privatisation may also lead to costs, e.g., a reduction in economies 
of scale (see section 2.4.4 and 6.2.2 (iv) below). Furthermore, full privatisation may 
introduce elements of monopoly or oligopoly with weak competition, depending on the 
market structure of the industry in which the firm operates. In such a case, the government 
may need to also regulate the industry. 





Moving on from this overview, Section 2.3 considers the theoretical objectives and 
rationales of privatisation as governance reform, followed by Section 2.4 which considers 
privatisation challenges and outcomes in more detail. While partial or full privatisation 
has not featured as governance reform in the HC sector on KSA, it is argued that 
corporatisation does share most of the features of privatisation, excluding private 
ownership. Therefore, a review of the privatisation literature is argued to be relevant. This 
will lead to the working hypothesis that “private ownership is more effective” (Anuatti-
Neto, et al., 2003, p.4). In practice, Shirley (1999, p.115) reports that, “privatization and 
corporatization have similar political costs and tend to succeed or fail together.” 
2.4 Theories – Objectives and rationales of privatisation 
2.4.1 The ‘firm’ in context 
As noted above, corporatisation can be considered as the preparatory or transitional 
stages prior to partial or full privatisation, and there are a number of theories that lay out 
the rationale behind movements towards privatisation. Firstly, certain theories that 
examine the significance and motivations for achieving a desired objective or outcome of 
a firm are considered. Rational organisation theory sees the organisation as a device for 
achieving a particular goal or set of goals (Thompson, 1966). A rational organisation uses 
a formal structure to define the role of each member. In a business where roles and goals 
are clearly defined, the process of management should be rational and predictable. 
Rational systems primarily address the economics of cost management through market 
forces and pricing mechanisms.  
As opposed to this rational view, natural systems theories (McFarland and Gómez, 
2014) suggest that it is the unplanned, emerging relations and coalitions which matter, 
and the informal structure of relations that develops among participants is more influential 





in guiding behaviours and outcomes than the formal structure’s role, declared 
expectations and guiding principles. 
These two opposing views can be related back to Coase’s (1937) seminal work on 
‘the nature of the firm’ which provides a distinction between governmental organisations 
(which could be driven by rational approaches and polices) and those of private 
enterprises, suggesting that a firm consists of the system of relationships which comes 
into existence as and when the direction of resources is dependent on the entrepreneurial 
nature of man. 
More recent theories introduce the concept of open systems. Here the focus is 
extended into the environment and how this influences firm behaviour and survival with 
organisations perceived as “nodes of interdependent flows and activities linking shifting 
coalitions, and networks of participants, embedded in wider material-resource and 
institutional environments” (McFarland and Gómez, 2014, p.13). The focus within an 
open system analysis is more on the external environment than any other organisational 
feature.  
Organisations and their relationship models are also influenced by the surrounding 
environment. With the advent of globalisation and advanced technologies of 
communication, the context within which firms and governments operate today is 
fundamentally different than that of previous eras. Yet it is practically impossible for 
organisations not to be affected by historical factors that may still be reflected within the 
current practices (Daft, 2012). For example, at times of recession, the way firms operate 
may be different than in times of economic boom. Firms also experience regional 
differences which are related to different cultural, ideological and political contexts that 
can also change over time.  





It could be stated that both the quantitative and qualitative inputs and outputs will 
ultimately decide the long-term stability of the organisation. Yet in the context of 
privatisation, in addition to management issues, the role of politics cannot be seen 
separately. Political factors (both internal and external to the firm), may have a dominant 
role in the day-to-day operations, governance, credibility and administrative processes of 
an organisation.  
2.4.2 Political perspectives 
The concept of privatisation as a process involving governance reform emerged 
from Ancient Greece where private individuals handled all the major works of the 
government and has, in more modern times, become a global phenomenon. There is a 
perception that the main benefits of privatisation could be to decrease financial burdens 
on the government, minimising the role of the bureaucracies, cost cutting, political and 
various other domestic and global causes. The idea that private ownership is more 
efficient than public ownership, promoting better public sector financial health, is not 
new. Adam Smith (1776) wrote: “When the crown lands had become private property, 
they would, in the course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated” as 
cited in Sheshinski and López-Calva (2003, p.432). This section will now examine 
whether particular political influences may have played a significant role in promoting 
this view.  
Looking through a political lens, Starr (1988) proposes that the act of privatisation 
is directly related to neoliberal philosophies and concepts, aimed not simply at returning 
services to the private sector, but also at creating new kinds of market relations, with 
results hopefully comparable or superior to traditional public programmes.  
Drucker’s (1973) perspective on privatisation suggests that as a systematic policy it 
did not gain political ground until the late 1970s onwards. Drucker’s perspective 





suggested that nongovernmental organisations were more suited to the delivery most of 
products and services, and this was implemented firstly in the United Kingdom (UK). 
However, this historical account is challenged by the socialist viewpoint taken by 
Hastings and Levie (1983) who state that the move to privatise the UK nationalised 
industries covered ‘a multitude of sins’. This was allegedly illustrated by the sale of 
nationalised concerns and material assets, the placement of shares with institutional 
investors, private investment in public projects, and joint public/private sector ventures. 
Furthermore, Hastings and Levie (1983) believed that, whilst the (then Conservative) 
government’s motivations suggested an improved and more efficient use of public sector 
resources, through opening up new areas to market forces, similar benefits could possibly 
have been gained more easily by addressing the efficiency needs of nationalised concerns 
from within the public sector. In this case, it seems that the underlying political motivation 
may have been to break up the public sector because of political and economic ideologies 
alone, with little respect for social considerations. This is supported by the statement from 
Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (i.e., Minister for the Treasury), on 
the need to further loosen “the grip of the public sector” (Hastings and Levie, 1983, p.12).  
The historical assessments of the effects of privatisation are obviously influenced 
by the framework within which they are assessed, their varying political environments 
and its motivation. There are also many considerations relating to the privatisation 
process, e.g., how the government performs the privatisation process, whether 
theprogramme is correctly sequenced, whether regulations are applied, and whether 
effective corporate governance is formed for privatised entities (Estrin and Pelletier, 
2015, p.1).  
These observations supported by the Feigenbaum and Henig’s (1994) political 
underpinning of privatisation theory which proposes that in many cases, public services 





were privatised due to political preferences and not because there was a belief that the 
decision would result in cost savings. Feigenbaum and Henig’s argument is that 
privatisation, in many of its forms is better understood as a political phenomenon.   
Privatisation can take three forms. Firstly, as a short-term solution to address 
immediate financial problems. In many cases this involves contracting out public services 
in order to save money. Secondly there is tactical privatisation which is aimed at localised 
political interests and opportunism to attract allies and reward supporters. The final type 
of privatisation is defined as systemic in nature and is aimed at reshaping entire societal 
expectations of what government should do and should be responsible for.  
Public choice theory (Buchanan, 1969, Niskanen, 1971, 1975) may be included 
under the heading of politics or, more accurately, political economy. Public choice theory 
studies political behaviours through an economic lens. It considers that similar 
assumptions and economic models about market behaviours can be applied to political 
behaviours (Buchanan, 1973, p.131). Self-interested politicians and bureaucrats may 
exploit state ownership for their own purposes. Grindle (1989) suggests that government 
and state bodies will act in certain ways in weak institutional settings, where people do 
not have the power to demand effective performance, particularly in less developed 
countries (Grindle, 1989, p.9). Public choice theory can also be used to examine the 
drivers of partial (as opposed to wholesale) privatisation as being based on three major 
considerations. Firstly, although privatised firms may be more competitive than State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) which may be used for political ends and, as a result, may be 
unable to compete effectively and may run deficits in competitive markets. In this case 
partial privatisation could balance any negative impact of retaining services internal to 
government bodies. Secondly, for the purpose of political intervention, politicians, as well 
as bureaucrats, may have the power to let SOEs monopolise the market, setting up barriers 





to entry, or avoiding competition in any way, thus providing some degree of control over 
market forces. Finally, due to multiple objectives, SOEs may have vague responsibilities 
for monitoring, with corporate governance being arguably more difficult to apply than in 
private enterprises (Sheskinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003, p.436). Reviews of the empirical 
literature suggest that privately-owned firms perform better than SOEs, and that 
privatisation promotes the financial and operating performance of firms (Bortolotti, et al., 
2003). 
2.4.3 Social perspectives 
Scott (2003) as cited in Gotsdanker (2018, p. 1) defines organisations as being 
“conceived as social structures created by individuals to support the collaborative pursuit 
of specified goals”. Neo-Institutional theory suggests that organisations compete not just 
for resources and political power but also for institutional legitimacy, i.e., for social as 
well as economic fitness (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). If this is the case, it is important 
to consider the impact of privatisation policies across various social groups such as 
gender, ethnicity, age, livelihood, and geographic location (International Monetary Fund, 
2010). 
Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice promotes certain principles, e.g., social and 
economic inequalities may be arranged for the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged 
members of society, consistent with the difference principle in addition to that of fair 
equality of opportunity where offices and positions must be open to everyone (Rawls, 
1971). Of particular relevance here is how social equity and equality may be applied to 
the economic factors of HC privatisation.  
The Constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO) states that 
“Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be fulfilled 
only by the provision of adequate health and social measures” (World Health 





Organization, 2006a, p.1). This WHO statement subtly raises the issue of balancing both 
equity and equality, whilst providing an acceptable level of service, yet still fulfilling and 
complying with (perhaps conflicting) political, social, and economic drivers. This point 
highlights the difficulties in applying rationality to structures that are in flux due to the 
external environment. This makes the cultural and social influences, combined with 
economic considerations and drivers of privatisation, an important dimension to consider 
within the context of this study. It should be noted here that because of Islamic values 
(Mohammed was at times a physician) the culture of the KSA requires universal HC, 
especially for vulnerable groups. As noted at (1.3.1) above, in the case of conflict between 
the governmental regulations and Islamic law, Islamic law dominates.    
2.4.4 Economic perspectives 
(i) Scale and scope. From an economic perspective ‘full privatisation’ could be 
specifically defined, as the “…transfer of ownership and control of government or state 
assets, firms and operations to private investors. This transfer takes the form of issue and 
sale or outright distribution of shares to the general public” (OECD, 1999, p. 69). The, 
OECD goes on to suggest a further definition, proposing a range of treatments which also 
embrace policies and processes such as contracting out, where activities, while publicly 
organised and financed, are carried out by private sector firms.  
The consideration of changing perspectives over time within the HC industry, and 
the variety of possible movements towards privatisation (i.e., corporatisation, as opposed 
to partial or full privatisation) brings further complexity to definition and assessment 
when considering the economies of scale and scope. For example, the decentralisation of 
a state organisation may involve greater economies and reduce transactions costs, 
however, in someway this is not different to the proposed advantages of nationalised 
industries which may have strong characteristics of natural monopolies (Chick and 





Nelles, 2007, p.278). Nevertheless, in the case of privatised entities, the problems with 
information flows and incentives could cause diseconomies of scale, particularly in the 
area of transaction costs before, and also after, contracts are signed (Coase, 1937). 
However, Baumol and Lee (1991, p. 1) suggest that contestability may be relied upon to 
achieve an appropriate scale using the “…norms of behavior provided by the theory as a 
guide for regulation of its larger firms, instead of resorting to nationalization”. Coase 
argues that the size of a firm (as measured by how many contractual relations are 
‘internal’ to the firm and how many ‘external’) is a result of finding an optimal balance 
between the competing tendencies of these transaction costs. Nevertheless, in general, 
making the firm larger may initially be advantageous, but the decreasing returns indicated 
above may eventually prevail. Whilst it could be argued by some that HC can never be a 
truly competitive industry, the UK has attempted to create a semblance of market 
competition and evidence suggests some potential cost and benefits, whereas 
international results are more consistent and reduced costs for patients and commissioners 
are observed (Health Foundation, 2011). However, there is a view that this assertion 
cannot be applied equally across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
(Learmonth, 2018). Indeed, comparisons with the Scottish NHS with its centralised 
oversight has provided a stability of service in comparison to the market- driven changes 
introduced in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. However Scottish NHS financial 
costs have been consistently higher per head.  
 (ii) Costs and benefits. Contestable Markets Theory Baumol, et al. (1982) propose 
that, where entry barriers are low, even the threat of potential entry by firms attracted to 
an industry where price > marginal cost, may be sufficient to make incumbent firms keep 
price close to marginal cost in order to deter new entrants. It could be argued that 
Contestable Markets Theory implies regulation to increase the entry threat (not 





privatisation), as opposed to SCP (see 2.2 above). Traditionally in neo-classical economic 
theory, firms were assumed to maximise profits, i.e., revenues minus costs, which 
necessarily implied the minimisation of short-term average costs, regardless of market 
structure; this might affect revenues differently in the case of perfect competition, 
oligopoly, and monopoly. However, if long-term average costs decline over the entire 
range of demand (as in natural monopoly) then it might be efficient to have a monopoly 
or regulation of entry by the State.    
The height of barriers to entry, and therefore their implications for costs incurred 
after privatisation, should also be considered empirically. Williamson (1981) supports a 
Transaction Cost Approach which focuses on the processes, governance and 
organisational structure of the firm, rather than commodities, as a basic unit of analysis. 
Williamson’s transactions costs include the costs incurred overcoming barriers to entry, 
and he generally proposes that contractual costs depend on that the human agents are 
confined by rationality and that at least some agents are characterised by opportunism 
(Williamson, 1981). The point here is that, during privatisation, if barriers to entry 
(fixed/sunk costs) are low, competition or threatened competition might prevent 
incumbent firms from taking advantage through the ‘moral hazards’ of Principal-Agent 
theory (see below).  
 (iii) Behaviours. Principal-Agent Theory analyses the effects of the possible 
divergence of interest between Principals (e.g., Government) and Agents (e.g., Health 
Providers) under asymmetric information, when it is difficult for the Principal to monitor 
the actions of an Agent. In this case, agents could easily take unobserved actions, giving 
rise to possibilities of ‘moral hazard’ (negative opportunistic behaviours), in pursuit of 
their own self-interests or profit, at the expense of the interests of the Principal. Migue 
and Belanger (1984), as cited in Adams, et al. (2006, p.386) suggest in their model “…that 





even where the politicians would be prepared to finance additional output, bureaucrats 
may offer fewer units in order to retain some discretionary funding”. Williamson (1964) 
hypothesised that under uncertainty, profit maximisation could not be the objective of the 
managers of a joint stock organisation. However, agency theory assumes that utility 
maximisation is a manager’s sole objective. Where some decision-making authority is 
delegated to the agent, managers may focus on increasing the size of the firm as their 
source of utility, rather than shareholder returns, because that may give them greater 
prestige and a larger power base (McColgan, 2001, p.4). This divorce of ownership and 
control may be resolved when privatisation promotes a partial or total unification of 
ownership and control. Malik (2015, p.19) states that “Corporate governance is the 
response to typical agency problems between investors and managers of firms, who 
frequently have divergent interests”. At the same time, Tirole (2011, p.1) offers a 
definition which proposes that “…corporate governance among economists and legal 
scholars refers to the defense of shareholders’ interests.” However, different cultures have 
different perceptions. For example, this sentiment would not be accepted in a stakeholder-
based environment such as Germany or Japan as suggested by Lubetsky (2008). 
On a similar theme, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) identified that a ‘shirking’ 
problem was a possibility in team production, which is common to most firms. If 
aggregated over the firms in a privatised industry, this may result in Market Failure, since 
private Marginal Benefits may diverge from social Marginal Benefits. In the case of 
privatisation, firms (if unobserved and unregulated) may maximise their own profits, e.g., 
by not providing care unprofitable patients. Whilst there is no specific set of conditions 
that can determine market failure which covers both human and environmental factors, 
agency and transactions cost theories are useful frameworks to compare the strengths of 
market-driven versus bureaucratic structures (Ouchi, 1980). 





What is clear is that there is a diversity of theoretical positions that endeavour to 
explain the logic, potential challenges, and possible outcomes of privatisation. On the one 
hand, the economic theories of the SCP paradigm (reviewed by Boru and Kuhil, 2018) 
may be argued to favour privatisation and breaking up (State) monopolies, while 
Contestable Markets Theory (Baumol, et al., 1982) would favour regulation and lowering 
entry barriers as a means of increasing competition which may improve efficiency. On 
the other hand, theories of Markets and Hierarchies (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 2005; 
Ouchi, 1980) might predict that privatisation will face difficulties depending on cultural 
factors in relation to governance using markets, hierarchies or trust. Imperfections in 
product and capital market competition may also generate undesirable outcomes. 
In the context of these different implications of theories for policy, this literature 
review will now move on to consider various empirical studies which provide findings 
from different contextual and cultural settings, and explore the benefits, challenges and 
outcomes of both corporatisation and privatisation within the context of HC. 
2.5 Empirical Research – Challenges and outcomes 
In the light of these conflicting theoretical perspectives, it is necessary to review 
empirical outcomes reported in the literature on privatisation and corporatisation. 
2.5.1 Meta-analyses 
Cavaliere and Scabrosetti (2008) conducted an in-depth study of the literature on 
privatisation and efficiency by following its evolution from the application of agency 
theory to recent contributions from political economy. They observed that PE had 
improved substantially, while AE was higher in SOEs (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti, 2008). 





Due to re-organisation, privatisation may have facilitated increases in PE, while its effects 
on AE were not so certain.  
Bel and Warner’s (2008) focuses on the challenging issues of privatisation within 
local governments. Using empirical studies from North America and Europe the relevance 
of insights provided by transaction cost theories is identified, suggesting that many 
privatisations have not delivered as expected on cost savings. The primary reasons for this 
are considered to be inadequate management of service delivery markets and a lack of 
competition. They conclude that other forms of market governance, e.g., managed–mixed 
public/private delivery, mixed public/private firms, inter-municipal cooperation and 
dynamic contracting may achieve better results. 
Hodge’s (1999) meta-analytic international review considers 162 empirical studies 
showing that post-privatisation improvements in productivity and financial performance 
were significant. Nevertheless, he also cautions that these results should not be seen in 
isolation, as the performance of the control firms in the study were also seen to similarly 
increase. Privatisation produced labour productivity gains, but Hodge believes there is no 
simple link between the size of the private sector and national economic growth. From a 
customer/consumer perspective, the narrative reviews considered by Hodge suggest that 
consumer promises were often not met. Some areas did show significant service quality 
improvement, but this was attributed to regulatory intensity and public accountability 
rather than to ownership change. Similar to Bel and Warner (2008), Hodge (1999) 
identifies the most critical issue related to privatisation of SOEs to be the effectiveness of 
new regulatory and competition arrangements. Regulation is about reordering priorities 
and power and policy permanency. In the context of privatisation, the role of regulation 
may be important. It is a distinctive mode of policy making and an alternative mode of 
public control. The primary aim of introducing a regulatory framework is that it may 





provide a degree of independent oversight to protect the consumer, privately owned new 
companies and the government (Hossain and Malbon, 1998).  
2.5.2 Regional, country, and sector comparisons 
Considering a 25-year period (1977-2001) globally, Western Europe has shown the 
greatest number of privatisations (but smaller), closely followed by Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, although the scale varied between regions, with 
individual transactions within Asia being considered proportionally fewer but larger 
(Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004).  
Towards the end of the study period a decline in the number of transactions was 
identified. British privatisations were predominant in this period as early adopters, with 
the key drivers being de-nationalisation and austerity, i.e., a reduction in public sector 
borrowing requirements. In this case, it is important to note that although major 
corporations were privatised, in many cases the government continued to hold a ‘golden 
share’ which allowed the state a power of veto over strategic decisions (Bortolotti and 
Siniscalco, 2004). A particularly interesting example using this approach is provided by 
Parker and Wu (1998) which analyses the performance of British Steel Corporation 
(BSC), before and after privatisation in December 1988. In the first stage, performance in 
terms of trends in labour, total factor productivity, and profitability are assessed, followed 
by a comparison between the PE of the UK steel industry and six other major steel 
producing nations.  
         By using Data Envelope Analysis (DEA), positive results were found for BSC prior 
to privatisation, followed by a collapse in performance. In contrast, Aylens (1988) as cited 
in Gomés, (2001) also examined the UK steel industry, stating that the overall 
performance of the BSC improved after privatisation. In 1980, BSC was one of the lowest-
performing companies, manufacturing steel at extremely high cost compared with 





competitiors (Gomés, 2001). This trend was reversed by the mid-1980s and the BSC 
shifted to the top spot, though hidden subsidies could conceivably have been responsible 
(Blair, 1997, p.575). This change did not require any change in ownership. Decentralised 
business units with clear commercial objectives, which focused on outcomes, were 
established. Productivity bonuses were paid to the workers in 1987, which accounted for 
20 per cent of the total income of a steel worker. Increments in incentives led to the 
improvement of the work force, thus giving an upward thrust to the business. However, it 
is difficult to judge the long-term effects of governance changes in BSC, with over sixty 
years of nationalisation/denationalisation. Although, it looks like that the UK government 
thought it was rational to help BSC pay the dues arising from its own fail, in 2019 BSC 
was forced into compulsory liquidation after the UK government refused to further cover 
short-term financing needs of £30m (Coppola, 2019). It cannot be concluded that 
privatisation for this organisation was a success story. 
Other areas of Europe followed Britain with large-scale privatisation activities in 
the mid-1980’s with the trend reaching a peak in the late 1990’s. In most cases the highest 
revenues were raised by public share offerings in the early sample period, with smaller 
companies owned at local government level sold through private sale. It is interesting to 
note that some governments (e.g., France) preferred partial privatisation whilst others 
(Germany and Italy) retained governmental control over ‘strategic’ companies, in addition 
to tight regulatory controls and statutory constraints. 
A review (Gomés, 2001) of privatisation in each of the European Union's member 
states identifies differences in the degree of privatisation. She also elaborates on the 
barriers that may have prevented efficiency gains, e.g., the peculiar form that privatisation 
took in many cases and the behaviour of the capital market in some regions. Gomés 
indirectly notes that privatisation could lead to a redistribution of income, wealth, and 





economic power, although these effects are yet to be studied and researched. The author 
also recommends a focus on the long-term effects of the competitiveness of European 
privatisations and the implications for social welfare. 
Within North America and the Caribbean, privatisations highlight the impact of 
cultural differences between countries, with the USA mainly focusing on the outsourcing 
of public services to private operators (Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004). It is suggested 
that in this case, privatisations bring significant savings to the taxpayer, with former 
public services requiring fewer employees working at higher productivity.  
Contracting-out appears mainly in those countries with strong legislative control 
over public budgets and a history of fiscal crisis, suggesting that local politicians with 
‘soft budget constraints’ (SBCs) are forced to privatise public services to achieve greater 
efficiencies. However, Bortolotti and Sincalco (2004, p.83) suggest that privatisation is a 
process which could start with the sale of minority stakes of SOEs to just raise capital. 
The concept of SBC was introduced by Kornai (1986) and has become a familiar part of 
the economics lexicon. Originally formulated by Kornai to analyse economic behaviour 
in socialist economies marked by shortage, the SBC is now regularly invoked within a 
literature that examines the economic transition from socialism to capitalism and from 
SOEs to privatisation. It is noted that budgetary constraints seem to be harder in the 
wealthiest and most liberal states, where public preferences have been transformed into 
stringent laws. In contrast, the opposite is observed in the poorer areas where levels of 
unemployment and unionisation are high (Kornai, 1986, p.25). 
The relationship between the effectiveness of privatisation and institutional 
development implies that privatisation tends to result in “…less positive outcomes in 
transition economies where the institutional environment is weak” (Wang, 2007, p.5). 
Wang (2007) furthermore suggests that privatisation may not be an effective device in 





resolving agency problems. This has been shown to be the case by the problems with 
Russia’s ‘voucherisation’ programme, as ‘insiders’ stripped assets knowing that newly 
generated minority shareholders had no transparency or enforcement capabilities to 
prevent such opportunistic behaviour (Jefferson, 1998). In contrast, within other 
developing countries (for example Sub-Saharan Africa) the main driver of privatisation 
was to support the need for investment, infrastructure, and services, with privatisation 
seen as a step towards attracting international investment into SOEs to facilitate the area’s 
development.  
Many countries chose to partially privatise SOEs. According to Li and Wang (2006. 
p.653) “Partial privatization, or allowing the state to remain as one of the owners of these 
firms.” As mentioned in 2.3.2 above, on the other hand, Clarke, et al. (2005) argue that 
privatisation should not be done partially, where Governments holding majority shares in 
SOEs may result in those firms performing poorly by conventional accounting measures. 
Governments may reduce ownership through share flotations, widely used by many 
developing countries since the early 1990s. According to Huibers (2004) as cited in 
Rindyawati (2013), approximately 33 of the 80 countries outside the OECD employed 
initial public offerings to privatise state-owned banks. Since the state-owned banks in a 
country are mostly considered as large enterprises, performance of national stock markets 
might improve. Giving access to capital and improving economic growth could indirectly 
affect other domestic enterprises. Privatisation through initial public offerings may also 
motivate broader investment (Rindyawati, 2013, p.11). Moreover, Huibers (2005) as cited 
in Jiang and Yao (2011) declared that, for various reasons, state ownership is usually 
blamed for poor performance, where governments fund sectors with low financial and 
high social returns. Theoretically, state ownership means “all citizens are co-owners who 
in practice have no power and no incentive to influence and monitor the management of 





state banks. This free-rider problem leaves governments the only effective representative 
agent” (Jiang and Yao, 2011, p.4).  
Garrón, et al. (2003) considered the transfer of 31 (out of a total of 93 privatised 
firms), to the private sector, across a number of industries (including Agro-industrial, 
Manufacturing, Transportation and Communications), in Bolivia since 1992. The results 
indicate increased productivity in these firms, associated with a reduction in fixed assets, 
sales,  and employment. The decrease in fixed assets was greater than the reduction in 
employment, suggesting that the productivity increase may have owed more to improved 
allocation of capital than improved use of personnel. In this case, the overall impact on 
national unemployment raises an important consideration: reducing employment in one 
industrial sector may well raise productivity but also unemployment if alternative jobs 
are not secured. Similarly, a decrease in the manufacture and maintenance of fixed assets 
may have a negative impact on other industries. Because of the decrese in the sales and 
the focus of the authors on 'net profit over sales', the study suggested that privatisation of 
the firms in Bolivia had no significant impact on their profitability. In addition, the 
majority of the Bolivian firms were in massive debt before privatisation. 
A study by Galiani, et al. (2003) to examine the effects of privatisation for financial 
and non-financial Argentine firms. In the case of non-financial firms, although the study 
did not find any statistically significant effect of privatisation on prices, the results 
showed that there were large increases in operating efficiency and profitability. In contrast 
to the case of non-financial firms, the study did not find overall large increasing in 
operating efficiency after the privatisation, however, some indicators of efficiency 
performed well (e.g., output per employee increased). Employment decreased during 
privatisation, which may be either a cost or a benefit, depending on whether the economy 
is above or below potential GDP. In addition, the study found a decrease of child MR 





when water utilities were privatised. Finally, in this example, investment increased by at 
least 350 per cent as a result of privatisation, consistent with the view that one of the main 
motives was to re-establish investment. Generaly, the results of this study showing “…a 
favorable picture of privatization.” (Galiani, et al., 2003, p.43) 
Anuatti-Neto, et al. (2003) tested the relative effectiveness of 119 Brazilian 
companies privatised since 1991, where the state decentralised control of the firms and 
sold minority stakes to the private sector. This study found that privatisation was 
associated with improved financial performance, brought in foreign investment and 
increased operating efficiency. However, final conclusions are difficult because (a) some 
of the improved financial performance was achieved through increases in product prices 
and (b) employment was reduced. Higher investment created new jobs but not necessarily 
for the newly unemployed, and in the end, public opinion was not totally supportive.  
In the light of this review of international empirical studies on corporatisation and 
privatisation, there seems to be a general suggestion that they have found associations 
between these governance reforms and improved financial performance and productivity, 
thus supporting an SCP perspective. However, it is important to remember that costs may 
have been incurred elsewhere in order to achieve higher profits and productivity, and to 
understand in more detail whether findings of productivity gains are generalisable, e.g., 
whether applicable to the HC sector in KSA. 
2.5.3 Health care systems and services 
The WHO states that “a good health system delivers quality services to all people, 
when and where they need them” (Regmi, 2012, p.1). The exact configuration of services 
varies from country to country, but arguably requires in all cases “a robust financing 
mechanism, well-trained and adequately-paid workforce, reliable information on which 





to base decisions and policies, and well maintained facilities and logistics to deliver 
quality medicines and technologies” (Lekshmi, et al., 2014, p.92).  
The governance reforms and policies towards management intended to deliver 
improved health services can be examined at several levels (Preker and Harding, 2003). 
Firstly, consideration of clinical management at a patient level needs arguably to address 
performance options related to the coordination, clinical administrative costs, efficiency 
and effectiveness of processes at a service/provider level. Secondly, the mechanisms of 
governance at an organisational and institutional level must arguably consider problems 
with efficiency, productivity, quality, as well as client responsiveness, related to 
incentives faced by the organisation as a whole. Finally, the stewardship and policy 
process at the national level must arguably address a holistic oversight of the health 
sector, budgetary management and predictability as well as overall rationality and 
efficiency of resource flows. 
         When addressing the patient level, the variance between the actual performance of 
health systems and the rising expectations of society is leading to more pressure for both 
health authorities and political leaders. This is evident, particularly within the USA, 
which, although possessing the most marketised health system in the world, may also be 
considered the most expensive and inefficient one, with reportedly bad outcomes, and 
low levels of customer satisfaction (Zakaria, 2012). Although, HC is a requirement for 
human life and it should be benefited to everyone including those who cannot afford to 
pay, the USA HC system has not matched the expectation of the population. The biggest 
beneficiary of the USA HC sector is the private health insurance corporations which 
cooperated with the good HC facilities on how their patients are covered, consequently, 
allowing the uninsured people (15 per cent) to access only a few government facilities 
(Jaqua and Jaqua, 2019).  





Country-level statistics (Ford, et al., 2013) suggest that the USA has private health 
costs per person that are disproportionally high due to high drug prices, transactions costs 
and shareholder compensations, with overall spending increasing at nearly five times 
GDP growth, with governmental spending on health also increasing over the past 40 years 
(Crivelli, et al., 2010). Whilst there could be many reasons for this observation, a key 
factor for consideration is that the USA “is the only industrialized country that treats HC 
like a market commodity instead of a social service” (Angell, 2008, p.1). Even before the 
full roll-out of the Affordable Care Act (ACA or ‘Obama- care’), government HC 
spending had soared from 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1987 to 8.4 per cent in 2011 (Pope, 
2013). However, some believe that the USA has the most efficient HC system when 
considered from the point of view of dynamic efficiency (Waśniewski, 2012), since the 
system of private HC has created an incentive to invest in new technologies. The economy 
of the USA has been found to have high dynamic efficiency in general (Abel, et al., 1989), 
but in terms of measured static health outcomes on a global basis (for example life 
expectancy and infant mortality) the USA shows poor results. Nader (2012) goes a step 
further and suggests that HC bills come with high levels of fraud suggesting that fully 10 
per cent of all HC expenditures are the result of computerised billing fraud and abuse, 
stating that “2.7 trillion dollars of annual HC costs opens a gigantic window on the 
massive waste, redundancy, profiteering, fraud, and sometimes criminal over-billing” 
(Nader, 2012, p.1). This issue was identified by Lapsley (1993), who highlighted, with 
caution, the possibilities of opportunistic behaviour within a purchaser/provider model. 
In contrast, Villa and Kane’s (2013) analysis of the USA health situation provides 
a different perspective, with the results of their study suggesting a more positive outcome 
such that privatisation “might be an effective strategy to make universal health coverage 
systems more efficient and sustainable” (Villa and Kane, 2013, p.32). The results of this 





empirical study showed increased operating margins, reduced lengths of stay, and higher 
occupancy rates, although caution was noted around costs of access to care, in terms of 
the loss of beneficial but unprofitable services. In this case, it should be noted that the 
survey only considered three limited locations within the USA. In comparison, a study by 
Ozcan and Luke (1993) of a sample of 3,000 urban hospitals in the USA examines the 
variation in hospitals’ PE. In this analysis, government-run hospitals were found to be 
more technically efficient than for-profit hospitals.  
It is also important to consider how different health service offerings are influenced 
by privatisation. Brent (2008) assessed a cost-benefit analysis of the privatisation of 
psychiatric hospitals in the USA. Within this sample it was observed that the privatisation 
of psychiatric services in general hospitals would provide a social gain only if the change 
took place in for-profit instead of non-profit hospitals (Brent, 2008).  
Whilst the literature on the USA’s HC systems provides us with useful insights into 
the potential challenges and risks of a particular form of private operation, we also need 
to be aware of other modes of implementation and influencing factors.   
Angell (2008) compared the HC systems of Canada and the USA. He suggested that 
the Canadian government was in favour of making the Canadian HC system more like the 
USA’s system, by partially privatising it. Yet it is proposed that HC costs per person are 
twice as high in the USA than in Canada, has worse outcomes, is less ‘efficient’, and 
provides fewer basic services than the Canadian system. Angell (2008) found that the best 
way to improve the Canadian HC system is to put more resources into public HC and 
concluded that the best option may be partial privatisation with government monitoring 
through the use of performance contracts. 
In a case study regarding the privatised hospital St. Goran in Sweden, it was found 
that the effects of the privatisation were not negative, and could be attributed to the media 





attention that this change received. The high media interest in the hospital may have meant 
that employees felt they were being noticed and that the organisation was perceived as 
modern and successful (i.e., The Hawthorne Effect as noted by Falkenberg, 2010).  
Finally, the threat of transferring a public health system hospital into the market 
place could be considered as the single most effective means of ensuring greater static 
efficiency in the services provided by the hospital (Lapsley, 1993). In this case it should 
be stressed that it may not be just the act of privatising the hospital that is perceived as 
being the means of ensuring AE and PE but, also the perception of a threat of privatisation 
may act as an agency for change. Such a belief would appear to confirm the findings of 
the Martin Company Study conducted during the USA’s Industrial Revolution. This study 
demonstrated that the productivity of employees might improve if they believe their work 
performance is being scrutinised. Lapsley (1993, p.388) also believes that it is the threat 
of possible ramifications that is “the single most effective means of ensuring maximum 
efficiency” although the longevity of success through this means of motivation (i.e., 
through the imposition of fear) seems likely to be short lived.  
With recent advances in technology and new entrants using low cost ‘startup’ 
models, the threat to traditional HC models and markets should not be underestimated. 
For example, a survey carried out by PWC (Brino, 2014) suggested that consumers would 
not be averse to using at-home kits for diagnoses, or online consultations that have 
previously been supplied in clinical facilities or hospitals.  
Moving on from privatisation studies, Maharani and Tampubolon (2016) consider 
a number of studies that address the impact of corporatisation on hospitals in various 
countries, finding a variety of conflicting results when focusing on the impact of 
efficiency and quality of care on overall hospital performance. Their review highlights a 
number of limitations to the studies including narrow sets of data (either by time or 





quantity of hospitals considered), the omission of control hospitals (i.e., non-corporatised 
hospitals), unobserved variables and, finally, the inability to uncover the underlying 
association of corporatisation with hospital considered due to poorly specified models of 
analysis (e.g., taking no account of heterogeneity).  
Whereas the USA has predominantly chosen a private property rights approach with 
assets remaining in the private sector, many countries in Europe have followed a 
gradualist implementation. It is suggested by Wadge, et al. (2017) that private HC may 
play a role that is complementary to public services and may fulfil a demand for care 
amenities and reduce waiting lists in primary care through the purchase of supplementary 
private health insurance on a personal preference basis, with health services provided 
through a framework of public, semi-autonomous government hospitals, governmental 
and private hospitals.   
As an alternative to extreme laissez-faire or total control by the State, Rodriguez-
Alvarez, et al. (2012) look at how alternative forms of corporatisation of health services 
can benefit developing countries which are also seeking to improve the performance of 
their public health systems, where demand uncertainty impacts efficiency. Rodriguez-
Alvarez, et al. (2012) consider the Spanish model where the National Health Service 
provides a publically funded service with access to free health services at the point of use. 
Private HC plays a complementary role and provides services not covered in the public 
offering, fulfils demand in care amenities, and helps avoid waiting lists. Private services 
are provided through the purchase of private health insurance or on a fee-paying basis. 
Tiemann, et al. (2011) compared efficiency in terms of cost and technical aspects 
on German public, private non-profit and private for-profit hospitals, with mixed findings. 
In contrast to the evidence from studies in other countries, especially the USA, the data 
from Germany indicated that private ownership (i.e., private for-profit and non-profit) is 





not necessarily associated with higher efficiency as compared to public ownership. The 
results show that public hospitals were found to have higher efficiency than private non-
profit hospitals. Tiemann, et al. (2011) also found that private for-profit hospitals were 
providing better quality services, which (for the examples considered) is measured by 
only one indicator - risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality, (Tiemann, et al., 2011, p.7) - as 
compared to other types of ownership. In another study, Tiemann, et al. (2012) reported 
that the transfer of hospitals from the public to the for-profit private sector led to 
permanent increases in efficiency, however, increasing the efficiency of private non-profit 
hospitals was temporary when converted from the public sector. 
Whatever the degree of movement towards market-related reforms (i.e., partial 
privatisation, corporatisation, or just the perception that they are being considered) is 
chosen, it seems evident that any reform must create mechanisms to ensure that vital 
services continue to be delivered. Considerations of alternative modes of performance 
enhancement also need to be further explored but could include placing some financial 
risk on the end-user, which might encourage patients to utilise facilities and services more 
sparingly. For example, in the USA it has been shown that uninsured patients are less 
likely to incur any HC expenses in a year than their counterparts who have coverage 
because they use fewer and cheaper services. However, this could have a negative impact 
on health outcomes (Institute of Medicine, 2003). Another approach could be to increase 
regulatory controls on profit margins in highly marketised environments, specifically 
when dealing with service provision to un-insured individuals, who could be supported 
by governmental subsidies either to the patient or directly to the hospital (Institute of 
Medicine, 2003).  
On the other hand, hierarchical, bureaucratic regulations may not result in improved 
effectiveness and efficiency. It may be that both efficiency and effectiveness in providing 





HC services could not be maintained because the management did not have adequate 
control of resources (especially labour) and production (Lapsley, 1993). Another issue is 
that managers may be unable to maintain their quality of work on a daily basis due to the 
absence of performance-based incentives for individuals, teams, or organisations (Preker 
and Harding, 2003). It may be important to provide appropriate incentives to staff to 
encourage a fair and transparent working environment, as advised by Wilson, who asks, 
“Why scrimp and save if you cannot keep the results of your frugality?” (Preker and 
Harding, 2003, p.5). In fact, the effects of performance incentives were shown to 
significantly improve the PE of health centres in the study carried out by Akazili, et al. 
(2008) within health service provision in developing countries. 
However, if responsibilities are moved from centralised to localised control, giving 
hospitals some degree of management autonomy, the introduction of a new layer of rules 
and regulations regarding operations and interactions between the different layers 
suggests that a structured form of accountability with respect to performance measures is 
required (Preker and Harding, 2003). Strengthening such mechanisms may be a critical 
element of organisational reform, which reduces the use of traditional hierarchical 
accountability mechanisms. Performance measures have sometimes been recorded in a 
‘framework agreement’ or ‘performance contract’. This mechanism is intended to clarify 
the objectives and outcomes of the service as well as to formally specify the criteria by 
which management will be judged. In a few cases, a board of directors has been 
established to implement this process of monitoring managerial performance and 
depoliticising decision-making. Such decentralisation is one aspect of corporatisation. 
According to Preker and Harding (2003), effective corporatisation appears to be an 
institutionally intensive organisational reform that necessitates a sustained, complex, and 
politically challenging role for government agencies and officials. However, the 





experience with performance contracts in public hospitals may be seen as unimpressive 
(Preker and Harding, 2003).  
Although the NHS in the UK has followed different solutions to supplying HC 
services to the public for 68 years, “More recently, under the UK coalition government, 
£4 million was allocated to develop ‘cutting-edge ideas’ focused on addressing major 
health management problems (Gov. UK, 2014) and, in the past year, there was investment 
of £15 million by Innovate UK in projects to address the challenges” (Fascia and Brodie, 
2017, p.338). The UK’s contracting-out of services within the NHS has raised many 
complaints involving the asymmetry of information, which prevents inexperienced local 
councils from monitoring private HC providers. This may permit private providers to 
“Exploiting opportunities to increase revenues through ‘gaming’ the system” (Button and 
Leys, 2012, p.7). For example, bidders may submit low bids to win contracts but may 
later overcharge local councils for providing care when it is difficult to refuse to pay on 
compassionate grounds. Furthermore, in the case of the mentally ill (a group which may 
not be able to articulate their concerns) one provider was exposed for using abusive 
practices to reduce care and thus increase profits (Kelley, 2009). Note that these 
undesirable behaviours are difficult to anticipate. Therefore, the solution of ‘performance 
contracts’ used in the literature has been considered on a case-by-case basis. Principal-
Agent problems can (in theory) be mitigated arguably by ‘complete contingent contracts’, 
which specify all the actions which the Principal wants the Agent to take in the event of 
every situation. Thus, the contract may seek to prevent a ‘business as usual’ collusive 
culture (Lapsley, 1993) among private providers. More directly expressed, there may be 
a tendency for a collusive culture to cover up any problems with the private provider.  
Brock (2004) examined the changes in the public health system and primary care 
services in Florida’s county health departments. It was reported that most public health 





professionals believe that the public sector should maintain oversight and monitor private 
contractors to ensure that populations receive the necessary level and quality of care. It 
was also reported that they may believe (as the health department’s role in clinical services 
declines) that public health officials should strengthen their focus on essential public 
health services. Preserving, protecting, and promoting the health of communities may 
remain an important consideration. Brock (2004) concluded that County health 
departments should retain a role in quality assurance, case management, disease 
surveillance, education, and outreach to vulnerable populations. By making the 
appropriate choices, public health departments may effectively and efficiently manage the 
safety net. 
2.6 Managing Performance 
Performance, as defined by the International Standards Office (ISO, 2015) is a 
measurable result that can relate either to quantitative or qualitative findings. Performance 
is assessed against predetermined criteria measuring the economic efficiency, 
effectiveness and quality aspects of the goods or services supplied (OECD, 1997). The 
following subsections will explain what is meant by these concepts in a HC setting and 
how this compares to more generalised economic definitions. 
Theoretically, the SCP paradigm view is that market concentration may involve 
collusion or other monopolistic practices, (i.e., the greater the number of firms in an 
industry the more competitive it may be). Where a number of firms compete, they may 
find it more difficult to charge prices above marginal cost, earning excess profits. 
Conversely, increased concentration may encourage anti-competitive practices and raise 
excess profits, though from an Efficiency perspective, a firm’s profits performance may 
be positively related to efficiency because efficient firms with low cost structures may 
increase profits by expanding market share (see section 2.2 above).  





Of course, privatisation may lead to competitive or uncompetitive product markets. 
Besides the possibility of increased product market competition, privatisation exposes 
firms to the discipline of private capital markets. However, this discipline may be flawed. 
Compared with government supervision, yes, capital markets may provide ‘harder’ 
budget constraints (Kornai, 1986) and more dispassionate supervision. However, capital 
markets may also be excessively ‘short-termist’ or provide inadequate supervision of 
executive directors awarding themselves generous remuneration.    
2.6.1 Quality aspects of performance 
As noted above, the OECD (1997) definition of performance consists of efficiency, 
quality, and effectiveness aspects. In the same way that efficiency in a HC setting is 
considered difficult to define, the same can also be said of the quality of HC. Generally, 
the ISO 9000 standard (ISO 4028 , 2004) defines quality as “the totality of features and 
characteristics of a product or service that bear its ability to satisfy stated or implied 
needs”. Raleigh and Foot (2010) provide a simple overview of the six domains of quality 
in a HC setting from the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2001). These comprise Safety, 
Effectiveness, Patient-centred Experience, Timeliness, Efficiency, and Equity, and this is 
one of the more respected and inclusive quality frameworks used within the HC industry. 
The World Health Organization (2006b) provides definitions for each quality dimension 
in the IOM framework: 
• Safe, avoiding harm from the care that is intended to help. 
• Effective, delivering HC that is based on evidence and results in improved health 
outcomes for individuals and communities, based on need.  





• Acceptable/patient-centred Experienc, delivering HC which takes into account 
the preferences and aspirations of individual service users and the cultures of their 
communities. 
• Timeliness, delivering HC that is timely, geographically reasonable, and provided 
in a setting where skills and resources are appropriate to medical need. 
• Efficient, delivering HC in a manner that maximises resource use and avoids 
waste.  
• Equitable, delivering HC which does not vary in quality because of personal 
characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, geographical location, or socioeconomic 
status, safe, delivering HC which minimises risks and harm to service users. 
To support these six domains a number of indicators or measures may be defined 
to enable quality assessment. Donabedian’s (1966) classic paper for assessing the quality 
of care defines three measures of quality – structure (e.g., resources and services utilised), 
process (clinical procedures and interventions) and outcomes (for example mortality or 
well being). This is the model that the KSA (CBAHI, 2015) has adopted for the 
assessment of quality where structural standards address the system’s inputs, such as 
hospital beds available, manpower, design of hospital buildings, availability of personal 
protective equipment for health workers (e.g., gloves and masks), and the availability of 
equipment and supplies (e.g., microscopes and laboratory reagents). Activity and 
procedural standards address the clinical and administrative activities or interventions 
carried out within the hospital in the care of patients or in the management of the hospital 
or its staff (e.g., PE, inpatient discharged, tests performed, waiting times 
responsiveness). Outcome standards look at the assessment of the benefits of an 
intervention and whether the expected purpose of the activity was achieved. They provide 





information about whether predicted outcomes are being realised. Examples of outcome 
quality indicators may arguably include MR indicators.  
2.7 Chapter Summary  
To summarise, hospitals are clearly important to public health. Regardless of 
cultural differences, in many countries a frequently proposed policy to address hospital 
efficiencies is a movement to a corporatised or (fully or partially) privatised structure. 
This is consistent with theory of the SCP paradigm (reviewed by Boru and Kuhil, 2018) 
which implies breaking up monopolies (including state monopolies, i.e., privatisation) 
may improve performance. SCP is therefore adopted as the basis for the generation of 
hypotheses in this thesis, extended beyond privatisation to movements towards 
privatisation (i.e. corporatisation). Of course, these market-related reforms do not 
guarantee competition, e.g., the act of privatisation alone may not achieve more product 
or capital market competition.  
The second theme considered in the literature review considers the potential PE of 
different forms of privatisation (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti, 2008). Measuring the 
efficiency and effectiveness of services delivered in a hospital may be extremely difficult 
in light of collusive or culture-based control systems under which hospitals may operate 
(Lapsley, 1993). In certain countries, the most difficult aspect of measuring hospital 
performance, and introducing new forms of management into a traditional hospital 
system, may be related to deterministic, collusion-based behaviours, culture and 
associated control mechanisms that define clinical processes and procedures.  
The resolution of these ‘soft’ factors (as opposed to hard economic ‘facts’) and the 
effect on particular forms of privatisation performance measures also needs to be studied 
in further depth (Marr, 2012). However, Braithwaite, et al. (2011) provides a level of 
caution in assessing the overall impact of the advantages and disadvantages of 





corporatisation and suggesting that in most cases evidence on either side of the argument 
is weak and often conflicting without clear or concise answers due to poorly designed 
studies and inconsistent data. Despite this challenge, the recurring message within this 
literature review is the need for accountability via a system that captures the relevant 
performance and efficiency measures tied to key events in the production process, as 
generally we may expect to find that PE (and perhaps dynamic efficiency too) may be 
higher with some degree of privatisation, though AE and economies of scale may benefit 
more from public control. In addition, the impact of some degree of corporatisation on 
the activities of pharmaceutical companies further complicates the picture.   
As noted in Chapter 1, the KSA has been ruled by one family (the House of Saud) 
since its inception, with a tribal culture extending to all aspects of society and commerce, 
including the health sector. Williamson (1985) suggests that understanding this wider 
(socio-economic) picture is important. In this context, it is crucial to take these socio-
economic factors into consideration. 
 In conclusion, this review has identified gaps in the existing literature, where 
questions relating to corporatisation have rarely been addressed, and never in the KSA 
context. In addition, few previous studies have tried to control for the presence of fixed 
effects when considering the efficiencies of corporatisation/privatisation strategies. 
Therefore, a focus in this study on varying market-based health provision policies in the 
KSA may provide a unique opportunity to add new insights to current academic research, 
existing theories and provide a test of SCP predictions. 
Chapter 3 will now outline the conceptual framework that explaining the key stages 
and processes towards privatisation, from initial motivations to assessing the performance 
of the entity (through different stages or levels of corporatisation), where efficiency acts 





as one indicator of overall HC performance, and how governance reforms may be related 























Conceptual Framework  
3.1 Introduction 
In any economy, there are many moving parts, making it difficult to isolate just one 
motivational factor behind a government’s reform strategy. As identified in Chapter 2 the 
process of corporatisation may have a complicated relationship with the desire to achieve 
greater economic efficiency, specifically within the context of HC where other 
considerations, components, and outcomes (for example, quality aspects) may also need 
to be factored into the analysis. Furthermore, a positive view of corporatisation and 
privatisation strategies is, of course, only one possibility. Therefore, all possible outcomes 
should be considered.  
Details of how corporatisation and privatisation movements may affect hospital 
performance were considered based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. This chapter 
presents a conceptual framework, explaining the key stages and processes towards 
privatisation strategy, from initial motivations to assessing the performance of the entity, 
where efficiency acts as one indicator of overall HC performance. The model is built 
through a diagrammatic approach, illustrating the pathways through which motivations 
trigger actions on the various components of corporatisation, which may improve the 
performance of the entity or system. The information from the conceptual framework is 
then used to generate a set of hypotheses to test.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section 3.2 presents a diagrammatic 
representation of the conceptual framework linking the process of corporatisation to 
performance. Section 3.3 presents a model from which the stated hypotheses are derived. 
Finally, Section 3.4 concludes. 





3.2 Conceptual Framework 
Privatisation involves the transfer of ownership or management of firms from the 
public domain (government) to the private sector (private ownership). In Chapter 2, the 
literature review outlined the three forms of privatisation, where corporatisation is often 
seen as a necessary precursor to full or partial privatisation. A corporatisation movement 
towards full or partial privatisation will not commence unless there is a motivational 
trigger. Under public ownership or management of firms, the corporatisation process can 
be divided up into a number of logical components (see section 2.3.1). The change from 
public ownership may be carried out over a number of phases. In each of these phases the 
government may then undertake a number of actions that affect the status of each 
component and its movement towards achieving full or partial privatisation. Once the 
process of corporatisation is underway attention shifts to an understanding of the intended 
outcomes or impacts the chosen actions: overall performance will be assessed and the 
results will inform the previous steps in the process. The conceptual framework is 
summarised in Figure 3.1 below.  
 
Figure 3.1 - Summary of Conceptual Framework 
3.2.1 Motivations 
The first stage of the model explains the motivations behind a 
corporatisation/privatisation strategy. These motivations are caused by influences acting 
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as triggers to the overall process of corporatisation and privatisation movements. When 
firms are under public ownership or management, there are several motivations for 
market-based reform including political, fiscal, desire to reform industry structure, and 
ideological shifts (see section 2.4.2). The figure below summarises the main motivations 
for embarking on a corporatisation strategy based on data from Clarke and Cull (1998); 
Galiani, et al. (2003); Garrón B., et al. (2003); Bel and Warner (2008); Painter (2009).  
 
Figure 3.2 - Motivations for corporatisation and privatisation 
(i) Political. It could be observed that the movement towards privatisation may be 
politically motivated (e.g., Feigenbaum and Henig’s, 1994), potentially influenced by 
popular opinion, private industry, government bureaucracy, lobbying groups, and 
academia (Painter, 2009). Critics tend to focus attention on what they think are the 
disproportionate influences that private industry and lobby groups exert on shifts towards 
MOTIVATIONS 
Political  
- Popular opinion 
- Private industry influence 
- Government bureaucratic influence 
- Lobbying group influence 
- Academic influence 
COMPONENTS 
Pressure on Fiscal Expenditure 
- Shift to reduce costs 
Desire to Reform Industry Structure 
- Internationally competitive industry 
- Industry protection 
- Inefficiency 
Ideological Shifts 
- Domestic or international movements towards 
philosophical ideals 
- Demographics 





privatisation. On the other hand, individuals seeing the advantages of these movements 
argue that government bureaucratic institutions and anti-reform academics hold too much 
influence over policy makers. Although this study does not address power and political 
influence per se, it could be a factor contributing to the success or failure reforms. It is 
worth noting that political motivation alone does not often lead to a government adopting 
movements towards privatisation (Bel & Warner, 2008; Rasmussen, et al., 2018).  
(ii) Fiscal deficit. Movements towards privatisation can also be motivated by 
pressure on fiscal expenditures (e.g., Bortolotti and Sincalco, 2004), labelled here as the 
need to reduce a fiscal deficit. This motivation has a simple balance sheet explanation. 
When government spending is growing faster than the government’s ability to pay for the 
expenditure, eventually the government has to cut down on the cost side of its balance 
sheet or increase taxes. Perhaps one of the most successful ways to reduce government 
spending is to shift costs off the government’s balance sheet through movement towards 
privatisation. One of the clearest examples of this, is the wonders have been made through 
companies’ privatieed by the Thatcher government from 1989 to 1990 (Moore, 1992). 
This budgetary motivation can go the other way as well, with governments, at times, 
eliminating private sector control over certain industries in an effort to reduce costs. In 
such an instance, reform may be more, as opposed to less, expensive (Clarke and Cull, 
1998, Galiani, et al., 2003). Opponents often argue that a fiscal deficit has more to do 
with not enough taxes and not that costs are growing too fast. As with political motivation, 
this study does not empirically address the effect fiscal expenditure might have on 
reforms, although it is worth noting that the fiscal background may affect the success or 
failure of reform, and the need to reduce fiscal deficit is one possible motivation. Within 
the Middle East this motivational factor is becoming more evident, after the recent 
downward trend in world oil prices (Garside, 2019), resulting in oil exporting countries 





seriously considering reform of their public entities as a means of diversification (Al-
Omran, 2019). With respect to KSA, following the movement to the New Public Self-
Operating System phases (a way from fully corporatisation), the MoH budget increased 
substantially year-on-year (see section 5.5.1); this might be associated with the fact that 
corporatisation and privatisation are considered an “important pillar of Saudi Arabia’s 
recent economic reform” (Bazoobandi, 2019, p.2).   
(iii) Industry reform. The third motivation behind reform may be a desire to reform 
domestic HC industry structure, i.e., the need to carry out economic reform of domestic 
HC industry may involve changes to structure of hospitals in an industry considered to be 
inefficient. One way to address an inefficient domestic industry structure may be to move 
towards privatising it, supporting the premise that SCP applies as discussed in 2.2. and 
2.4.4. Part of the reform could also be to address problems associated with monopoly 
power or some other industry structure. Supporters of market-based reform claim that - if 
well performed – it will lead to competition in the market place. In turn, competition may 
improve efficiency and performance (Dinavo, 1995). This is the positive point of view, 
also repeated in this study, as the Saudi government targeted corporatisation/privatisation 
to promote competition and enhance efficiency (CEDA, 2018). This view, however, is 
not universally accepted. Some academics and other supporters of government-managed 
institutions argue that the corporatisation/privatisation of some industries may lead to 
higher prices for consumers and a less innovative performance where competition is 
limited (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003, p.1622).   
(iv) Ideology. The motivation towards market-based actions may be related purely 
to a shift in a government’s ideology. This study does not attempt to address ideological 
factors motivating reform. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in the 1980s (see 3.2.1 (ii) 
above) the leader of the UK government at that time believed that privatisation is one of 





the major reforms to eliminate the corruption impact of socialism. In contrast, the UK 
Labour Party believed that capital assets should be held by a popularly elected 
government to protect the country economically (Millar, 1997, p.391-395). Birdsall and 
Nellis (2003) suggest that governmental ideologies are due to the prevalence of public 
opinion and perceptions of unfairness in certain sectors of the community, rather than 
fact. However, according to Millar (1997) movement towards privatisation is not limited 
to a capitalist ideology alone.  
3.2.2 Components 
Components of a corporatisation (section 1.4) movement, full, or partial 
privatisation, are logical groupings of actions to firstly provide additional clarity and 
granularity to the process, and secondly to allow each component (and its associated 
actions) to act as independent (yet related) levers which can be adjusted to improve the 
overall performance. In the first stage of the process of corporatisation (on the assumption 
that corporatisation/privatisation is the chosen path), the motivations act as triggers to 
inform the orientation of the component structure. Depending on whether there are one 
or more motivations and how they are prioritised will affect the final structure of the 
model, and which actions are required to deliver the movement towards a partially, or 
fully, privatised regime. The conceptual model for this study is based on a subset of 
Harding and Preker’s (2000) analytical model reviewed in Chapter 2.  






Figure 3.3 - Components of Corporatisation 
 
 
The first three components in Figure 3.3 focus on those areas that may contribute 
to the desired efficiencies within the corporatisation strategy, whilst the last component 
takes a wider view of overall performance (ISO 8402, 2004) which includes both 
efficiency and quality aspects. 
(i) Decision rights. Increasing the autonomy of the organisation and its managers 
as it moves away from governmental controls allows greater freedom to make decisions 
at a local level. The local authority for decisions on various aspects of production 
including inputs, outputs, outcomes, and operational processes is increased in the 
movement towards full or partial privatisation (Preker and Harding, 2003, p.5). 
(ii) Market exposure. There are two dimensions to market exposure in 
corporatisation. Firstly, to create an internal market, introducing pseudo-competition 
between different entities (hospitals in the case of this study) to attract service users 
(patients). Secondly, there is a move to localised market transactions and introducing 
competition concerning recruitment, salaries and staffing mix, rather than centralised 















(iii) Residual Claimant. Simply this means that any savings (the residual left after 
costs are accounted for) from efficiencies, budget surpluses, and profits are retained. As 
an organisation moves towards full or partial privatisation, the residual will not be 
retained by the public purse.    
(iv) Accountability. Performance is related to both efficiency and quality. The 
accountability component of a corporatisation strategy introduces different controls, 
measures and regulations between the various stakeholders to influence the behaviours 
and actions related to achieving the desired HC outcomes in a manner outlined by the 
chosen performance model. 
3.2.3 Actions 
Actions are directly related to components and the result is change and movement 
as shown in Figure 3.4 (based on Preker and Harding, 2003) below. 
 
Figure 3.4 - Relationship between components and actions of corporatisation 
 
(i) Corporate governance. As identified in Chapter 2, one of the theoretical 
challenges of a movement towards privatisations is the principal-agent problem. When a 
private entity takes responsibility for a public organisation the ability to make 























returns is decreased, which may introduce various forms of principal-agent problems. 
This can lead to a cautious attitude in the shift towards privatisation and an increase in 
bureaucratic control. Depending on the level of perceived problems, the model of 
corporate governance can be used as a measure to modify decision-making rights. 
However, this may impact outcomes and, subsequently, overall performance, meaning 
the benefits of HC market competition may not be fully realised (Greengross, et al., 
1999). 
(ii) Market Formation. Achieving the perceived benefits from increasing market 
exposure is possibly the key component for any corporatisation or privatisation regime 
from a purely economic perspective. Actions applied to market exposure components 
may be required to increase competition, reduce barriers to entry, and prevent monopoly 
power. This action is closely related to that of corporate governance as discussed above. 
It often stems from observations (Shelley, 1995) about how the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) privatised its public sector. In this example, purchasers ended 
up with monopoly power, although citizens were provided with limited opportunities to 
participicate in the new market economy by the government (Shelley, 1995, p.3). The 
issue may be avoided by ensuring that when corporatisation occurs, competition is present 
and there are ways for new private entities to enter the market. In many cases within HC 
a pseudo (internal) market is formed, for example, in UK HC a pseudo (internal) market 
was enacted in law (National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990) with the 
intention to open up the market to competition. 
 (iii) Incentives. Movement towards privatisation is often intended to improve the 
effects of incentives on efficiency particular through the retention of financial residuals 
in preparation for entering wider capital markets. For example, the action in changing the 
ownership/management of firms may affect managerial incentives, which in turn affect 





performance and can increase efficiencies. In a privatised organisation, the performance 
of managers is driven through the capital market, where the capital market aligns the 
interest of shareholders and managers. However, in KSA this is not possible, as the public 
HC sector is primarily funded by MoH through a centralised funding model (Almutairi 
& Al Shamsi, 2018). Moreover, under private management, activities that increase asset 
values and minimise costs can be rewarded directly, whereas such activities are not 
necessarily rewarded under public management. The movement of budgets from central 
to localised control, and the ability to retain cost savings year on year is one action that 
can be introduced early in the corporatisation movement.  
(iv) Regulatory environment. Actions in this area can be motivated by concerns 
over introducing new moral hazards or decreases in quality aspects, possibly introduced 
by financial incentives. The action of introducing regulation and policy may ensure 
continued accountability. Some researchers suggest that the government should continue 
(Brock, 2004) to regulate the newly reformed industry, sector, or activity, others believe 
independent or self regulation is more appropriate (Preker and Harding 2003). Regulation 
may, perhaps, improve or damage the overall performance of the reformed activity. 
Whether regulation is useful is dependent on the market structure, which components of 
the model it is applied to, and associated behaviours of both the regulators and those being 
regulated (Garrón, et al., 2003).  
3.2.4 Phases 
In the current study, corporatisation is considered to be best divided into a number 
of discrete phases (see section 1.4) which contain various actions applied to components. 
By phasing the movement towards full or partial privatisation, different combinations of 
components and associated actions can be introduced, the outcomes measured and 
assessed, to determine whether the overall performance has achieved the desired effect 





and satisfied the original motivation/s. This allows for small, time-limited 
experimentations, providing a gradual rather than explosive path to understanding the 
interdependencies and risks in the local environment and how remaining aligned to 
motivational influences may affect the model.  
3.2.5 Outcomes 
Outcomes demonstrate what has been achieved by an organisation. Outcomes may 
be quantitative or qualitative. There should be a line of traceability from the 
organisation’s motivations through to the components and eventual outcomes, 
irrespective of whether, or what form of privatisation or corporatisation strategy is 
chosen. In this way, the economic efficiencies can be related to the HC outcome variables. 
Figure 3.5 below represents the three measures of quality defined by Donabedian (1966) 
as mentioned before in 2.6.1 above, and this is the model that the KSA (CBAHI, 2015) 
has adopted for the assessment of quality. Structural standards address the system’s are 
inputs, outputs standards to address the activities or interventions carried out within the 






















3.2.6 Assessment and performance feedback loop 
HC outcomes contribute to the overall performance of the hospital system and may 
be measured and assessed. However, if they are not used or are inappropriately 
constructed for the environment, then they may have limited benefit. As noted in section 
2.6.1 (through the six domains of quality in a HC setting, p.67), the quality of outcomes 
provided, as well as efficiency aspects, is both important considerations within HC 
performance, as well; Donabedian (1966, p.166) highlighted the conflict of using 
“economic efficiency as a measurable dimension of (HC) quality”. KSA quality 
assessment model (see 2.6.1 and 3.2.5 above) is a view that is supported by Lafortune, et 
al. (2016) of linking both the outputs and outcomes with the inputs to provide hospital 
services. However, the final step in this model attempts to addresses this conflict of 
definition between economic efficiency and (HC) quality. 
The trouble with empirical data is that the types of efficiency are aggregated. For 
the purpose of this study, two types of efficiency concepts are considered, PE, and AE by 
measuring outcomes related to cost (per 1,000 of the local population), i.e., static 
efficiency relating to the combination of resources at a given point in time, itself 
comprising PE (relative to a PPF), and AE (choice of point along that frontier). The study 
considers aspects of HC quality through the study of MR outcomes in relation to output 
variables (Statsoft, 2018).  
These indicators could be fed back and can be used within the government, to allow 
better-informed adjustments to be made to components and actions, to meet motivations, 
or alternatively highlight considerations for further inspection. 
3.3 Formal Hypotheses 
The previous section outlines how the components and actions associated with 
corporatisation shown within this study's theoretical model can be supportive of the desire 





to achieve both greater economic efficiency and hospital performance in a positive way, 
through a number of actions. In particular the indicators of performance can identify the 
relative efficiencies of inputs and outputs and how these contribute to the effectiveness 
of HC quality outcomes. Therefore, the main focus of this research is to identify whether 
different levels of corporatisation (as indicated in Figure 1.1) exhibit positive or negative 
consequences in terms of hospital efficiency and effectiveness. Formal hypotheses to test 
in the study are stated as follows: 
H1 - Performance in terms of efficiency may differ under the different forms of 
corporatisation. The basis for this hypothesis is derived from the above discussion and 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 which indicate that incentive effects are different 
under the different forms of corporatisation, so that PE and AE may differ according to 
whether the firm is fully corporatised, or less so (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  
H2 - Corporatisation will be positively associated with efficiency. A positive 
association between corporatisation and PE would be consistent with the design of 
incentives (Holmström, 1979), public choice (Niskanen, 1971, 1975; Buchanan, 1969), 
and principal-agent (Williamson, 1964; Migue and Belanger, 1984; McColgan, 2001; 
Adams, et al., 2006). 
H3 - Fully corporatised hospitals will perform better in terms of quality than 
partially corporatised hospitals. Under less corporatised firms, public managers are 
constrained by the extent of the control retained by the government. In fully corporatised 
firms the balance of control changes, decision rights increase, and residual rights are 
retained by the local organisation, rather than the central public purse (see 1.4 above). 
Thus, if the performance of the firm improves with an increase in corporatisation 
components, then H3 is confirmed. However, any level of corporatisation does not totally 
release an organisation from the bureaucratic control with its conventional accounting 





measures (Clarke, et al., 2005; Jiang and Yao, 2011).  
More formally, the main hypotheses can be described in the form of a model 
specified as: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡,𝑡−𝑛, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑡−𝑛)              Hypothesis  (1) 
Where 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡 represents a measure or indicator of efficiency, 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑡−𝑛 represents the movement towards privatisation, and 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡,𝑡−𝑛 represents the other controls in the model. The t and n subscripts capture 
time period and the number of phases, respectively. Let β be the coefficient measuring 
the effect of corporatisation on efficiency, so that 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑡−𝑛 is hypothesised to 
be statistically different from zero and positive, meaning that periods of greater 
corporatisation are correlated with a higher measure of efficiency, i.e.,: 
𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑡−𝑛 > 0                                                                   Hypothesis (2) 
As explained in chapter 1, this study includes four phases, so that n=4. Given the 
(supposed) ordinal nature of a corporatisation movement, the paper also hypothesises 
that: 
𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 > 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−2 > 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−3  
Hypothesis (3)  
Hypothesis (3) simply implies that the closer the movement towards privatisation, 
the greater the increase in efficiency will be. This is consistent with the argumentation 
stated earlier (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Sheshinski and López-Calva, 2003). Thus, the 
t-1 coefficient would be greater than the t-2 coefficient; t-2 coefficient would be greater 
than the t-3 coefficient, but t-4 is a reversal. 





3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has examined the corporatisation process, through which movement 
towards privatisation may increase the efficiency of firms. Corporatisation results when 
only management control is moved to the private sector and the government retains 
ownership. A corporatisation strategy may be motivated by a change in political 
paradigm, a need to reduce a budget deficit, to overhaul industry, or through changes in 
ideology. Moving towards privatisation may have the potential to improve the efficiency 
of organisations by removing waste and using inputs more efficiently. It is shown that 
corporatisation has a number of components that are affected by actions, causing 
movement towards (or away from) greater efficiencies and overall performance. 
However, the private management of organisations may fall prey to principal-agent 
problems, necessitating additional governance and regulatory frameworks that may also 
affect performance.  
A set of three hypotheses has been developed which will be tested empirically, in 
the case of the phased corporatisation of hospitals in the KSA, between 1979 – 2014. The 













The previous chapter presented a conceptual framework explaining the pathways 
through which performance is expected to improve with the degree of corporatisation. 
This conceptual framework provides a background for a set of three hypotheses to test. 
This chapter presents the methodology employed in this study to test those hypotheses. 
There are four sections to the chapter.  
The first section 4.2 discusses the philosophical approach and rationale for the 
chosen approach of this study. The second section 4.3 presents the three performance 
domains within the framework, a description, and examples of possible indicators. 
Section 4.4 presents a description of the sets of variables and how they were used. The 
fourth section 4.5 provides the sources and description of the data employed for the 
empirical testing of the stated hypotheses. 4.6 presents the econometric methods 
employed in this study in order to address the research questions, associated hypotheses, 
and support the discussion and interpretation of the findings. Finally, the empirical model 
is presented at 4.7.  
4.2 Philosophical approach and rationale 
Paradigms based on Ontological, Epistemological, and Methodological 
Assumptions may be viewed as sets of basic beliefs that address first principles. Maykut 
and Morehouse (1994) as cited in Yavuz (2012, p.60), explain “that ‘Ontological 
Assumptions’ concern questions about the nature of reality; ‘Epistemological 
Assumptions’ concern the origins of knowledge and the relationship between the 
knower and the known; ‘Axiological Assumptions’ study the roles of values in 





understanding; ‘Logic’ deals with the possibility of generalisation and causal linkages 
between bits of information”.  
Firstly, Ontology is about ‘the nature of reality’. Naïve Realism assumes objective 
facts, separate from human perception, but Nominalism assumes no such facts, just 
approximations to reality. Secondly, Epistemology, as mentioned above, is related to 
what is the nature of relationship between the knower and the known, where the answer 
to this question is restricted by the answer given to the ontological question, and that 
impacts research Axiology, so the knower should be either objective, or subjective where 
the researcher's perceptions may lead to biases (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). Thirdly, 
Methodology, involves the methods used to explore the ‘facts’ that may be organised 
around theories, e.g., using experiments or quantitative methods to find relationships, 
predictions, and generalisations (using Deductive logic), or an Inductive approach could 
use qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods. 
Interpretivism assumes subjective facts, where there is no absolute truth, but 
multiple opinions differ according to human perception. However, as its philosophical 
stance, this study uses an Objective Positivist Methodology “…which postulates that 
propositions can only be known directly from experience” (Fascia, 2014, p.4). Of course, 
so-called objective data may conceal value judgements, and data inaccuracies may bias 
the results of tests on hypotheses. The researcher may recognise these problems but 
adhere to findings anyhow. There can be no guarantee that the researcher can exclude 
human emotion and behaviour from influencing positivist studies. Positivists tend to be 
inflexible, as they believe that everything can be measured and calculated. They see things 
as they are and tend to disregard unexplained phenomena and eliminate the process of 
finding answers by creatively and indirectly solving a problem. The observed ‘facts’ 
assembled for this study have indeed been gathered, are number-based and allow the 





hypotheses derived from economic theories to be tested. These hypotheses concern 
predicted HC efficiency with different levels of corporatisation, developed using a 
deductive logic that focuses on the verification of hypotheses to develop relationships, 
predictions, and generalisations. 
Nevertheless, there are many weaknesses with a naïve realist/positivist approach, 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Teddy, 1999), that cannot be avoided totally. Although 
interpretive research tends to depend heavily on qualitative data, in the case of this KSA 
study, quantitative data may offer a clearer understanding of the phenomenon of interest 
than qualitative data based on declared subjectivity where the enquiry’s aim based on 
‘facts’ is to provide an explanation or prediction to verify or refute hypotheses (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994, p.112). In addition, ‘objectively verifiable’ performance standards may be 
generally more dependable than subjective standards as they include quantity, speed, and 
efficiency, which can be measured mathematically.  
Although objective data related to performance, efficiency and effectiveness may 
be less capable of being distorted by potential bias (because it is arguably less susceptible 
to errors in human judgment), in some fields, such objective data can be misleading. For 
example, in the case of HC in the UK, financial incentives were introduced for General 
Practitioners (GPs) for the provision of ‘quality care’, which has in some cases led to 
over-prescriptions and a decrease in the overall well-being of patients (Donnelly, 2019). 
Using another example, hospital MR may be a weak measure of how hospitals actually 
perform and it may not be the major criterion for deciding whether a hospital is good or 
bad as it takes into account all potential deaths, not just the mortalities that were prevented 
through high quality care. Many patients may be too sick to be saved when they are 
admitted to the hospital. 





In contrast, looking at specific mortality rates may make sense. For example, 
looking at death rates following a heart attack could be a good quality measure since there 
is anticipation that those patients should survive. As noted in 2.6.1 above, the introduction 
of Quality Initiatives in the KSA did not formally occur until 2003, with the creation of 
an accredited body in 2006 - the CBAHI. However, more recently the MoH in KSA has 
applied Performance indicators such as ‘Deaths Reported to MOH Hospitals by Disease 
Groups, National, and Sex’ (Ministry of Health Portal, 2019, p.301). 
4.3 Performance domains 
As defined in Chapter 2, HC performance is often discussed in the literature in terms 
of a set of measurable indicators capturing information on efficiency, effectiveness, and 
quality aspects. Within the KSA, MoH has adopted a set of performance indicators that 
are structured around the CBAHI (2015) performance framework (see section 2.6.1). 
Figure 4.2 below presents the three performance domains within the framework, a 
description, and examples of possible indicators. In this case, it is important to understand 
the context of these domains as terminology which is used by HC and Quality Assurance 
professionals and experts in the KSA currently, in relation to the more generic economic 
definitions (i.e., inputs, outputs, and outcomes). The three domains are concerned with 
structural performance, activity and procedural performance, and finally outcome 
performance. Structural standards address hospital inputs, activity and procedure 
standards address hospital outputs, and outcome standards are concerned with the 
effectiveness of the hospital services on HC outcomes. Figure 4.1 (based on Preker ans 
Harding, 2003 and performance indicators, CBAHI, 2015), below shows the direct 
relationship between the definitions and measurements of hospital activity (Inputs, 
Outputs, and Outcomes) noted within the quality aspects of performance in 2.6.1 and 
repeated in 3.2.5 above, with the overall indicators of KSA performance domains 














Figure 4.1 - Relationship between performance measures 
 
Within these three domains, as noted in a number of studies (Aday, et al., 1993; 
Hurst, 1999; Kötter, et al., 2012; Bartel, et al., 2014), performance can cover a number 
of areas including population health, patient outcomes, responsiveness of the HC system, 
safety as clinical quality and appropriateness of care, depth and breadth of the HC system, 
as well as productivity.  
(i) Population health. Population health represents measures of aggregated data on 
the health of a population and may not be wholly representative at a hospital level. 
Previous studies have included such indicators as MR, years of life lost, and instances of 
avoidable mortality (Knowles, et al., 1997; Hurst, 1999).  
(ii) Patient outcomes. Indicators of patient or individual level health outcomes, 
such as health status can be used either on an absolute or relative (per capita) basis. Prior 
studies using patient level health outcomes have used indicators such as radiology impact, 
and patient satisfaction (Aday, et al., 1993).  
























(iii) Responsiveness. A related measurement area is responsiveness of the HC 
system, which captures the way individuals are treated and the environment in which they 
are treated during health system interactions. Some measures may also include subjective 
rankings. Indicators of this measurement area include patient dignity, autonomy, 
confidentiality, communication, prompt attention, and quality of basic amenities. Prior 
studies have included indicators capturing patient experience and satisfaction measures 
(Manary, et al., 2013).  
(iv) Safety. By assessing the clinical quality and appropriateness of care for 
procedures such as operations carried out in hospitals across the country, the aim is to 
improve care by ensuring procedures are as safe as possible, improving the experience of 
patients and encouraging good practice. For example, internal peer reviews or quality 
assurance visits from external bodies are ways to assess the clinical quality of procedures 
(for example, operations) carried out in hospitals. In this example it could be suggested 
that the higher the rate of peer review visits, the less efficient the hospital is, as it could 
indicate low quality of the care provided requiring excessive monitoring of peer, or 
alternatively, just that the hospital is rigorous in carrying out internal quality assessment 
regimes.   
(v) Depth and breadth. This area captures the extent to which individuals use the HC 
system services, where service provision/output leads to performance. The outputs of the 
HC provision process can be observed by the extent to which systems obtain effective 
coverage of the population, where the effective coverage system might be defined as the 
ratio of the realised HC gain -from a set of interventions- over the total potential gain, if 
the providers -for a given HC system- performed at their optimal level (Adams, et al., 
2002). Previous empirical studies have used proxies including utilisation measures, such 





as access to HC, use-to-need ratios, spending on HC, and health outcome measures 
(Zuvekas and Taliaferro, 2003). 
(vi) Productivity. Prior studies have measured labour productivity as a specific 
productivity variable, as well as cost-effectiveness measures and PE (Bartel, et al., 2014).   
The present study has attempted to cover these areas as much as possible. However, 
the extent to which they can be considered directly is limited by data availability and the 
focus of the present study. Firstly, since the focus of the current study is (to reiterate) to 
identify whether different levels of corporatisation (as indicated in Figure 1.1) exhibit 
positive or negative associations with hospital efficiency and effectiveness set within the 
KSA HC environment, it may be difficult to draw causal inference between hospital 
governance and patient level outcomes such as patient satisfaction. Doing so may require 
patient experience surveys across the hospitals over time, which were not available in the 
KSA at the time of undertaking the present study.  
         Secondly, a key issue arising from the various studies (as cited in Sheiner and 
Malinovskaya, 2016, p.8) is that some researchers have measured quality of HC through 
outcomes, e.g., Howard, et al. (2010); Rosen, et al. (2007); and Romley, et al. (2015), 
and measure improvements by changes in life expectancy. Other researchers have used 
less direct measures, e.g., Lakdawalla, et al. (2015), who assessed changes in life 
expectancy associated with new treatments for multiple myeloma and colorectal cancer. 
Others focus on inputs, without measuring outcomes or the outputs of HC services that 
patients received. This is the approach currently used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) in their quality adjustment for hospital producer price indexes for the treatment of 
heart attacks, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgery (e.g., measuring the heart failure 
comprises whether patients were given specific medicine, or whether they were given 





smoking stoppage advices. Likewise, the BLS regulates prices of the nursing home 
services according to the nurse level).  
         Figure 4.2 below attempts to logically align the measurements of hospital activity 
(Inputs, Outputs, and Outcomes) and performance domains (Structural, Procedural, and 
Outcomes) with a description and examples of possible indicators. 
Measurement 
Domain 




The system’s inputs  
 
- Spending on HC 
- Hospital beds available 
- Manpower (Doctors, Nurses, 
Allied Personnel) 
- Hospital building designed to 
provide basic amenities 
- Stock equipment for safety (e.g., 
gloves and masks) 
- Clinical equipment and supplies 









The system’s outputs 
The clinical and administrative activities or 
interventions carried out within the hospital in 
the care of patients or in the management of 
the hospital or its staff 
- Administration assessments and 
PE 
- Patient assessments and 
procedures to measure the way 
individuals are treated and 
environment in which they are 
treated during health system 
interactions (e.g., tests performed, 
waiting times responsiveness) 





Measures provide indications about the 
benefits and effectiveness of an intervention, 
and whether predicted outcomes are being 
acheived  
- MR indicators  
- Population Health 
- Instances of avoidable mortality 
- Effectiveness measures  
- Readmission rates 
- Utilistion measures such as rates 
of access and use to need ratios  
- Patient satisfaction  
 
Notes: based on MoH Quality Performance Framework 
Figure 4.2 Hospital Inputs, Output, and Outcome 
         Furthermore, the first part of the next section discusses how the issues of definition, 
grouping and assignment of variables are addressed in the present study. These data issues 
and the justification for our approach are discussed in the next section.  






It is generally believed that hospitals provide three essential services, namely 
inpatient, outpatient, and laboratory services. In this model, outputs should reflect these 
core services, whilst inputs should reflect the resources used to generate these outputs 
(services provided). According to Chansky, et al. (2013), it is possible to aggregate these 
different types of outputs into a single index to indicate overall inputs and outputs of the 
hospital. However, the authors argued that disaggregating the set of services (treatments) 
provided by hospitals is preferable, as it is a more precise measure and has the advantage 
of determining productivity in the most direct way. This suggests consideration of outputs 
in terms of services provided, rather than in terms of those who provided it.   
Table 4.1 presents a description of the five sets of variables and how they were 
used, to provide a better understanding of the scope of the study data, the dimensions of 
the performance indicators used and measured, and to aid a consistent definition for the 
interpretation and examination of the results.  
Table 4.1 - Description of variables 
Variable Description and Usage in Study 
Input variables: 
MoH Budget Annual total expenditures by the MoH in millions of Saudi 
Arabian Riyals (SAR) 
Number of Beds Annual total hospital beds, by hospital  
Number of Doctors Annual total Doctors, by hospital  
Number of Nurses Annual total Nurses, by hospital  
Number of Allied Personnel Annual total Allied Personnel, by hospital  
Output variables*: 
Inpatients discharged Annual total Inpatients discharged, by hospital  
Radiology tests Annual total Radiology tests performed, by hospital  
Laboratory tests Annual total Laboratory tests performed, by hospital  
Review visits  Annual total Review visits carried out, by hospital  
Outcome variables: 
MR The number of deaths per 1,000 of the local population of KSA. 
Variable is used to measure the population health as a 
performance (quality) outcome. 
Control variables:  
Location of the Hospitals An indicator of whether the hospital is located in a rural, semi 
urban, or an urban area. (0 for Rural, 1 for Semi-urban, and 2 
for Urban) 
Size of the City Measured by the local population number of city where a 
hospital is located (0 for big-sized city, 1 for medium-sized city, 
and 2 for small-sized city). 
Number of Pilgrims Millions per annum.  





Programme variables: (System Phases) 
Bilateral Agreements Management type during the period 1979 to 1982 
Partial Operating Management type during the period 1983 to 1987 
Comprehensive Operating Management type during the period 1988 to 1999 
New Public Self-Operating Management type during the period 2000 to 2014 
*Output variables in the regression analysis are used as inputs (independent variables).     
(i) Input and Output variables. In line with the literature reviews in Chapter 2 on 
hospital performance, the approach adopted in this present study was to examine hospital 
performance (efficiency) in terms of usage of numerous resources (inputs) to produce 
multiple HC products and services (outputs) to achieve the outcomes required. A major 
measurement issue in service-providing entities generally, and a hospital especially, 
relates to the longstanding debate (e.g., Jacobs, 2000; Ozcan, 1992) on which indicators 
that could be considered as inputs or outputs to examine performance (efficiency). The 
debate has continued in both academia and the HC industry. Even today for example, 
Google Scholar returns over 16,000 hits on the search term “hospital performance 
indicators” covering 2019 alone and 54,000 in the past four years). Generally, there has 
been little consensus or standardisation on the definitions of hospital inputs and outputs, 
in order to account for the complex nature of the services that hospitals provide. Rather, 
studies appear to have adopted definitions that are suitable for the specific purpose of 
their own study.  
Some studies focus exclusively on cost-related variables as inputs such as 
operational cost, patient cost, and doctor fees. While outputs are considered as income 
such as revenues, gross margins (e.g., Iswanto, 2015; Chansky, et al., 2013). Defining 
hospital inputs and outputs in terms of financial costs and revenues may limit the extent 
to which these indicators capture hospital performance and certainly introduce AE to the 
analysis as well as PE. Taking a solely cost-related view could also be perceived as 
heavily weighted towards assessing profit-making performance. Most hospitals in 
developing countries, however, are set up as public sector (rather than for profit-making) 





utilities, and hospital performance may not be orientated towards financial aspects as 
there are also the non-financial aspects of performance to consider. 
Another strand of studies distinguishes two general types of outputs of hospitals 
(e.g., Scott, 1979). The first type considers outputs as processes, relating to actions and 
activities performed on the patients. From this point of view, proposed input variables 
can also be considered as process outputs. If processes relate to the functioning of 
hospitals as indicated by the number and types of services performed for patients, then 
these inputs differ markedly and are the resources used to provide these services, are not 
by themselves the activities/actions. The second type considers outputs as outcomes, 
relating to changes that occurred in the condition of the patient.  
However, a third strand of studies (Iswanto, 2015; Hossein, et al., 2011; Al-Shayea, 
2011; Caballer-Tarazona, et al., 2010; Bhat, et al., 2001; Jacobs, 2000) address hospital 
efficiency in developing countries, using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
approach. This strand of studies has generally adopted similar definitions of inputs and 
outputs. Specifically, in Bhat, et al. (2001), input variables include number of beds, 
number of doctors, number of nurses, and capital input, whilst the output variables 
comprised laboratory tests completed, inpatients treated, outpatients discharged, and 
maternal and child health cases treated.  
Thus, the first set of variables is, five input quantity variables, which include MoH 
budget, number of Beds, number of Doctors, number of Nurses, and number of Allied 
personnel used in the hospitals. 
The second set of variables is, output quantity variables. These include the number 
of Inpatients discharged, number of Radiology tests, number of Laboratory tests, and 
number of Review visits. These four output variables are used as the dependent variables 
to indicate hospital performance (efficiency). However, in the regression tests these 





outputs are used as independent variables to indicate hospital performance 
(effectiveness). 
The other variables considered in this study are outcome variables, control 
variables, and programme variables.  
(ii) Outcome. MR, measured as the number of deaths per 1,000 of the population, 
as used by MoH is the key variable to proxy for outcome quality. However, MR is a key 
performance indicator used across the HC industry (in this case quality defined by the 
effectiveness of HC production efficiency) across the programme variables (phases). MR 
is used as the dependent variable for the regression’s tests in this study, where the outputs 
set became independent variables (see section 6.2.3 (i)). MR (at population level) cannot 
be used as an output variable for the hospitals because factors other than hospital 
performance could also have contributed to the observed MR in the population.  
(iii) Control. Three main control variables are used. Firstly, location of the hospitals 
to capture the potential affect of environment. Secondly, the size of the city as measured 
by the local population of the area where the hospitals are located. Finally, the total 
number of pilgrims is also included as a control variable. This is particularly important, 
as the annual influx of pilgrims (see section 1.3.2) tends to put increasing pressure on 
hospital resources, with congestion effects on performance. 
(iv) Programme. Finally, in line with the process of changes in management and 
operation of hospitals in the KSA, as mentioned previously in 1.4 above, four broad 
phases are identified, namely: The Bilateral Cooperation Agreements, Partial Operating 
System, Comprehensive Operating System, and New Public Self-Operating System 
phases (Al-Ateeq, 2002). The programme variable is time-limited across each phase and 
indicates changes in corporatisation movements in management, control, and operation 
of the hospitals within the scope of this study. The aim of this study is to examine 





differences in hospital performance according to each of these phases. Therefore, a binary 
indicator (0 or 1) is generated for each of these phases to capture programme associations, 
using one phase as the reference. For example, the Comprehensive Operating System 
phase variable takes the value 1 if the period was 1988 to 1999, and value 0, if otherwise.  
4.5 Data   
This study follows previous studies that apply the DEA model of hospital 
efficiency. Using DEA techniques, it examines the association between the physical 
inputs into a hospital production process and the non-qualitative outputs of that process. 
In addition, a major strength of using a range of (input and output) variables is that they 
are consistent with the disaggregation approach suggested by Chansky, et al. (2013).   
The majority of the datasets used in this study were obtained from the MoH, KSA. 
The MoH is the main government agency with the responsibility to provide HC services 
at all levels to the populace in the KSA, and is the main official source of HC data in the 
KSA. The unpublished collection of official records and data from MoH involved several 
meetings with the officials of MoH in order to get them to release the data for the research. 
Economy-wide data were sourced from publicly available records (for example KSA 
Statistical Yearbooks). Population data which distributed by city, was obtained from the 
General Authority for Statistics, KSA. The dataset for MR was obtained from World 
Bank.    
4.5.1 Summary statistics of hospital-specific variables 
The study population consists of 37 MoH’s hospitals in the KSA. Although the 
MoH is the dominant provider of hospital services in the KSA, as represented in chapter 
1, there are other governmental hospitals that were operating at the same time that have 
not been considered. Ideally, all of the hospitals should be included in the study, or a 





random sample (to eliminate sampling bias) of them selected. However, this is impossible 
as certain criteria constrained the study to adopt a non-probability sampling approach, 
involving selection of a sample of 20 hospitals (covering 54 per cent of all corporatisation 
hospitals) on the basis of a set of selection criteria, rather than each hospital having equal 
chance of being sampled from the entire population of hospitals. The criteria used for the 
selection of the 20 hospitals were: 
(i) Hospitals that have complete data and have been in existence for the entire 36 
years of the study period (1979 – 2014), and 
(ii) Hospitals that have undergone all the four phases of change in management 
and operation during the period.  
These criteria were essential to address the research questions. In 2014 the total 
number of hospitals was 270 (Ministry of Health, 2015), so the results represent less than 
10 per cent of the total MoH hospital population. A key limitation of the non-probability 
sampling approach is that of limited external validity, as the findings should be considered 
with caution, where the number of hospitals included cannot be considered as truly 
representative of all MoH hospitals4. However, according to the size of the populations 
served by (37) hospitals for the years 1979 and 2014, as represented in Appendix 4.A, 
there are no statistically significant differences between selected (20) and excluded (17) 
hospitals, where the P-values for the t-test are greater than 0.05, and the Mean Differences 
between selected and excluded hospitals are considered slight. 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of the corporatisation stages, size of city, 
location of hospitals, and number of pilgrims.  
 
 
4 Efforts at collecting characteristics data on the excluded hospitals to test for sample bias proved abortive. 
Individual hospitals cannot give data to the public. The MoH has no data on the excluded hospitals. 





Table 4.2 - Summary statistics - phases, hospital size and location control variables 
Variable Obs. 
Mean 
(%) Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Corporatisation phase (Bilateral Agreements) 720 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Corporatisation phase (Partial Operating) 720 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Corporatisation phase (Comprehensive) 720 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Corporatisation phase (New Public Self-
Operating) 720 0.42 0.49 0 1 
 
Size of city – Big city 720 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Size of city – medium 720 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Size of city - small city 720 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
Location of hospital – Rural 720 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Location of hospital – Semi-urban 720 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Location of hospital – Urban 720 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Number of pilgrims (Millions) 720 1.196 0.295 0.703 1.705 
The Table shows the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum: there are n = 720 observations (20 hospitals observed over 36 years). The 
majority of the observations (42 per cent) are in the period of the New Public Self-
Operating. The majority of the cities (60 per cent) where the hospitals are located were 
classified as big cities in the KSA, whilst the majority of the hospitals (80 per cent) are 
located in semi-urban and urban areas. The number of pilgrims to the KSA averaged about 
1.2m per year, ranging between minimum of 0.7m and maximum 1.7m.  
4.5.2 Descriptive statistics of variables for all periods and by phase: mean values 
Appendices 4.B and 4.C provide descriptive statistics of the output and input 
variable data, respectively, from which Table 4.3 below is derived. The Table shows the 
mean values of the output and input variables, and the MR outcome variable, for all 
periods (1979-2014) and by corporatisation phase: Bilateral Agreements phase (1979-
1982), Partial phase (1983-1987), Comprehensive phase (1988-1999), and finally the 
period of the New Public Self-Operating System phase to 2014.  
For the output variables, the mean value increases sequentially apart from Inpatients 
discharged. The mean value of the Inpatients discharged variable is relatively lower 





during the period of Comprehensive Operating System phase than the mean values 
calculated against each of the other phases. The mean values of all output variables were 
relatively higher under the New Public Self-Operating System than other phases.  
In terms of input variables, the mean value of number of Beds, Doctors, Nurses and 
Allied personnel increases over time and are all relatively higher under the New Public 
Self-Operating System phase than under each of the other preceding phases. The MoH 
budget (as a macro variable) increases across each phase, with a proportionally larger 
mean increase in the New Public Self-Operating System phase (i.e., approximately 207.3 
per cent larger than the Comprehensive Operating System phase). The MR outcome 
variable decreases across each sequential phase. 
However, no hard conclusions can be drawn at this stage of the study. This is largely 
because other factors may have contributed to the observed mean values of the input, 
output, and outcome variables. More importantly, the mean values may hide important 
timing effects on the observed variables.  
Moving on, the econometric methods are presented in the next section.  
Table 4.3 - Mean values of variables for all periods by phase (to nearest whole number) 














Outputs:           
Radiology tests 482561 27059 27116 35249 71363 
Inpatients 
discharged 
12131 11383 11414 11073 13415 
Laboratory tests 1164130 678785 678822 1037093 1556954 
Review visits 88217 77397 77465 82226 99479 
Inputs:      
Beds  269 166 183 281 314 
Doctors  136 86 92 140 161 
Nurses 251 173 179 259 290 
Allied personnel 115 71 74 99 154 
MoH Budget (SAR) 17275215 7642650 8539581 9443287 29021318 
Outcomes:      
MR 6 8 6 5 4 
Source: Author calculation from Tables 4.B and 4.C in the Appendix. 
Notes: Output variables used in regression section as inputs (independent variables). 
           Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the budget variable is less than 10 in Appendix 5.F and 5.G. 





4.6 Econometric Methods 
Three keys econometric methods are employed in this study in order to address the 
research questions, associated hypotheses, and support the discussion and interpretation 
of the findings. Starting from highly restrictive nonparametric Data Envelope Analysis 
(DEA), to parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), to more flexible Panel Data 
Analysis, in addition to the Ordinary Least Squares Analysis (OLS), where no single 
model able to address all RQs (see section 1.5). For example, DEA is concerned with 
inputs and outputs, no other than Panel Analysis can examine changes overtime; so, these 
models acting as robust checks on each other. The remaining part of this subsection 
presents a detailed description of these methods and their applications. 
4.6.1 Data envelope analysis (DEA) 
Since it is expected that efficiencies change through corporatisation, it is possible 
to analyse each phase using DEA (e.g., Charnes, et al., 1978; Banker, e. al., 1984). DEA 
has been used in many studies to assess the efficiency of public services, as well as 
changes in the public-private management of public utilities, including HC (e.g., Ozcan 
and Luke, 1993; Cullinane, et al., 2006; Tiemann, et al., 2012). DEA is a nonparametric 
linear programming method assumes that there is no statistical noise and the production 
functions consists only of the inputs and the outputs for measuring the PE (in this study) 
of Decision-Making Units (DMU), which use the same set of input variables to produce 
the same set of outputs (Coelli, 1996). This assumption does not allow other factors to 
influence production outside the inputs. As such, there is no assumption of a deterministic 
production frontier.  
The two basic DEA models that are most widely used are DEA-CCR based on 
Charnes, et al. (1978) and DEA-BCC based on Banker, et al. (1984). The two models 





differ in terms of their underlying assumptions. The DEA-CCR model assumes constant 
returns to scale, implying that all observed production compositions can be scaled up or 
down proportionally. The DEA-BCC model, on the other hand, assumes variable returns 
to scale and is graphically represented by a piecewise linear convex frontier (Cullinane, 
et al., 2006). 
Output orientation represents increasing the output quantities without changing the 
input quantities used. On the other hand, input orientation presents decreasing the input 
quantities without changing the output quantities. 
The application of DEA in this study follows the general form of the DEA model, 
stated in the form of a set of inputs, outputs, and associated matrices, indicating the linear 
combination of the inputs and outputs. The standard formal mathematical specification 
of the varied DEA models can be found in Cooper, et al. (2000). 
The efficiency score for each hospital is calculated as:  
efficiency score=     weighted sum of outputs weighted sum of inputs                                                         (1) 
The hospital is considered to be efficient with a score 1, but inefficient with a score 
of less than 1. 
The CCR ratio model calculates an overall efficiency for the unit in which both its 
pure PE and scale efficiency are aggregated into a single value. Furthermore, the scale 
efficiency can be computed from the CCR and the BCC models denoted as SE: 
SE = UCRS / UVRS                                                                                         (2) 
Where UCRS and UVRS are the PE measures for the hospital derived from applying 
the DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC models, respectively, While SE = 1 indicates scale 
efficiency, and SE < 1 indicates scale inefficiency. In empirical applications, scale 
inefficiency may be due to increasing or to decreasing returns to scale, which can be 





specified by assaying the sum of the reference weights 𝑒𝜆𝑖. If this sum is equal to 1, the 
law of constant returns to scale dominates, whilst increasing and decreasing returns to 
scale prevail if the sum is less or greater than 1, respectively. (Cullinane, et al., 2006, p. 
23) 
The application of DEA in this study facilitates an overall evaluation of hospital 
performance (efficiency) in the KSA because it has the advantage of considering multiple 
inputs and outputs. Regarding the application of DEA in the context of determining a 
relationship between hospital performance (PE in this study) and different types of 
management and operation structures, Valentine and Gray (2001) applied the DEA-CCR 
model to examine the efficiency of 31 container ports. 
Using the DEA results, Tobit Regression Analysis is used to find the determinants 
of efficiency gaps among the hospitals, largely because the efficiency scores of the 
hospitals are censored above the maximum value of efficiency scores (Ji and Lee, 2010). 
The efficiency scores are the dependent coefficients, and the determinants are hospital 
level, while the control variables include population, location of hospital and size of the 
city.  
4.6.2 Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
The SFA model provides an alternative approach to DEA which was introduced 
simultaneously by Aigner, et al. (1977). SFA model assumes the existence of a parametric 
function relating outputs to inputs and the existence of random shocks outside the control 
of firms which can affect output (Cullinane, et al., 2006). Thus, the idea behind SFA is 
that the error term is composed of two parts, one that captures the effects of inefficiency 
relative to the stochastic frontier, and the statistical noise component to capture the 
random shocks outside the control of firms.  





The SFA can be specified as: 
𝑌𝑖 =  (𝑋𝑖 , 𝑈𝑖, 𝑉𝑖)                                                                                                 (3) 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the observed scalar output produced by hospital i, (i=1,..I), from a given 
vector (K 1) of inputs 𝑋𝑖,  𝑈𝑖 is a non-negative inefficiency term (first error component), 
and 𝑉𝑖 is the statistical noise component, which can be either positive or negative (second 
error component).  
Liu (1995) used SFA to examine performance of British ports under public and 
private sector ownership and management. 
The PE of hospital i can be obtained as the ratio of the observed physical output to 
the maximum level of physical output, dependent on input levels. The PE score can be 
computed as: 
𝑃𝐸𝑖 = 𝑒−𝑈𝑖 =
𝑌𝑖
𝑓(𝑋𝑖, 𝛽)𝑒𝑉𝑖
                                                                                                   (4)            
Where 𝑓(𝑋𝑖, 𝛽)𝑒𝑉𝑖 is the stochastic frontier production, and 𝑈𝑖 is a non-negative 
random variable. The main advantage of this specific model is that it includes 
environmental elements in the approximation of the production frontier because these 
elements may exercise a direct effect on efficiency. Together with DEA, the measurement 
of efficiency may be more accurate in addressing the effect of corporatisation in the KSA 
on hospital performance (efficiency).  
Two additional considerations are presented in this subsection.  
4.6.3 Panel data specification 
The first relates to the panel data of the sample of hospitals, and the need to consider 
the stability of the model over time. By using information of both the variations between 
hospitals, and the changes overtime, panel data specification increases the precision of 





performance (efficiency) estimates, and makes it possible to have a better understanding 
of the complicated behaviour of different economic relationships. Panel data models can 
be specified as pooled regression, fixed effects (FE), and random effects (RE) models 
depending on the underlying assumptions (Hill, et al., 2011).  
The pooled regression model is the simplest version, which ignores individual 
specific effects (i.e., the possible individual heterogeneity is ignored) and simply pools 
together the data on different DMUs. For illustrative purpose, a simple pooled regression 
model with 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑀 output Y, at time period  𝑡 = 1,2 … , 𝑇, can be written as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (5) 
The FE model specification, on the other hand, assumes that there are behavioural 
differences amongst the hospitals. These individual heterogeneities are captured by 
different individual hospital specific time invariant intercepts. In this case, there are 
individual differences captured by the intercept 𝛽0𝑖, but these are fixed over time. A 
simple FE specification can be stated as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                       (6) 
We can eliminate the FE conditions by expressing both the dependent and 
independent variables as deviations for their respective (group) mean value as: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 =  𝛽2  (𝑋𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖 ) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡  −  𝜀?̅?)                                                         (7)                                                            
Notice that the FE individual intercept term 𝛽0𝑖 dropped out. Frequently the FE 
within-group estimator gives the similar results but this estimator discards time variation 
in the data. In order to control the variance issue and to assure valid statistical conclusion 
when some of the underlying regression model’s assumptions are breached, it is usual to 
depend on the robust standard errors, where it is robust to employ the robust standard 
errors “Even if there is no heteroskedasticity, the robust standard errors will become just 





conventional OLS standard errors. Thus, the robust standard errors are appropriate even 
under homoskedasticity.” (Yamano, 2009, p.3) 
The third basic panel data specification is the RE model in which individual 
heterogeneities are also assumed (as in a FE model), but they are now treated individually 
as RE, because of randomly selected units of observation. A simple RE specification can 
be stated as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0̅̅ ̅ + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (8) 
Where β0̅̅ ̅ is the population average of the intercept, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 = ui + εit, where ui is the 
random variable related to the hospital, while εit is related to the hospital and time (with 
zero mean and constant variance). 
RE is probably best if there is a belief that there are no omitted variables/or the 
omitted variables are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the model, while if 
the omitted variables correlated with the variables in the model, FE may control for 
omitted variable bias, so that, the main advantage of the FE approach is that the estimated 
coefficients are unbiased (Williams, 2018). 
4.6.4 Regression analysis 
OLS regression gives equal weight to all observations, but when the 
heteroscedasticity test is present it suggests bias in the ability of OLS to produce the 
smallest possible standard errors. Using least squares regression testing would be more 
appropriate, as this method allows for further examination of those output variables 
previously showed a residual efficiency, in greater detail.  
Whereas the previously noted methods study the efficiency levels of a hospital’s 
performance, using the OLS method, Regression Analysis can be used to assess the 





quality aspects of the hospital’s performance. This is achieved through using the MR 
outcome variable as a proxy for HC quality (see 6.2.3 (i)). 
4.7 Empirical Model Specification 
DEA and SFA are based on the simple concept of Pareto Optimality (Charnes, et 
al., 1994), which simply states that a unit in a sample is Pareto-efficient if it provides the 
largest output for a combination of inputs in that sample. In other words, DMU ‘A’ is 
efficient if there is no other DMU that can produce more than A’s output, while using 
fewer inputs. The most efficient hospital will have a score of 1 using DEA, while all other 
DMUs will have scores relative to this unit. A DMU with a score of 0.90 is thus operating 
at a 90 per cent level of efficiency compared to the most efficient DMU. 
The objective of this study is to establish whether the progress towards privatisation 
(through various phases of corporatisation) has led to an improvement in the performance 
(efficiency, effectiveness and quality aspects) of hospitals. This study is, therefore, 
comparing a particular DMU (hospital) with its own past. The relative efficiency is 
calculated for each hospital at different points in time. A score 1 of efficiency in a 
particular year would mean that Hospital A was operating at its most efficient level in 
that year. Moreover, other variables that could affect the output of a hospital are also 
controlled, for example the population of the area of hospital location.5  
For ease of interpretation, the empirical model explaining the relative efficiency of 
hospitals was assumed to take a log-linear form of the Cobb-Douglas specification: 
 
5 For example, DMU (hospital A) and (hospital B) are identical in terms of inputs, but are in different 
locations, one densely and the other sparsely populated areas, respectively. Hospital A will naturally have 
more patient visits than hospital B. It may seem that hospital A is more efficient than B, however, the 
difference in output is due to demand, rather than efficiency. Hospital B may be operating below capacity 
not because of inefficiency, but because it does not get enough patient visits. Hence, it is necessary to 
control for population. 
 





𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln 𝐷𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4 ln 𝑁𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡




+ 𝑣𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                      (9) 
Where i denotes the ith output Y (i=Radiology tests, Laboratory tests, Review visits, 
and Inpatients discharged) for Hospital j (j=1, 2, ……20) at time t (t=1, 2, …..36). β0 – β5 
are the input coefficients associated with the independent variables in the model are 
estimated. Β6k is a vector of kth X control variables (k=size of city, location of hospital, 
and number of pilgrims), Dyear is a dummy variable to check the effects of 
corporatisation phases, ujt (≥0) is a measure of inefficiency, whilst vjt is the error term 
representing the symmetric statistical noise. 
Each of the corporatisation phases (Bilateral Agreements, Partial Operating, 
Comprehensive, and New Public Self-Operating) for the model in Eq. (9) is estimated. 
Alternatively, one of the phases may be selected as the benchmark, against which to 
compare efficiency of the hospitals with respect to the output Yi. It is expected that the 
efficiency level will vary according to the level of corporatisation within each phase in 
line with Hypothesis H1.  
Variants of the model in Eq. (9) are estimated using pooled regression as the 
baseline model, FE and RE models, as well as testing for stability of the models.  
The effect on population health is modelled and estimated, in which the MR 
outcome variable is specified as a proxy for the outcome quality of the hospitals: 
                                                            (10) jt
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Here, 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is a vector of outcome quality as shown in Equation (9), is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated in the model, and is the error term, assumed to be 
independently identical distributed (iid).  
4.7.1 Assumptions and diagnostic tests 
The usefulness of these models is dependent largely on the validity of the 
underlying assumptions. For example, the DEA as a non-parametric approach assumes 
that there is no statistical noise and the production functions consists only of the inputs 
and the outputs. This assumption does not allow other factors to influence production 
outside the inputs. As such, there is no assumption of a deterministic production frontier. 
Violations of the assumptions may lead to misleading conclusions and inferences drawn 
from the estimation results. Therefore, diagnoses of the estimation results from the 
models will be undertaken, in order to determine the validity of the underlying 
assumptions.  
A rolling window analysis assesses the model’s stability over time. In general, it is 
assumed that the parameters of the model were constant over time (e.g., Stock and 
Watson, 2011). However, (for example) changes in the economic situation may 
sometimes raise an issue with the stability of the model’s parameters.  
Given that each of the hospitals in the KSA data were observed over a period of 36 
years, and the possibility of instability of the data, we applied DEA rolling window 
analysis to a panel data specification of the DEA and SFA models (see, Cullinane, et al., 
2004). These considerations allowed tracking the efficiency of each hospital in the sample 
over time. The robustness of this additional test provides a greater level of confidence in 
the results. 
j





The dataset is not time series or cross section data. This research is about studying 
the performance of hospitals across many time periods. Panel data models are useful for 
identifying unobservable heterogeneities within hospitals, which may be constant, or vary 
over time. By using information of both the variations between hospitals, and the changes 
over time, panel data specification increases the precision of performance (efficiency) 
estimates, and makes it possible to have a better understanding of the complicated 
behaviour of different economic relationships. This approach tests the multi-collinearity 
between the independent variables, and also solves the omitted variable bias and 
decreases auto-correlation problems. The Shapiro-normality test was used to determine 
the independent variables normality distribution. 
This study runs Pooled regression analyses. If the model is unstable (P-value <5%), 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for Heteroskedasticity is performed. It is also stated 
that panel data models can be specified as a pooled ordinary least square (pooled OLS) 
regression, FE or RE models, depending on the underlying assumptions. There is an 
assumption in which both RE and FE models are consistent when there is no correlation 
between individual unit-specific effects and the explanatory variables. The FE and RE 
are measured and compared by the Hausman (1978) specification test to examine whether 
unobserved hospital heterogeneities are constant or vary randomly overtime, if the RE is 
better, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test is run to show the consistency between the 
RE model and the Robust Regression model. The FE model prevails if the null hypothesis 
(H0: The RE is consistent) is rejected.   












The overall objective of this chapter is to record and examine the empirical analyses 
that may identify which KSA hospital management phase is more efficient across the 
study period (1979-2014). This is addressed by, testing the hypotheses (in 3.3 above) via 
the econometric models cited in the preceding chapter (in 4.6 above) and addressing this 
study’s research questions. Two research questions were formulated.  
Firstly - Have different forms of corporatisation generated the gains that may be 
associated with the movement of reforms towards privatisation? 
Secondly - Have HC quality considerations (or effectiveness) modified conclusions 
relating to the efficiency of different HC governance systems? 
This study includes four system phases, as detailed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4), and 
defined thus: 
• Bilateral Cooperation Agreements (1979 –1982): co-operation between the 
KSA and Chinese, Danish, and German governments in some hospitals. 
• Partial Operating System (1983 – 1987): contracted out non-medical 
operations and some medical aspects to specialised operating companies under 
multiple contracts.  
• Comprehensive Operating System (1988 – 1999): transfer of management and 
operation of all medical and non-medical operations to a single company under 
a formal contract, with the MoH taking a supervisory role only. 
• New Public Self-Operating System (2000-2014): the MoH took greater 
responsibilities for the operation and management of the hospitals. 





Chapter 3 outlines a Conceptual Framework, and lays out the three main forms of 
privatisation, where the different forms of privatisation are distinguished by the level of 
ownership transferred to the private sector, and whether management is also transferred 
to the private sector, such that Corporatisation is the separation of ownership and 
management. The government retains a full ownership shareholding but transfers a degree 
of management of the firm to the private sector. Partial Privatisation is where the 
government transfers a minority ownership shareholding (less than 50 per cent) to the 
private sector and retains management of the firm. Full Privatisation is where the 
government transfers all or the majority of ownership shareholdings (at least 50 per cent) 
and management to the private sector. 
No hospitals within the confines of this study’s data sample are either partially or 
fully privatised. However, ‘Corporatisation’ is considered as a movement towards 
privatisation, as this stage often precedes partial or full privatisation, which has been the 
Saudi government’s strategy since the 2nd National Development Plan (Ministry of 
Planning, 1975) was to increase the private sector’s opportunities to manage, operate, and 
maintain projects within a free market framework.   
The period 1979-2014 saw a number of corporatisation ‘movements’ (which is an 
intermediate phase of movement towards privatisation as explained in 1.1 above) 
intended to provide experience for a later transition to a (partial or full) privatised 
operating model mentioned within the KSA 5-year development plans, and recently, in 
the NTP 2020 and the latest long-term development plan (Vision 2030). These 
experiments resulted in operational (medical and non-medical), administration, and 
management functions moving to external company suppliers in partnership with the 
MoH over time. The latter stages of the Comprehensive Operating System phase were 





fully corporatised, whereas the other system phases within this study had varying levels 
of application of the components of corporatisation.  
Chapter 4 define the Methodology and presented the main sources and descriptions 
of the data employed for the empirical testing of the stated hypotheses and the associated 
econometric specifications of the various models to be estimated. To reiterate, the 
hypotheses to test in this study are as follows:  
H1 - Performance in terms of efficiency may differ under the different forms of 
corporatisation. 
H2 - Corporatisation will be positively associated with efficiency. 
H3 - Fully corporatised hospitals will perform better in terms of quality than 
partially corporatised hospitals.  
This chapter is divided into a number of sub-sections presenting the results from 
the economic models of analysis, outlined in the previous chapter. As stated in Chapter 
4, four key econometric methods are employed in this study in order to address the 
research questions and associated hypotheses, and account for potential issues arising 
from the sample data. These econometric techniques are DEA, SFA, Panel Data Analysis, 
and Regression Analysis. Sections 5.2-5.6 use each of these techniques to bring a 
quantifiable focus on establishing whether corporatisation has led to improvements in the 
efficiency of the KSA hospitals within the sample set to consider Research Question 1.  
Section 5.2 uses the DEA model, including estimation of an input-based DEA 
model for constant and variable returns to scale using a two-stage approach. The 
efficiency scores are also used to examine if the relative efficiencies identified in the DEA 
are impacted by external variables using a Tobit Regression Analysis. Section 5.3 
presents a set of results from the estimation of the SFA model to consider the periods of 
change in the management and operation of the hospitals included in the study. The main 





objective here is to estimate PE across the hospitals over the period. Section 5.4 the 
standard panel data estimation models which consider both time-invariant inefficiency 
(fixed) and time-varying (random) effects, thus effectively testing the stability of the 
models. Section 5.5 provides a trend analysis of input and output variables. Section 5.6 
specifies and presents the results of Regression analyses using the MR specification and 
model. The purpose of this section is to support the consideration of Research Question 
2, by examining the effect of the efficiency measures on hospital outcomes, in which the 
MR is specified as the variable for quality. Section 5.7 summarises and concludes this 
chapter by identifying which hypotheses are supported. 
5.2 Data Envelopment Analysis 
This section presents estimation results of the DEA model as defined in the previous 
chapter (Section 4.6.1). Following the description of the data outlined in the previous 
chapter, an input-oriented, two-stage DEA model is estimated for each of the management 
phases in which relative efficiency is measured in terms of minimising inputs while 
satisfying at least the given output levels.6 We performed input-oriented DEA model 
because of the limited control of the hospitals over their outputs. The relative efficiency 
of the hospitals is measured on the assumption of Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) as the 
baseline model. CRS implicitly assumes that the hospitals were operating at their optimal 
scale or within the constraint of their individual PPF. The Variable Returns to Scale 
(VRS) relative efficiency measurement model is also estimated, which allows a 
distinction between efficiency and scale efficiency (see, Banker, et al., 1984).  
 
6 The first stage measures the relative efficiency scores and the reference weights, whilst the slacks are 
estimated in the second stage. Thus, the two-stage estimation procedures identify the optimal solution (Ji 
and Lee, 2010).  





5.2.1 DEA Analysis  
When applying DEA in this study, a hospital is considered ‘efficient’ when the DEA 
score equals 1, and all slacks are 0, where further improvement is needed for a hospital 
to become efficient, either by increasing in outputs and/or decreasing in inputs. The slacks 
are either positive (which means that the hospital is using a surplus of an input that leads 
to inefficiency), or negative (which means that the inputs need to be increased to improve 
the quality of care) (Valdmanis, et al., 2008). A hospital is considered ‘weakly efficient’ 
if a DEA score equals 1, but where the slacks are different from 0. To aid interpretation 
of the results, the figures for input slacks are used to calculate the percentage by which a 
less efficient hospital has to minimise all its inputs in order to achieve maximum 
performance by performing slack analysis. Slack analysis allows management to know 
which inputs need to be increased (and by how much) to increase quality and which inputs 
should be decreased to lower inefficiency (Valdmanis, et al., 2008). Table 5.1 below 
presents the DEA measures of hospital relative efficiency ( ) by management phases. The 
Table shows for each hospital the relative efficiency scores and associated rankings. For 
the less efficient hospitals (i.e.,  < 1), the relative efficiency scores are used to calculate 
the level of reduction in all inputs required for the less efficient hospitals to improve 
performance. The results are summarised in the following table, estimated using STATA 
(Statistical Software, vs.12).  
(i) Efficiency by hospital. The DEA results (Table 5.1) show three groupings of 
hospitals. The first grouping contains ‘Efficient’ hospitals. Hospitals that are efficient are 
considered being either ‘Always Efficient’ or ‘Weakly Efficient’ depending on the slacks. 
Five hospitals (25 per cent of the sample) were considered Efficient (Hospital Nos. 4, 7, 
8, 14, and 15). The second groupings of hospitals are those that are ‘Always Inefficient’. 
Table 5.1 shows that six hospitals (30 per cent of the sample) are always inefficient 





(Hospital Nos. 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, and 19) within the study period. The third group contains 
hospitals that have ‘Varying levels of efficiency’. The remaining nine hospitals (45 per 
cent of sample) had varying levels of efficiency as results referring to it change across the 
phases. 
 (ii) Efficiency by Phase. Hospital efficiency is compared across the four phases 
(detail shown in Appendices 5.A-5.D). The Bilateral Management phase (1979-1982) has 
eight hospitals with efficiency score ‘1’. Three hospitals (Hospitals No 5, 8 and 14) were 
Always Efficient and five hospitals were Weakly Efficient. Twelve hospitals have an 
efficiency score ‘Ɵ<1’ which suggests they were Inefficient. 
In the Partial Management phase (1983-1987) there are seven hospitals with 
Efficiency score ‘1’. one hospital (Hospital No. 8) is Always Efficient, and six hospitals 
are Weakly Efficient. The remaining thirteen hospitals have an efficiency score ‘Ɵ < 1’ 
indicating that they are Inefficient. 
In the Comprehensive Management phase (1988-1999) there are nine hospitals with 
efficiency score ‘1’. Four of these hospitals (4, 5, 8, and 14) are Always Efficient, and the 
other five hospitals were Weakly Efficient. The remaining eleven hospitals were 
considered Inefficient. 
The New Public Self-Operating System phase (2000-2014) results include ten 
hospitals with an efficiency score of ‘1’. Eight hospitals (Hospitals No 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 
16, 18, and 20) are Always Efficient, and two hospitals that are Weakly Efficient. There 
are ten Inefficient hospitals. 
Table 5.2 below, shows that generally the Partial System phase has the lowest level 
of Efficient hospitals and vice versa in the New Public Self Operating System phases.  
 
 




Table 5.1 - DEA Measures of Hospital Relative Efficiency by Management Phases 
 
Bilateral Cooperation Agreements 
(1979 –1982) 
Partial Operating System 
(1983 – 1987) 
Comprehensive Operating System 
(1988 – 1999) 





scores ( ) 
Reduction in 
inputs 
required (%) Rank 
Efficiency 
scores ( ) 
Reduction in 
inputs 
required (%) Rank 
Efficiency 
scores ( ) 
Reduction in 
inputs 
required (%) Rank 
Efficiency 




1 7 1 0.00 6 1 0.00 13 0.922023 7.80 18 0.69776 30.22 
2 11 0.852372 14.76 10 0.868883 13.11 6 1 0.00 12 0.960013 4.00 
3 20 0.334993 66.50 20 0.331722 66.83 20 0.259642 74.04 20 0.21146 78.85 
4 5 1 0.00 3 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 9 1 0.00 
5 1 1 0.00 9 0.891304 10.87 1 1 0.00 19 0.261887 73.81 
6 9 0.960822 3.92 8 0.93115 6.89 11 0.967481 3.25 13 0.952728 4.73 
7 8 1 0.00 7 1 0.00 8 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 
8 1 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 
9 16 0.612717 38.73 16 0.606478 39.35 12 0.932161 6.78 11 0.961747 3.83 
10 18 0.388478 61.15 18 0.401169 59.88 19 0.583878 41.61 17 0.725644 27.44 
11 10 0.91405 8.60 11 0.848066 15.19 7 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 
12 15 0.62593 37.41 15 0.618331 38.17 16 0.682679 31.73 15 0.758812 24.12 
13 12 0.725894 27.41 12 0.746888 25.31 9 1 0.00 14 0.94805 5.20 
14 1 1 0.00 2 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 
15 4 1 0.00 4 1 0.00 5 1 0.00 1 1 0.00 
16 19 0.369582 63.04 19 0.36165 63.84 17 0.682122 31.79 1 1 0.00 
17 17 0.577251 42.27 17 0.560487 43.95 14 0.778555 22.14 10 1 0.00 
18 14 0.663348 33.67 14 0.654693 34.53 15 0.699381 30.06 1 1 0.00 
19 13 0.676793 32.32 13 0.664744 33.53 18 0.638642 36.14 16 0.741059 25.89 
20 6 1 0.00 5 1 0.00 10 0.982559 1.74 1 1 0.00 
Notes: The slacks are reported for each management phase in the Appendix Tables A5.A – A5.D; DMU’s are the decision-making units (the 20 hospitals); Rank shows the ranking of each 
hospital according to the relative efficiency scores; efficiency scores are the measures of efficiency of each hospital. A hospital is efficient when the score=1, and all the slacks are zeros. 
A hospital is ‘weakly’ efficient if the score=1, but the slacks are different from zero. Figures in the Reduction in Inputs Required were calculated as % by which less efficient hospitals 
have to minimise their inputs in order to improve performance.  









Total Always Efficient Weakly Efficient 
Bilateral 8 3 5 12 
Partial 7 1 6 13 
Comprehensive 9 4 5 11 
New Public Self-Operating  10 8 2 10 
All periods 14 1 13 6 
Source: Author calculation from Tables 5.A - 5.D in the Appendix 
 
(iii) Comparison of comprehensive Operating System and the New Public Self-
Operating System. Table 5.1 above shows that four hospitals (Hospitals No 16,17,18 and 
20), or 20 per cent of the sample moved from being Inefficient to Efficient (from  ≠ one 
to be  = one), and three hospitals (Hospital No, 2, 5 and 13), or 15 per cent moved from 
being Efficient to Inefficient when transiting from the Comprehensive Operating System 
phase to the New Public Self-Operating System phase. However, six hospitals (30 per 
cent) remained Efficient (  = 1) in both phases, and seven (35 per cent) hospitals remained 
Inefficient (  ≠ one) in both phases. This gives a total of 65 per cent of hospitals that were 
not associated with the movement from the Comprehensive System phase to the New 
Public Self-Operating System phase. 
(iv) Reduction of inputs. Comparing the inefficient hospitals, the range of the level 
of reduction in all inputs required for the hospitals to become efficient varies considerably 
































 Partial Operating 
System       








 Comprehensive Operating 
System  








 New Public Self-
Operating 
System       
(2000-2014) 
 6 3.92 6 6.89 20 1.74 9 3.83 
 11 8.6 5 10.87 6 3.25 2 4 
 2 14.76 2 13.11 9 6.78 6 4.73 
 13 27.41 11 15.19 1 7.8 13 5.2 
 19 32.32 13 25.31 17 22.14 12 24.12 
 
18 33.67 19 33.53 18 30.06 19 25.89 
12 37.41 18 34.53 12 31.73 10 27.44 
9 38.73 12 38.17 16 31.79 1 30.22 
17 42.27 9 39.35 19 36.14 5 73.81 
10 61.15 17 43.95 10 41.61 3 78.85 
16 63.04 10 59.88 3 74.04 - - 
3 66.50 16 63.84 - - - - 





hospitals %  






62.58  59.94  72.30  75.02 
 
Under the Bilateral Cooperation Agreements phase, the level of reduction in all 
inputs required to achieve maximum relative efficiency ranges between 3.92 per cent and 
66.50 per cent.  
In the Partial Operating System phase inefficient hospitals would require between 
6.89 per cent and 66.83 per cent reduction in all their inputs. 
 In the Comprehensive System phase the level of reduction in all inputs required by 
inefficient hospitals ranges between 1.74 per cent and 74.04 per cent. 
 In the new Public Self-Operation System phase, the level of reduction in all inputs 
required by inefficient hospitals ranges between 3.83 per cent and 78.85 per cent.  





The lowest average reduction of inputs required from inefficient hospitals is shown 
in the Comprehensive System phase. These results suggest that (on average) inefficient 
hospitals are most efficient (closer to their PPF) in the Comprehensive System phase 
compared to other phases. Furthermore, the New Public Self-Operating System phase 
shows the largest variance between inefficient hospitals (75.02). Additionally, it is worth 
noting that labour inputs (number of Doctors and Nurses) are the main inputs responsible 
for the main source of inefficiency in the inefficient hospitals (see Appendix 5.A-5.D), as 
we explained in (5.2.1) that the slacks analysis shows the root of inefficiency.  
(v) Variable returns to scale (VRS). In order to obtain further information on the 
relative efficiency of the hospitals, an input-based DEA model for variable returns to scale 
is estimated in the Table (5.4) below. Note that there are no slacks in this case, since the 
output levels have no effect on relative efficiency evaluation.  
Eight hospitals show Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) on their VRS frontier under 
the first two phases. The number decreases to six hospitals under the Comprehensive 
System phase. The number further declines to four hospitals under the New Public Self-
Operation System phase 
However, the number of hospitals on the Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) on the 
VRS frontier increases from two (in the Bilateral Cooperation System phase), to four 
under the subsequent two phases, then finally to five under the last phase. 




Table 5.4 - Oriented DEA Relative Efficiency Results Under Assumption of VRS 
Hospit
al 
BILATERAL  PARTIAL  COMPREHENSIVE  NEW PUBLIC SELF-OPERATING 
CRS_PE VRS_PE SCALE RTS  CRS_PE VRS_PE SCALE RTS  CRS_PE VRS_PE SCALE RTS  CRS_PE VRS_PE SCALE RTS 
1 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  0.922 1 0.922 drs  0.698 0.881 0.792 irs 
2 0.852 0.962 0.886 irs  0.869 0.876 0.992 irs  1 1 1 -  0.960 1 0.960 drs 
3 0.335 0.335 1 -  0.332 6.844 0.048 irs  0.260 0.260 1 -  0.211 0.211 1 - 
4 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 - 
5 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  0.262 0.268 0.979 irs 
6 0.961 1 0.961 drs  0.93115 1 0.93115 drs  0.967 1 0.967 drs  0.953 1 0.953 drs 
7 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 - 
8 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 - 
9 0.613 0.708 0.865 drs  0.606 0.625 0.970 drs  0.932 0.990 0.942 drs  0.962 1 0.962 drs 
10 0.388 0.471 0.825 irs  0.401 0.417 0.961 irs  0.584 0.735 0.795 irs  0.726 1 0.726 drs 
11 0.914 0.944 0.968 irs  0.848 0.900 0.942 drs  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 - 
12 0.626 0.627 0.998 irs  0.618 0.619 0.998 irs  0.683 0.689 0.991 irs  0.759 0.770 0.986 irs 
13 0.726 0.726 1.000 irs  0.747 0.749 0.997 irs  1 1 1 -  0.948 0.949 0.999 drs 
14 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 - 
15 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  1 1 1 - 
16 0.370 0.370 1 -  0.362 0.674 0.537 irs  0.682 0.698 0.977 irs  1 1 1 - 
17 0.577 0.604 0.956 irs  0.560 0.569 0.985 drs  0.779 0.779 0.999 drs  1 1 1 - 
18 0.663 0.679 0.978 irs  0.655 0.719 0.910 irs  0.699 0.704 0.993 irs  1 1 1 - 
19 0.677 0.711 0.952 irs  0.665 0.741 0.897 irs  0.639 0.702 0.910 irs  0.741 0.770 0.962 irs 
20 1 1 1 -  1 1 1 -  0.983 1 0.983 irs  1 1 1 - 
Notes: CRS_PE: PE under Constant Returns to Scale = Relative efficiency Score; VRS: PE under Variable Returns to Scale: SCALE: Scale efficiency (CRS_TE/VRS_TE); RTS: Type of Returns 
to Scale - irs = Increasing returns to scale (scale is positive); drs – decreasing returns to scale if scale is negative.  





5.2.2 Tobit regression analysis level data 
Using the preceding analysis as a baseline, attention is now focused on regression 
analysis using the relative efficiency scores. 
 Tobit Regression is used to examine the determinants of efficiency differences 
amongst the hospitals, largely because the efficient scores of the individual hospitals are 
censored at their maximum values (Ji and Lee, 2010). The relative efficiency scores are 
the dependent variable, and the determinants are hospital levels, and the control variables 
include population, location of hospital and size of the city.7  
Note that the Tobit Regression analysis is considered more appropriate as it 
is dealing with the distribution characteristics of the efficiency levels where the 
dependent variable contains observations with zero value or other continuous 
observations. In contrast Probit or Logit analysis can only handle binary (0, or 1 values) 
dependent variables.  
Four Tobit models are estimated independently for each of the phases of management 
and operations, Bilateral Cooperation Agreements, Partial Operating System, 
Comprehensive Operating System, and Public Self-Operation System phases.  
Table 5.5 below presents the results of the Tobit estimations using the following 
hypothetical variants: 
H01: There is no effect of population on CRS 
Ha1: There is some effect of population on CRS 
H02: There is no effect of semi-urban area on CRS 
Ha2: There is some effect of semi-urban area on CRS 
H03: There is no effect of urban area on CRS 
 
7 Note that the number of pilgrims was not included as they are not hospital level variables that could 
determine their input-based efficiency. 





Ha3: There is some effect of urban area on CRS 
H04: There is no effect of medium-sized city on CRS 
Ha4: There is some effect of medium-sized city on CRS 
H05: There is no effect of small city on CRS 
Ha5: There is some effect of small city on CRS 
H06: Constant = 0  
Ha6: Constant ≠ 0 








System                  
(1983 – 1987) 
Comprehensive 
Operating 
System        
(1988 – 1999) 
New Public 
Self-Operating 
System       
(2000-2014) 
Dependent variable: CRS 
Hospital Relative Efficiency 
scores     
Population 0.121* 0.137* 0.464* -0.012*** 
 (0.0213) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 
Reference: Hospital located in 
rural area     
Hospital located in semi-
urban area 0.127* 0.141* 0.191* 0.088* 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.034) (0.254) 
 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Hospital located in urban area 0.098** 0.108* 0.094* 0.039* 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.019) (0.014) 
 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.007 
Reference: Size of city - Big 
city     
Size of city - medium city 0.174* 0.156* 0.175* 0.056*** 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.031) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 
Size of city - small city 0.136* 0.119* 0.072* 0.011 
 (0.036) (0.0323) (0.018) (0.013) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.413 
Constant 0.410* 0.422* 0.647* 0.945* 
 (0.081) (0.076) (0.037) (0.024) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 80 100 240 300 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values in the third rows, where significance levels are 
*p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1.  
Table 5.5 shows that different control variables are significantly related to the CRS 
relative efficiency scores of the hospitals across the four different management and 
operational phases apart from the small city in the last phase. When comparing the results 





of the different phases, the coefficient on the constant terms shows the variance in the 
average relative efficiency score for each period. 
In the first three phases, the Ha1, Ha2, Ha3, Ha4, Ha5, and Ha6 hypotheses are accepted 
as all the coefficients of population, location, size of city, and constant are positively 
related to the CRS relative efficiency scores of the hospitals. Furthermore, there is a 
significant increase from small cities to medium-size cities, and from hospitals located in 
urban areas to those which are located in semi-urban areas. For example, the first phase 
shows that, compared to big cities, the CRS relative efficiency scores of the hospitals 
increase progressively from small cities to medium size cities (0.136 to 0.174 
respectively). Compared to rural areas, the CRS relative efficiency scores of the hospitals 
increase from hospitals located in urban areas to those are located in the semi-urban areas 
(0.098 to 0.127 respectively).  
In the New Public Self-Operating System phase, (Ha1, Ha2, Ha3, Ha4, Ha6 and H05) 
hypotheses are accepted as the coefficient of population is negatively related to the CRS 
relative efficiency scores of the hospitals and is also significance. Compared to rural 
areas, the CRS relative efficiency scores of the hospitals increase from hospitals located 
in urban areas to those are located in the semi-urban areas (0.039 to 0.088 respectively). 
Medium sized cities are positively related to the CRS relative efficiency scores of the 
hospitals and are marginally significant (i.e., at 10 per cent level) while small cities are 
considered insignificant. However, the hospital located in a small city might show less 
efficiency than the hospital located in a bigger city (even with identical inputs) not 
because of inefficiency, but because it may have fewer patients to visit, which means that 
the difference in output is due to a lack of demand, rather than inefficiency.  
In conclusion to this section, Table 5.5 shows that the variance in the average 
efficiency score is generally statistically significant for all phases. The coefficients 





increased gradually from 0.41 under the Bilateral Cooperation Agreements phase 
increased to 0.42 in Partial Operating System phase, then to 0.65 in Comprehensive 
Operating System phase and finally 0.95 in the New Public Self-Operating System phase.  
5.2.3 DEA summary  
Table 5.6 - DEA Table Summary 
Efficiency by Hospital No. of Hospitals Percentage of Hospitals 
Always Efficient/Weakly Efficient 5 25% 
Always Inefficient 6 30% 
Varying levels of Efficiency 9 45% 
 
Efficiency by Phase No. of Hospitals Percentage of Hospitals 
Hospitals were NOT associated with changes in all 
phases 11 55% 
Hospitals were associated with changes in all phases 9 45% 
 
Average reduction of Inputs required from 







System            
(1983 – 1987) 
Comprehensive 
Operating 
System          
(1988 – 1999) 
New Public-
Self-Operating 
System       
(2000-2014) 
Average Reduction input required to become efficient 
%  35.82 34.73 26.10 27.81 
Variance in Reduction of inputs required % points 
across all hospitals  62.58 59.94 72.30 75.02 
 
Comparison of Comprehensive and New 
Public Self-Operating System phases No. of Hospitals Percentage of Hospitals 
Hospitals which were POSITIVELY associated with 
move from Comprehensive to New Public Self-
Operating system phase  
4 20% 
Hospitals which were NEGATIVELY associated 
with move from Comprehensive to New Public Self-
Operating system phase  
3 15% 
No Change in efficiency between the two phases 13 65% 
 
 








System            
(1983 – 1987) 
Comprehensive 
Operating System          
(1988 – 1999) 
New Public 
Self-Operating 
System       
(2000-2014) 
IRS 8 (40%) 8 (40%) 6 (30%) 4 (20%) 
DRS 2 (10%) 4 (20%) 4 (20%) 5 (25%) 
 














System                
(1983 – 1987) 
Comprehensive 
Operating System        
(1988 – 1999) 
New Public  
Self-Operating 
System       
(2000-2014) 
DEA Analysis 
Average Relative Efficiency Score 
over whole sample  0.79  0.77  0.856  0.861  
Average Efficiency over inefficient 
hospitals  0.64  0.65  0.74  0.72  
Tobit Regression 
Constant (the variance in the 
average CRS efficiency score) 0.410* 0.422* 0.647* 0.945*  
(0.081) (0.076) (0.037) (0.024)  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values in the third rows, where significance levels are *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Looking back at the efficiency scores from the Table 5.7 above, it can be observed 
that the intercept increases over time when considering the whole sample. Robust 
standard error is the criterion to be adopted and preferred at the lowest value in the period 
New Public Self-Operating System. However, the control variables (which are positively 
and significantly related to the CRS relative efficiency scores across the four phases) have 
a greater significance when moving to the third phase, compared to movement to the final 
phase, except in the constant, which shows that the fourth phase exhibits greater 
efficiency.  
5.3 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)  
The second set of results obtained from the estimation of stochastic frontier 
production function models for panel data, covering the entire period (1979-2014) for all 
hospitals to estimate the relative PE (the ratio of the observed outputs to the potential 
outputs for the same level of inputs) across the hospitals over the period taking into 
account the control variables including: pilgrims, location of hospital and size of the city 





in addition to the input variables. While the first set (Appendix 5.E) of results obtained 
from the estimation of each output are to calculate and maximise the potential outputs via 
maximum likelihood estimation, showing wheather the observed variation in efficiency 
(differences in the production) will be related to inefficiency or random shocks outside 
the control of hospitals, through gamma. “If gamma ϒ is close to zero, the differences in 
the production will be entirely related to statistical noise, while if gamma ϒ close to one 
reveals the presence of technical inefficiency." (Hamidi, 2016, p.6) 
5.3.1 Measures of PE by hospital  
Table 5.8 bellow shows the results of the STATA routine xtfrontier to derive the 
PE score by hospital (row) referenced to specific output variable (column).  




























No. of Review 
visits 
  1 0.314 1 0.608 1 0.459 1 0.806 
2 0.428 2 0.824 2 0.214 2 0.885 
3 0.074 3 0.032 3 0.051 3 0.046 
4 0.079 4 0.039 4 0.17 4 0.898 
5 0.048 5 0.011 5 0.695 5 0.049 
6 0.262 6 0.943 6 0.169 6 0.932 
7 0.964 7 0.664 7 0.434 7 0.95 
8 0.5 8 0.597 8 0.713 8 0.94 
9 0.241 9 0.897 9 0.168 9 0.543 
10 0.345 10 0.35 10 0.331 10 0.459 
11 0.3 11 0.956 11 0.29 11 0.953 
12 0.219 12 0.793 12 0.1 12 0.702 
13 0.373 13 0.687 13 0.221 13 0.741 
14 0.315 14 0.795 14 0.909 14 0.728 
15 0.424 15 0.596 15 0.411 15 0.803 
16 0.168 16 0.301 16 0.39 16 0.675 
17 0.431 17 0.882 17 0.182 17 0.881 
18 0.362 18 0.804 18 0.136 18 0.549 
19 0.391 19 0.432 19 0.121 19 0.592 
20 0.344 20 0.902 20 0.183 20 0.723 




0.3291   0.6056   0.3173   0.6927 




0.1956   0.31169   0.2305   0.2652 





 (i) Number of inpatients discharged. Across the whole study period (1979-2014) 
the average PE score is 0.3291. Ten hospitals (50 per cent) score below average. Hospital 
No. 7 has the highest PE score (0.964). Hospital No. 5 has the lowest PE score (0.048). 
The variance in PE scores for this variable is 0.916, with a Standard Deviation of 0.196. 
 (ii) Number of radiology tests. Across the study period (1979-2014) the average 
PE score is 0.606. Eight hospitals (40 per cent) score below average. Hospital No. 11 has 
the highest PE score (0.956). Hospital No. 5 has the lowest PE score (0.011). The variance 
in efficiency scores for this variable is 0.944, with a Standard Deviation of 0.312 
(iii) Laboratory tests completed. Across the study period (1979-2014) the average 
PE score is 0.317. Twelve hospitals (60 per cent) score below average. Hospital No. 14 
has the highest efficiency score (0.909). Hospital No. 3 has the lowest PE score (0.051). 
The variance in PE scores for this variable is 0.858, with a Standard Deviation of 0.231. 
(iv) Review visits. Across the study period (1979-2014) the average PE score is 
0.693. Seven hospitals (35 per cent) score below average. Hospital No. 11 has the highest 
PE score (0.953). Hospital No. 3 has the lowest PE score (0.046). The variance in 
efficiency scores for this variable is 0.906, with a Standard Deviation of 0.265. 
5.3.2 SFA results for PE of output variables by hospital, by management phase 
(i) Number of Inpatients discharged. Table 5.9 presents the SFA PE results for the 
Inpatients discharged output variable, by hospital, by management phase.  
Bilateral System phase has the lowest average PE score (0.2333) whereas the New 
Public Self-Operating System phase has the highest average efficiency score (0.394). The 
Bilateral Management phase has eight hospitals (40 per cent) with above average 
efficiency scores. The Partial System, Comprehensive and New Public Self-Operating 
System phases each have ten hospitals (50 per cent) above each of the phase’s efficiency 
score.   





The average PE score increased by 0.161 between the Bilateral Management phase 
and the New Public Self-Operating System phase. The efficiency increase between the 
Comprehensive System phase and the New Public Self-Operating System phase is 0.085. 
The New Public Self-Operating System phase (2000-2014) recorded both the 
smallest variance (0.893) in range of scores and the lowest Standard Deviation (0.1938). 
The phase with the greatest variance between hospitals efficiency scores is the Bilateral 
System phase.  























































ve to New 
Public Self-
Op. 
  1 0.201 1 0.231 1 0.291 1 0.389 1 0.188 1 0.098 
2 0.312 2 0.344 2 0.407 2 0.503 2 0.191 2 0.096 
3 0.024 3 0.034 3 0.058 3 0.113 3 0.089 3 0.056 
4 0.027 4 0.037 4 0.062 4 0.12 4 0.093 4 0.058 
5 0.013 5 0.019 5 0.035 5 0.078 5 0.065 5 0.043 
6 0.156 6 0.183 6 0.238 6 0.335 6 0.179 6 0.096 
7 0.952 7 0.956 7 0.963 7 0.971 7 0.019 7 0.009 
8 0.387 8 0.42 8 0.481 8 0.571 8 0.184 8 0.091 
9 0.139 9 0.164 9 0.218 9 0.313 9 0.174 9 0.094 
10 0.231 10 0.262 10 0.323 10 0.421 10 0.191 10 0.099 
11 0.189 11 0.218 11 0.277 11 0.375 11 0.186 11 0.098 
12 0.121 12 0.145 12 0.196 12 0.288 12 0.168 12 0.092 
13 0.257 13 0.289 13 0.351 13 0.449 13 0.192 13 0.098 
14 0.203 14 0.232 14 0.292 14 0.391 14 0.188 14 0.098 
15 0.308 15 0.341 15 0.403 15 0.5 15 0.191 15 0.096 
16 0.082 16 0.102 16 0.146 16 0.231 16 0.148 16 0.084 
17 0.315 17 0.348 17 0.41 17 0.506 17 0.191 17 0.096 
18 0.246 18 0.278 18 0.339 18 0.438 18 0.192 18 0.099 
19 0.275 19 0.308 19 0.37 19 0.468 20 0.191 19 0.098 
20 0.229 20 0.26 20 0.321 20 0.42 19 0.192 20 0.099 
                          
Average    0.2333   0.2585   0.309   0.394   0.1606   0.0849 
Variance   0.939   0.937   0.928   0.893   0.173   0.09 
Standard 
Deviation   0.1987   0.1987   0.1981   0.1938   0.0512   0.0243 
 
All hospitals increased in efficiency over the four phases. The largest increase in 
efficiency score 1979-2014 is 0.192 while the lowest increase in efficiency score is 0.019. 





The largest increase between 1988-2014 (i.e., between Comprehensive and New Public 
Self-Operating System phase) is 0.099 while the lowest increase in efficiency score is 
recorded by Hospital No.7 at 0.009.  
(ii) Number of radiology tests. Table 5.10 below presents the SFA efficiency results 
for Radiology tests, between 1979 and 2014, by hospital, by management phase.  



























































  1 0.701 1 0.678 1 0.629 1 0.542 1 -0.159 1 -0.087 
2 0.872 2 0.86 2 0.836 2 0.789 2 -0.082 2 -0.046 
3 0.073 3 0.057 3 0.034 3 0.012 3 -0.062 3 -0.022 
4 0.087 4 0.068 4 0.042 4 0.015 4 -0.071 4 -0.026 
5 0.031 5 0.022 5 0.011 5 0.003 5 -0.028 5 -0.008 
6 0.959 6 0.956 6 0.947 6 0.931 6 -0.028 6 -0.016 
7 0.748 7 0.727 7 0.684 7 0.605 7 -0.142 7 -0.078 
8 0.693 8 0.668 8 0.619 8 0.531 8 -0.162 8 -0.088 
9 0.926 9 0.919 9 0.904 9 0.876 9 -0.05 9 -0.028 
10 0.469 10 0.436 10 0.372 10 0.272 10 -0.198 10 -0.1 
11 0.968 11 0.965 11 0.959 11 0.946 11 -0.022 11 -0.013 
12 0.848 12 0.835 12 0.806 12 0.753 12 -0.095 12 -0.053 
13 0.766 13 0.746 13 0.705 13 0.631 13 -0.135 13 -0.074 
14 0.85 14 0.837 14 0.809 14 0.756 14 -0.094 14 -0.053 
15 0.692 15 0.667 15 0.618 15 0.53 15 -0.162 15 -0.088 
16 0.419 16 0.386 16 0.322 16 0.224 16 -0.195 16 -0.097 
17 0.915 17 0.907 17 0.89 17 0.858 17 -0.057 17 -0.032 
18 0.857 18 0.844 18 0.817 18 0.766 18 -0.091 18 -0.051 
19 0.548 19 0.517 19 0.456 19 0.355 19 -0.193 19 -0.101 
20 0.929 20 0.923 20 0.909 20 0.882 20 -0.048 20 -0.027                           
Average   0.6675   0.6509   0.6184   0.5638   -0.1037   -0.0544 
Variance   0.937   0.943   0.948   0.943   -0.022   -0.093 
Standard 
Deviation   0.303   0.30704   0.31217   0.31654   0.0595   0.0321 
 
The New Public Self-Operating System phase has the lowest average PE score 
(0.5638) whereas the Bilateral phase had the highest average efficiency score (0.668). 
The Bilateral, Partial System and Comprehensive Management phase each have 14 
hospitals (70 per cent) with above average efficiency scores. The New Public Self-





Operating System phase has 11 hospitals (55 per cent) above the phase’s average 
efficiency score.   
The average efficiency score decreased by -0.104 between the Bilateral 
Management phase and the New Public Self-Operating System phase. The efficiency 
decrease between the Comprehensive System phase and the New Public Self-Operating 
System phase is -0.054. 
  The Bilateral phase (1979-1982) recorded both the smallest variance (0.937) in 
range of scores and the lowest Standard Deviation (0.303). The phase with the greatest 
variance between hospitals efficiency scores is the Comprehensive System phase. The 
other two phases recorded the same Variance with score 0.943. 
Hospital No. 10 at -0.198 records the largest decrease in efficiency score between 
1979-2014 while Hospital No. 11 at -0.022 records the smallest decrease. The largest 
decrease between 1988-2014 is recorded in Hospital No. 19 at -0.101 while Hospital No.5 
records the smallest decrease at -0.008. 
(iii) Laboratory tests completed. Table 5.11 below presents the SFA efficiency 
score for Laboratory tests completed between 1979 and 2014, by hospital, by 
management phase.  
The Bilateral phase has the lowest average PE score (0.220) whereas the New 
Public Self-Operating System phase has the highest average efficiency score (0.3852). 
The Comprehensive and New Public Self-Operating System phase each have eight 
hospitals (40 per cent) with above average efficiency scores. The Partial phase has the 
lowest number of hospitals 6 hospitals (30 per cent) above the phase’s average efficiency 
score.   
The average efficiency score increased by 0.166 between the Bilateral Management 
phase and the New Public Self-Operating System phase. The efficiency increase between 





the Comprehensive System phase and the New Public Self-Operating System phase is 
0.090. The New Public Self Operating System phase (1979-1982) recorded both the 
smallest variance (0.843) in range of scores and the lowest Standard Deviation (0.227). 
The phase with the greatest variance between hospitals efficiency scores is the 
Comprehensive System phase (0.87). The other two phases respectively recorded the 
variances of 0.864, and 0.869 for the Partial phase. 






























































  1 0.33 1 0.367 1 0.437 1 0.542 1 0.212 1 0.105 
2 0.107 2 0.132 2 0.189 2 0.291 2 0.185 2 0.103 
3 0.011 3 0.017 3 0.035 3 0.085 3 0.074 3 0.049 
4 0.075 4 0.096 4 0.145 4 0.241 4 0.166 4 0.095 
5 0.599 5 0.629 5 0.681 5 0.753 5 0.153 5 0.071 
6 0.074 6 0.095 6 0.144 6 0.239 6 0.165 6 0.095 
7 0.304 7 0.341 7 0.41 7 0.518 7 0.214 7 0.107 
8 0.622 8 0.651 8 0.7 8 0.768 8 0.146 8 0.068 
9 0.073 9 0.094 9 0.143 9 0.237 9 0.164 9 0.095 
10 0.205 10 0.238 10 0.306 10 0.416 10 0.212 10 0.111 
11 0.168 11 0.199 11 0.264 11 0.374 11 0.206 11 0.11 
12 0.033 12 0.045 12 0.078 12 0.153 12 0.12 12 0.074 
13 0.112 13 0.138 13 0.195 13 0.299 13 0.187 13 0.104 
14 0.875 14 0.886 14 0.905 14 0.928 14 0.053 14 0.024 
15 0.281 15 0.317 15 0.387 15 0.495 15 0.215 15 0.109 
16 0.26 16 0.296 16 0.366 16 0.476 16 0.215 16 0.11 
17 0.083 17 0.106 17 0.157 17 0.255 17 0.171 17 0.098 
18 0.053 18 0.07 18 0.112 18 0.199 18 0.146 18 0.087 
19 0.044 19 0.06 19 0.098 19 0.18 19 0.136 19 0.082 
20 0.084 20 0.106 20 0.157 20 0.255 20 0.172 20 0.098 
Average   0.2196   0.2441   0.2954   0.3852   0.1656   0.0897 
Variance   0.864   0.869   0.87   0.843   0.162   0.087 
Standard 
Deviation   0.2322   0.23445   0.2348   0.2265   0.0453   0.0897 
 





All hospitals (100 percent) increased in PE over the four phases. The largest increase 
in efficiency score between 1979-2014 is 0.215 while the smallest increase in efficiency 
score is recorded by Hospital No. 14 is 0.053. The largest increase between between 
Comprehensive and New Public Self-Operating System phase is recorded in Hospital No. 
10 at 0.111 while Hospital No. 14 records the smallest increase at 0.024. 
(iv) Review visits. Table 5.12, the Bilateral phase has the lowest average PE score 
(0.610) whereas the New Public Self-Operating system phase had the highest average 
efficiency score (0.7443). The New Public Self-Operating System phase has 14 hospitals 
(70 per cent) with above average efficiency scores. The Bilateral and Partial phases have 
the lowest number of hospitals 12 hospitals (60 per cent) above the phase’s average 
efficiency score. The Comprehensive System phase has 13 hospitals (65 per cent) 
showing above average efficiency scores.   
The average PE score increased by 0.135 between the Bilateral Management phase 
and the New Public Self-Operating System phase. The efficiency increase between the 
Comprehensive System phase and the New Public Self-Operating System phase was 
0.0641. The New Public Self Operating System phase recorded both the smallest variance 
(0.881) in range of scores and the lowest Standard Deviation (0.255). The phase with the 
greatest variance between hospitals efficiency scores is the Partial System phase (0.928).  
All hospitals (100 per cent) increased in efficiency over the four phases. Hospital 
No. 10 recorded the largest increase in efficiency score at 0.259 between 1979-2014 while 
the smallest increase in efficiency score is recorded by Hospital No. 11 at 0.035. The 
largest increase between Comprehensive and New Public Self-Operating System phase 
is recorded in Hospital No. 10 at 0.128 while Hospital No.11 records the smallest increase 
at 0.015. 
 



















































  1 0.723 1 0.751 1 0.796 1 0.854 1 0.131 1 0.058 
2 0.833 2 0.851 2 0.879 2 0.915 2 0.081 2 0.035 
3 0.006 3 0.01 3 0.027 3 0.084 3 0.078 3 0.056 
4 0.851 4 0.867 4 0.893 4 0.924 4 0.073 4 0.032 
5 0.006 5 0.011 5 0.03 5 0.089 5 0.083 5 0.059 
6 0.9 6 0.911 6 0.929 6 0.95 6 0.05 6 0.021 
7 0.927 7 0.935 7 0.948 7 0.963 7 0.037 7 0.016 
8 0.913 8 0.922 8 0.937 8 0.956 8 0.044 8 0.019 
9 0.393 9 0.438 9 0.52 9 0.637 9 0.244 9 0.117 
10 0.301 10 0.346 10 0.432 10 0.56 10 0.259 10 0.128 
11 0.93 11 0.938 11 0.95 11 0.965 11 0.035 11 0.015 
12 0.586 12 0.623 12 0.687 12 0.771 12 0.186 12 0.084 
13 0.636 13 0.67 13 0.727 13 0.803 13 0.167 13 0.075 
14 0.619 14 0.654 14 0.714 14 0.792 14 0.173 14 0.078 
15 0.719 15 0.747 15 0.793 15 0.852 15 0.133 15 0.059 
16 0.552 16 0.591 16 0.659 16 0.75 16 0.198 16 0.091 
17 0.828 17 0.846 17 0.875 17 0.912 17 0.084 17 0.037 
18 0.399 18 0.444 18 0.526 18 0.642 18 0.242 18 0.116 
19 0.45 19 0.494 19 0.572 19 0.68 19 0.23 19 0.108 
20 0.613 20 0.648 20 0.709 20 0.788 20 0.176 20 0.079 
Average   0.6092   0.6348   0.68015   0.7443   0.1352   0.0641 
Variance   0.924   0.928   0.923   0.881   0.224   0.113 
Standard 
Deviation   0.2815   0.2785   0.2712   0.2545   0.0757   0.0359 
5.3.3 SFA PE: summary 
(i) Average efficiency score. Figure 5.1 below shows the average PE measures (for 
all 20 hospitals) across all four outputs measures, providing a high-level comparison 
across management and operational phases. The New Public Self-Operating System 
phase shows the greatest average efficiency scores across all output variables apart from 
Radiology tests as an output measure of PE. The Bilateral System phase shows the lowest 
average efficiency scores across all the output measures except in the Radiology output 
where the Bilateral phase recorded the highest score.  





However, the variances between the different phase averages (at this summary 
level) are not obviously significant, and therefore, not supportive of checking the 
correlation of the efficiency of the various outputs with the management system phases, 
using the SFA method.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 - Summary of average PE of output variables by phase 
Table 5.13 below provides a more detailed comparative evaluation summary of 
the SFA results.  
Table 5.13 - SFA PE Summary 
 





(ii) Standard deviations. The New Public Self-Operating System phase shows the 
lowest Standard Deviations for Inpatients discharged, Laboratory tests and Review visits, 
as well as the highest Standard Deviation for Radiology tests SFA calculated efficient 
scores. In contrast, the Bilateral System phase shows the lowest Standard Deviation for 
Radiology tests SFA calculated efficient scores. The Partial System phase shows the 
highest Standard Deviation for Inpatients discharged (same score as the previous phase). 
The Comprehensive System phase shows the highest Standard Deviation for Laboratory 
tests. 
(iii) Average Variance Scores. The New Public Self-Operating System phase 
shows the lowest average Variance for all output variables, except for Radiology tests. 
Radiology tests showed equal average variance scores in the Partial System phase and the 
New Public Self-Operating System phase. The Bilateral System phase shows the widest 
variances for the Inpatients discharged output variable. The Comprehensive System phase 
shows the widest variances for Laboratory tests. The Inpatients discharged output variable 
shows the widest average variance in the Bilateral System phase. 
5.4 Panel Model Estimation  
The purpose of this section is to use a panel data model to measure relative 
efficiency providing a descriptive analysis that shows both within-phase, and between-
phase variations in trends exhibited by the output variables. The models are estimated 
using STATA (Statistical Software vs.12). 
5.4.1 Correlation matrix for input variables 
From Table 5.14 it can be concluded that there is a strong correlation between the 
No. of Doctors and No. of Nurses (0.76), the No. of Nurses and the No. of Allied 
Personnel (0.79), and the No. of Allied Personnel with No. of Doctors (0.72). The MoH 





budget shows proportional weaker correlations, ranging between 0.15 with No. of Nurses, 
to 0.29 with No. of Beds. Similarly, the number of Beds correlated for No. of Nurses 
(0.28) and No of Doctors (0.28), shows a weaker relationship than that of No. of Allied 
Personnel (0.32).  
The correlation matrix shows there is a strong correlation between the No. of 
Doctors, No. of Nurses, and No. of Allied Personnel variables, which are further tested 
for multi-collinearity (Appendix 5.E), where VIF > 10. By choosing just one input 
variable the issue of a multi-collinearity effect is addressed, thus avoiding risks biasing 
the model, making the relationship non-linear, and undermining confidence in further 
prediction and weakening interpretation. Therefore, for the purposes of this section of the 
alternative run, only a study of the number of Doctors variable will be taken into account 
(Appendix 5.G). This is due to doctors holding the highest level of medical influence, 
compared to the other input variables used in this study. 





No. of Doctors No. of Nurses No. of Allied 
Personnel 
MoH Budget 1 0.29 0.14 0.15 0.22 
No. of Beds 0.29 1 0.28 0.28 0.32 
No. of Doctors 0.14 0.28 1 0.76 0.72 
No. of Nurses 0.15 0.28 0.76 1 0.79 
No. of Allied 
Personnel 
0.22 0.76 0.72 0.79 1 
 
5.4.2 Panel Estimation Results 
Panel data analysis assumes a normal distribution for independent variables. Using 
the Shapiro-normality test (Appendix 5.H) shows that the null hypothesis (H0: 
independent variables are following the normal distribution) is rejected. Therefore, the 
independent variables (MoH Budget, Beds, Doctors, Nurses and Allied Professional input 





variables) have an abnormal distribution, where z value is not within the interval (-
1.96,1.96).  
Using the Shapiro-Francia test the variables are log-transformed, where a normal 
distribution for the variables is observed (Appendix 5.I).  
(i) Inpatients discharged as dependent variable. The Pooled Model (Appendix 5.J) 
rejects H0: The Model is stable, where P-value <5%. Furthermore, the Bilateral phase has 
been omitted because of the multicollinearity problem.  
Using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroskedasticity (Appendix 
5.K), the null hypothesis (H0: Homoscedasticity) is rejected, as P-value <5%. 
Using the same tests on the log of all the variables (Appendix 5.L, and 5.M) the 
results show that the heteroskedasticity problem is not remedied. 
 A Robust Pooled Regression (Appendix 5.N) is run as a remedy of 
Heteroskedasticity. For the log transformations the results show a lower standard error, 
and higher R squared (from 0.11 in Appendix 5.J for the Inpatients discharged (without 
log) to 0.41 in Appendix 5.L for the log Inpatients discharged). 
The FE model in Table (5.15) below, and RE model (Appendix 5.O) rejects H0: The 
RE is consistent. The FE model performed better than other models (P-value = 0.03 <5%), 
which is confirmed by using the Hausman test, but notice that the standard Hausman test 
does not work with RSE. 
From the Table 5.15 it can be concluded that only the Intercept, and New Public 
Self-Operating System phase are significant, while other are not. This suggests that the 
Inpatient discharged output variable does not have a big role in the association with the 
relative efficiency, whilst the transition to the New Public Self-Operating System was 
associated with an increase in the Inpatients discharged by 0.14 at the intercept (individual 
differences which are assumed to be fixed over time) 3.72.  





Table 5.15 - Panel Estimation results for log Inpatients discharged (FE model) 
FE model log (Inpatients discharged) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 3.72 0.34 0.00 
Log (Budget) 0.03 0.04 0.36 
Log (Beds) 0.19 0.18 0.29 
Log (Doctors) -0.26 0.17 0.13 
Partial Operating System 0.002 0.02 0.93 
Comprehensive Operating System  0.03 0.04 0.41 
New Public Self-Operating System 0.14 0.04 0.002 
Sigma_u 0.45    
Sigma_e 0.14    
Rho 0.91    
F test that all u_i=0: F (19,694)=144.61, prob >F=0.00 
R square: within 0.17   
  
R square: between 0.44   
R square: overall 0.19   
Corr (u_i, Xb) -0.66   
F (6, 694) 23.95                            0.000 
Hausman test between RE and FE models  
Variable b (fe) B (re) b-B SE 
Log (Budget) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.003 
Log (Beds) 0.19 -0.07 0.26 0.09 
Log (Doctors) -0.26 0.19 -0.45 0.12 
Partial 0.002 0.001 0.001  
Comprehensive 0.03 -0.00003 0.03 0.01 
New Public 0.138 0.10 0.04 0.01 
Chi square = 14.31   P-value = 0.03 
     
 (ii) Radiology tests as dependent variable. The pooled model, the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for Heteroskedasticity for all variables (Appendix 5.P), and 
the log of all variables (Appendix 5.Q) rejects H0: The Model is stable and rejects H0: 
Homoscedasticity as P-value <5%. 
As a remedy for heteroskedasticity, a robust pooled regression (Table below) for 
the log transformations gives a lower standard error. 
The Hausman test (Appendix 5.R) is used to compare the FE and the RE models. 
H0: The RE is consistent, is accepted, where P-value = 0.88.  





The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test results show the consistency 
between the RE model and the Robust Regression model, Table 5.16 below finding that 
we accepted Ha: Robust Pooled is consistent as P-value <5%. 
 Increasing outputs by increasing inputs may represent that the hospitals provide 
better services. This study analyses the PE of hospitals in relation to the output of services, 
on other hand such expenditure-related measures could be interpreted as representing 
waste and inefficiency.  
From the Table below, it can be concluded that the log (Budget), log (Doctor), the 
Comprehensive, and the New Public Self-Operating System phase are all significant 
while others variables are not. Simply put, this means that increasing the MoH Budget by 
1 per cent may increase the Radiology tests relative efficiency results by 0.51, which may 
suggest that the hospitals used this money attempting to increase the services as much as 
possible, instead of saving money and increasing their profits and retained earnings. Table 
5.16 below also shows that increasing in the No. of doctors by 1 per cent may be 
associated with an increasing the Radiology tests results by 0.98 (which might mean that 
the hospitals care more about people instead of reduce expenditures). 
  In addition, the Table below shows that the transition to the Comprehensive phase 
is associated with decreases in Radiology test relative efficiency, which decline further 
when moving to the New Public Self-Operating System phase. Although this study 
measured PE, reducing Radiology tests may suggest that the hospitals were more efficient 
and not performing unneeded tests, instead of just choosing less costly care. 
The two tables 5.15 and 5.16, show that the effect of the Radiology test variable is 
greater on the relative efficiency of the hospitals than the Inpatient discharged output 
variable. 





Table 5.16 - Panel Estimation results for Radiology test (Robust Model) 
Robust model log (Radiology tests) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept - 0.55 0.82 0.50 
Log (Budget) 0.51 0.12 0.00 
Log (Beds) - 0.19 0.12 0.12 
Log (Doctors) 0.98 0.05 0.00 
Partial Operating System - 0.04 0.05 0.36 
Comprehensive Operating System - 0.11 0.05 0.01 
New Public Self-Operating System - 0.21 0.07 0.01 
R squared 0.52   
Root MSE 0.40   
F (6,713) 217.94  0.00 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE 
Estimate results Var. Sd = sqrt (Var) 
Log (Review visits) 0.33 0.57 
E 0.04 0.20 
U 0.14 0.37 
 Chi bar (2) = 7157.91       Prob > Chi = 0.00 
 
 (iii) Laboratory tests as dependent variable. The pooled model and a Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for Heteroskedasticity is run for all variables (Appendix 5.S) 
and then for the log of all variables (Appendix 5.T). H0: The Model is stable and H0: 
Homoscedasticity is rejected. 
As a remedy of heteroskedasticity, a robust pooled regression model (Table below) 
for the log transformations is run which gives a lower standard error, and higher R square. 
The Hausman test is applied to compare between the FE and the RE models 
(Appendix 5.U) resulting in H0: The RE is consistent where P-value = 0.95.  
Then Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test in Table 5.17 below is used to 
test the consistency between the RE and Robust Regression model. The results show that 
we accepted Ha: Robust Pooled is consistent.  
 





Table 5.17 - Panel Estimation results for Laboratory tests 
Robust model log (Laboratory tests) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 1.58 0.54 0.004 
Log (Budget) 0.32 0.07 0.00 
Log (Beds) 0.26 0.09 0.004 
Log (Doctors) 0.72 0.05 0.00 
Partial Operating System - 0.05 0.06 0.41 
Comprehensive Operating System - 0.08 0.05 0.11 
New Public Self-Operating System - 0.02 0.06 0.71 
R squared 0.49   
Root MSE 0.36   
F (6,713) 125.34  0.00 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE 
Estimate results Var. Sd = sqrt (Var) 
Log (Review visits) 0.26 0.51 
e 0.05 0.21 
u 0.10 0.32 
 Chi bar (2) = 5352.67       Prob > Chi = 0.00 
 
As concluded from Table 5.17, the log (Budget), log (Beds), log (Doctors) and 
Intercept are significant, while other variables are not. With the Intercept at 1.58, 
increasing the MoH budget by 1 per cent may be associated with increases in Laboratory 
tests outputs by 0.32 (which might suggest that the hospitals care more about people by 
increasing the Laboratory tests made possible by increases in the Budget, instead of 
choosing the less costly care). The Table above also shows that increasing in the No. of 
Beds as input by 1 per cent, is associated with an increase in the Laboratory tests (output) 
by 0.26, which might mean that the hospitals have provided better services, instead of 
choosing the less expensive form of care (outpatients). Increasing the No. of Doctors by 
1 per cent may be associated with an increase in the Laboratory test results by 0.72. The 
transition between phases does not seem to be associated with the relative efficiency of 
Laboratory tests results. The Laboratory test output variable has a greater association with 





the overall efficiency of the hospitals than the Inpatient discharged and Radiology test 
outputs. 
(iiv) Review visits as dependent variable. The pooled model and a Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for Heteroskedasticity for all variables (Appendix 5.V) is run, 
and then for the log of all variables (Appendix 5.W), H0: The Model is stable and H0: 
Homoscedasticity are rejected. 
As a remedy for Heteroskedasticity, a robust pooled regression is run for the log 
transformations because it gives the less standard error (Appendix 5.V and Appendix 
5.W). 
FE and RE models are run. Using the Hausman test (Appendix 5.X) H0: The RE is 
consistent where P-value = 0.39 is accepted, suggesting that the RE model is performed 
better than FE model.  
Then the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is run to test the consistence 
between RE and Robust regression. In this case, it is found that we accepted Ha: Robust 
Pooled is consistent (Table 5.18). 
Table 5.18 - Panel Estimation results for Review visits 
Robust model log (Review visits) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 3.80 0.59 0.00 
Log (budget) 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Log (Beds) - 0.30 0.11 0.01 
Log (Doctors) 0.43 0.06 0.00 
Partial Operating System - 0.01 0.07 0.94 
Comprehensive Operating System - 0.02 0.07 0.79 
New Public Self-Operating System 0.09 0.08 0.27 
R squared 0.18   
Root MSE 0.41   
F (6,713) 11.75  0.00 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for RE 
Estimate results Var. Sd = sqrt (Var) 
Log (Review visits) 0.20 0.45 
E 0.05 0.22 
U 0.14 0.37 
 Chi bar (2) = 6416.11    Prob > Chi = 0.00 





From the Table, it can be concluded that the log (Beds), log (Doctors), and Intercept 
are significant while the other variables are not. When the Intercept is 3.80, increasing 
the beds by 1 per cent may be associated with decreases in the the Review visits by 0.30. 
Increasing the No. of Doctors by 1 per cent may be associated with increases in the 
Review visits by 0.43. The transition between phases is not associated with the Review 
visits output variable results.  
Table 5.19 below summarises the results of the preceding tables. 
Table 5.19 - Panel Estimate Results Summary 
 FE  RE  Robust model System Phases  
(As variable dummies) 
Number of Inpatients 
discharged 
Intercept N/A N/A New Public Operating 
System (0.14) 
Number of Radiology 
tests 
N/A N/A Log (budget), Log (doctors) Comprehensive (-0.11) and 
New Public Operating 
System (-0.21) 
Number of Laboratory 
tests completed 
N/A N/A Intercept, Log (budget), Log 
(beds), and Log (doctor) 
No significant effect 
Number of Review 
visits 
N/A N/A Intercept, Log (beds), and 
Log (doctor) 
No significant effect 
 
The results from Table above suggest that Laboratory tests are associated with the 
relative efficiency of the hospitals more than other output variables. 
5.5 Variables Trends  
5.5.1 Inputs variables trend overview 
The Figure below shows the trends in the non-financial input variables by 
management phases, using the mean value of input variables per annum for all hospitals 
used in this study. The four non-financial inputs (Number of Beds, Doctors, Nurses, and 
Allied Personnel) show similar trends over the period under consideration. Each of the 
input variables shows increasing trends over time, with significant change in the first three 
taking place in the early years of the Comprehensive System phase that subsequently 
seems to move upwards gradually over time.  







Phases: B=Bilateral Agreements, P=Partial, C=Comprehensive, S=New Public Self-Operating System. 
Figure 5.2 - Trends in the mean value of input variables per annum 
B P C S B P C S 
B 
P 








































































Figure 5.3 below shows that from the New Public Self-Operating System phase 
(2000-2014) onwards the MoH budget increases steadily. For the KSA, significant 
variations are observed in the MoH budget for the first three management phases: 
Bilateral, Partial, and Comprehensive. Following the move to the New Public Self-
Operating System phase, the MoH budget increased substantially year-on-year. In 
comparison, non-financial inputs show less within-phase and between-phase variations 
and are not obviously directly related to budgetary figures. Note that the data here is not 
only for 20 hospitals but for the total budget for all the MoH’s hospitals around KSA 
which also increased. There were 191 MoH hospitals in 2000 and 270 in 2014. 
 
Figure 5.3 - MoH Mean Budget (SAR) 
5.5.2 Output variables trend overview 
The four output variables generally show different trends between phases, and for 
each of the outputs, there appears to be within-period variations as shown in Figure 5.4 
below.  
The Bilateral and Partial phases did not show considerable within-period variations. 
In the Comprehensive phase however, all variables (except the Radiology tests output 
variable), have a significant variation until the New Public Self-Operating System phase. 






































































































attributed to the huge changes in this phase prompted by this fully corporatised phase for 
the MoH’s hospitals. In addition, the New Public Self-Operating System phase shows 
some within-period variations. 
    
  
Phases: B=Bilateral, P=Partial, C=Comprehensive, S=New Public Self-Operating System. 
Figure 5.4 - Trends in Output Variables 
5.6 Regression Analyses  
The purpose of this section is to isolate any potential unaccounted bias in the 
previous sections’ efficiency results, and secondly identify robust predictions where 
appropriate with respect to addressing this study’s hypotheses (particularly H3 - Fully 
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hospitals) within different time periods. Furthermore, it is suggested that quality 
considerations may be important, and should be examined in relation to output efficiency 
estimated within this study. For example, if output quantities are increased/decreased, this 
may be at the expense of population health (e.g., MR outcome).  
This possibility is posed through RQ2 - Have HC quality considerations (or 
effectiveness) modified conclusions relating to the efficiency of different HC governance 
systems?  
5.6.1 correlations between changes in output variables and the MR outcome  
This section looks at correlations between changes in output variables per 1,000 
of the local population (across the four phases), and the MR outcome (per 1,000 of the 
local population) as a quality proxy. Secondly, the evaluation of the data utilises the Least 
Squares method where the MR outcome variable (per 1,000 of the local population) is 
considered as the dependent variable. Section 5.6.2 develops the regression and evaluates 
the impact of multi-collinearities, where two multiple regression models are formulated. 
This section used Eviews (Version 10). 
5.6.1.1 MR per 1,000 of the local population  
The Figure below shows the trend in the MR, as an outcome quality proxy for the 
hospital, across the four phases of management and operations of the KSA HC sector 
during the period (1997-2014). As shown in Figure 5.5, the MR declines steadily from 
1980 and continues to do so over the time period of this study. This rate declines 
significantly, from a value of 8.89 deaths in every 1,000 bodies in 1979 to around 3.53 
per 1,000 in 2014, indicating rising population health.  
In addition, the MR has a quadratic declining trend that has to be considered at the 
level of model specification. The regression of the MR over a quadratic trend, shown in 






Table 5.20 below, confirms this observation, and reports a significant and negative 
relation trend in MR and quadratic trend in MR. 
 
Figure 5.5 - Trends in MR per 1,000 of the local population 
Table 5.20 - MR quadratic trend estimations results 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 36    
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     Quadratic trend -0.065134 0.005858 -11.11828 0.0000 
C 7.173032 0.248594 28.85445 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.784286     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.777942     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.730296     Akaike info criterion 2.263218 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
      
These results on MR raise the question of whether this downward trend in the MR 
outcome variable, can be correlated with the changes in output variables, in the different 
phases of corporatisation. This is particularly relevant to H3 - Fully corporatised 
hospitals will perform better in terms of quality than partially corporatised hospitals. H3 
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5.6.1.2 Inpatients discharged per 1,000 of the local population 
Figure 5.6 below shows considerable variations within the total Inpatients discharged per 
1,000 of the local population, across the different management phases. The lowest figure 
per 1,000 for Inpatients discharged is in 2014 with 10 per 1,000 and the highest figure is 
in 1991 with 19 per 1,000. 
  
Figure 5.6 - Inpatients discharged per 1,000 of the local population 
(i) Inpatients discharged per 1,000 of the local population – correlation analysis.  
The correlation analysis in the following Table 5.21 shows a strong positive correlation 
relation (0.76) between total Inpatients discharged and the MR. 
Table 5.21 - Correlation analysis - Total Inpatients discharged (per 1,000)/MR 
    
 Laboratory tests  MR 
   Inpatients discharged 1.000000 0.760239 
   MR 0.760239 1.000000 






































 (ii) Inpatients discharged - breakpoints. The data trend break/s observed may 
affect the results. Indeed, the consideration of one, or many breakpoints, gives different 
perspectives on the intensity of the relation between the two considered measures. The 
test of the breakpoint is designed to determine whether the data is connected or not. If 
there is a breakpoint, a regression model should not be used for all data, but we need to 
create two models, one before and one after the breakpoint. 
No breakpoint - Table 5.22 below shows estimates of the MR, assuming that there 
is no break in the relation.  
Table 5.22 - MR/total Inpatients discharged (per 1,000) without considering breakpoints 
Dependent Variable: MR 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 136 
Included observations: 36 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     Inpatients discharged  0.423914 0.062246 6.810276 0.0000 
C -1.736369 0.969456 -1.791076 0.0822 
     R-squared 0.577008 Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.564568 S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 1.022647 Akaike info criterion 2.936618 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Table 5.22 shows that there is a positive and significant relation such that every 
one-point decrease in the Inpatients discharged makes the MR decrease by around 0.424. 
From descriptive analysis and visual examination of the data by graphing, we 
noticed that there were many breakpoints. We chose three sharp breaks: in the most 
corporatised phase (1988-1999), in the least corporatised phase (2000-2014), and the last 
one was before these two phases, to distinguish the relation of this variable with MR in 
these three phases.  






Firstly with one Breakpoint (1993) - Table 5.23 below assumes an insignificant 
relationship before and after 1993 (breakpoint) between MR and the Inpatients 
discharged.   
Table 5.23 - MR/total Inpatients discharged (per 1,00) considering breakpoint 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares with Breaks| Included observations: 36 
 
    Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
 
    1979- 1992 (14 observations) 
 
    Inpatients discharged  0.266948 0.191839 1.391520 0.1737 
C 1.475818 3.505647 0.420983 0.6766 
 
    1993 - 2014 (23 observations) 
 
    Inpatients discharged  0.0607344 0.118488 0.568364 0.5738 
C 2.849498 1.609093 1.770872 0.0861 
 
    R-squared 0.701258     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.673251     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.885875     Akaike info criterion 2.699957 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.049283    
 
    
Secondly, with Multiple Breakpoints (1986, 1993, 2003) - compared to Table 5.22 
(no breakpoint), Table 5.24 with higher Adjusted R-squared suggests that for every one-
point increase in the Inpatients discharged resulted in an MR increase by around 3.7 per 
1,000 before 1986 and decrease by around 2.8 between 1993 and 2002. Between 1986 
and 1992 and after 2003 the effect is insignificant. 
Table 5.24 - MR/total Inpatients discharged (per 1,00) considering multiple breakpoints 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares with Breaks  
Included observations: 36   
Break type: Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially determined breaks 
Break selection: Trimming 0.15, Max. breaks 5, Sig. level 0.05 
Breaks: 1986, 1993, 2003   
 
    Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     1979 - 1985  -- 6 obs 
 
    Inpatients discharged  3.697012 1.341211 2.756472 0.0102 
C -60.65891 24.72487 -2.453356 0.0206 
 
    1986 - 1992  -- 7 obs 
 
    Inpatients discharged  0.097746 0.099581 0.981569 0.3347 
C 3.430498 1.803575 1.902055 0.0675 
 
    1993 - 2002  -- 10 obs 
 
    Inpatients discharged  -2.839983 0.380645 -7.460973 0.0000 
C 44.42702 5.461484 8.134606 0.0000 
 
    2003 - 2014  -- 13 obs 
 
    






Inpatients discharged  0.007282 0.070927 0.102664 0.9190 
C 3.463768 0.915324 3.784199 0.0007 
 
    R-squared 0.931831     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.914789     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.452391     Akaike info criterion 1.444590 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
    
5.6.1.3 Laboratory tests per 1,000 of the local population 
 Figure 5.7 below shows an upward trend for total Laboratory tests per 1,000 of the 
local population with considerable variations across the different management phases. 
The lowest figure per 1,000 for Laboratory tests is in 1994 with 1,007 per 1,000 and 
the highest figure is in 1999 with 2,408 per 1,000.  
 
Figure 5.7 - Laboratory tests per 1,000 of the local population 
(i) Laboratory tests per 1,000 of the local population - correlation analysis. In 
spite of the sharp change in the trend of the Laboratory tests during the period 1979-2014, 
the correlation analysis shows a strong negative relation (-0.75) between this variable and 
the MR. 
Table 5.25 – Correlation analysis - Total Laboratory tests (per 1,000)/MR 
     Laboratory tests  MR 
   Laboratory tests  1.000000 -0.748799 
   MR -0.748799 1.000000 
     






 (ii) Laboratory tests - threshold. The following Figure shows that the relation 
between the two measures may have a threshold as the MR became flat after a value of 
30 million Laboratory tests. This threshold was breached twice as presented in Figure 5.4, 
firstly in the Comprehensive Operating System phase (1997) and subsequently in the New 
Public Self-Operating System phase (2009). There is no presumption that lab tests are 
just to avoid death (imminent or otherwise), however this result shows that if the outcome 
measure is designated as MR then there is a threshold after which laboratory tests are 
limited. 
 
Figure 5.8 - Threshold chart - MR per 1,000 and Laboratory tests significance 
The estimates in the following confirm the significant positive correlation between 
the Laboratory tests with a threshold (Laboratory tests squared) and the MR.  
Table 5.26 - MR/Total Laboratory tests (per 1,000) considering Laboratory threshold 
Dependent Variable: MR 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 36 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
          Laboratory tests  -0.018764 0.004142 -4.530104 0.0001 
(Laboratory test) 2 4.97E-06 0.004142 -4.530104 0.0001 
C 20.77834 3.170832 6.552961 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.561970     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.535423     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 1.056317     Akaike info criterion 3.027109 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000001    


























5.6.1.4 Radiology tests performed per 1,000 of the local population 
Figure 5.9 below shows an upward trend for total Radiology tests performed per 
1,000 of the local population. There is a substantial change in the volume of tests 
performed after 2010. The lowest figure per 1,000, for Radiology tests, is 43 per 1,000 in 
1988 and the highest figure per 1,000 is in 2013 with 120 per 1,000.  
 
Figure 5.9 - Radiology tests per 1,000 of the local population 
(i) Radiology tests per 1,000 of the local population - correlation analysis. The 
Correlation analysis in the following Table shows a weak negative relation (-0.42) 
between the Radiology tests, and the MR.  
Table 5.27 – Correlation analysis - Total Radiology tests (per 1,000)/MR 
   
 Laboratory tests  MR 
   Radiology tests 1.000000 -0.421683 
   MR -0.421683 1.000000 





































































(ii) Radiology tests - Threshold. The following figure shows that the MR becomes 
flat after a value of one million performed Radiology tests, suggesting that the 







Figure 5.10 – Threshold chart – MR per 1,000 and Radiology tests significance 
The estimates reported in Table 5.28 below confirm the significance of a relation 
in MR to the Radiology tests variable, with a threshold. This threshold was breached from 
2006 onwards in the New Public Self-Operating System phase, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
The steep incline in this variable increased substantially between 2009 and 2014, within 
the context of this study. 
Table 5.28 - MR/Radiology test (per 1,000) considering Radiology threshold 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
          Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
          Performed Radiology  
tests  
-0.647677 0.081591 -7.938099 0.0000 




27.56121 2.806986 9.818792 0.0000 
     R-squared 0.699072     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.680834     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.875535     Akaike info criterion 2.651693 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    



























 5.6.1.5 Review visits per 1,000 of the local population 
Figure 5.11 below shows that Review visits have an overall downward trend across 
the period. However, between 1991 and 2001 the annual results (which were relatively 
static previously) start to show wide variances. This is particularly evident in the 
fluctuation in figures in the Comprehensive System phase (1988-1999) which finishes 
with the highest annual figure in 1999.  
The lowest figure per 1,000 for this variable is 79 per 1,000 in 2012 and the highest 
figure is in 1999, with 187 per 1,000.  
Figure 5.11 - Review visits per 1,000 of the local population 
(i) Review visits per 1,000 of the local population - Correlation Analysis.    
Correlation analysis reported in Table 5.29 shows a weak positive relation (0.48) between 
Review visits variable and MR variables. 
Table 5.29 – Correlation analysis - Total Review visits (per 1000)/MR 
  Review visits MR 
Review visits 1.000000 0.46448 











































































(ii) Review Visits – Switching Regime. Figure 5.12 below shows that the relation 
between Review visits and MR is not close. In addition, it may be characterised by a 
switch in the regime at both sides of 5 MR per 1,000.  
 
 
Figure 5.12 – MR per 1,000 and Review visits – Switch 
The relation between the two variables for all observations can also be estimated. 
The estimation results in Table 5.30 indicating a positive and significant correlation 
between MR and Review visits per 1,000 of the local population. 
Table 5.30- MR/Review visits (per 1,000) 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     Review visits  
 
0.034104 0.010793 3.159848 0.0033 
C 1.000343 1.212875 0.824770 0.4153 
     
     R-squared 0.227003     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204268     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 1.382448     Akaike info criterion 3.539541 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.003308    





























When considering the regime switching at a MR of 5 per 1,000, the estimates in 
Table 5.31 show an insignificant relation between the two variables for a rate above 5 
(before 1990) and a significant relation for the values under 5 (after 1989), but with a 
higher adjustment power (74 per cent) than the estimated model without the regime 
switching (20 per cent). 
Table 5.31 - MR/Review visits (per 1,000) considering switching 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
          Review visits 
 (MR >5) 0.004122 0.007126 0.578362 0.5669 
Review visits 
 (MR <5) 0.026127 0.006245 4.183439 0.0002 
C 3.458843 0.752641 4.595610 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.754555     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.739680     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.790714     Akaike info criterion 2.447894 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
5.6.1.6 Summary 
The Correlation analysis is summarised in Table 5.32 and the Least Squares 
Regression summarised in Table 5.33. 
Table 5.32- Summary - Output variables correlation with MR 
Correlation Result 
Inpatients discharged and MR Positive correlation 0.76 
Laboratory tests and MR Negative correlation -0.75 
Radiology tests and MR Negative correlation -0.42 
Review visits and MR Positive correlation 0.48 
 















– NO breakpoint 
Significant relation (0.42) 
Inpatients discharged/MR 
– 1993 breakpoint 
Insignificant relation before 1993  Insignificant relation after 1993 















and 1992  
Significant relation 






Radiology tests/MR – 
Threshold 
Flat after One million tests, significant threshold (0.0038)  
Laboratory tests/MR – 
Threshold 
Flat after 30 million tests, significant threshold (4.97E-06) 
Review visits/MR without 
Regime Switching 
Positive and significant relation (0.034) 
Review visits/MR with 
Regime Switching 
Insignificant relation above MR of 
5 per 1,000   
Significant relation below MR of 5 per 
1,000  (0.026) 
5.7 Multiple Regressions 
Moving on, it is important to consider the features of every single relation between 
the MR outcome (proxy quality) variable and the output variables (breakpoints, threshold, 
and switching regime). When not considering multi-collinearity, and using per 1,000 for 
the independent variables, the estimates in the following Table 5.34 report that only the 
Inpatient discharged output variable is significant, but using the independent variables at 
hospital level Table 5.35 reports that only the Inpatient discharged output variable is 
insignificant. 
Table 5.34 - MR multiple regression estimation results (variables per 1,000) 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     Inpatients discharged 0.389331 0.175377 2.219967 0.0339 
Laboratory tests  -0.001542 0.000999 -1.543264 0.1329 
Review visits 0.007261 0.016047 0.452474 0.6541 
Radiology tests 0.019270 0.012600 1.529325 0.1363 
C -0.938471 3.042644 -0.308439 0.7598 
     
     R-squared 0.654387     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.609792     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.968085     Akaike info criterion 2.901253 
Sum squared resid 29.05286     Schwarz criterion 3.121186 
Log likelihood -47.22255     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.978015 
F-statistic 14.67391     Durbin-Watson stat 0.343608 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000001    
 
 







Table 5.35 - MR multiple regression estimation results (variables at hospital level) 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     Inpatients discharged -1.28E-05 8.66E-06 -1.477069 0.1497 
Laboratory tests  -2.00E-07 1.09E-08 -4.902169 0.0000 
Review visits 1.80E-06 9.06E-07 1.984017 0.0562 
Radiology tests 7.81E-07 4.45E-07 1.755920 0.0890 
C 8.609068 1.543572 5.577366 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.626766     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.578607     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 1.006025     Akaike info criterion 2.978138 
Sum squared resid 31.37470     Schwarz criterion 3.198071 
Log likelihood -48.60648     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.054900 
F-statistic 13.01446     Durbin-Watson stat 0.269855 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000002    
5.7.1 Correlation analysis for output variables 
Table 5.36 below shows a high correlation between the outputs which may cause 
bias in the output efficiency estimations. 
Table 5.36 - Correlation Matrix for output variables 
 Inpatients discharged Laboratory tests Review visits Radiology tests 
Inpatients discharged 1.000000    
Laboratory tests  0.498819 1.000000   
Review visits 0.696549 0.711948 1.000000  
Radiology tests 0.348009 0.770892 0.404988 1.000000 
When considering multi-collinearity, two models could be estimated. The first 
(Model 1) has as independent variables Total Inpatients discharged and Total Radiology 
tests where MR is the dependent variable. The second (Model 2) has as independent 
variables Total Laboratory tests and Total Review visits where MR is the dependent 
variable. 






Firstly - Model 1 Multiple Regression (Inpatients discharged, Radiology tests). 
Table 5.37 below shows that the effect of Inpatients discharged on the MR is significant 
and positive (0.54) and the effect of Radiology tests on the MR is also significant (at 10 
per cent level) and positive (0.023).  
Table 5.37- Model 1 MR multiple regression (considering multi collinearity) 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
 0.544388 0.088509 6.150644 0.0000 Inpatients discharged 0.544388 0.088509 6.150644 0.0000 
Radiology tests 0.023351 0.012589 1.854824 0.0726 
C -4.867049 1.930225 -2.521493 0.0167 
     
     R-squared 0.616944     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.593728     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.987811     Akaike info criterion 2.835587 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 (i) Model 1 - Threshold (Radiology tests) - Observations. Table 5.38 below 
suggests that the threshold beyond which the Radiology tests have limited effect on the 
MR as there is a positive and significant coefficient of the square of the Radiology tests 
and MR while the effect of Total Inpatients discharged becomes insignificant, under this 
specification. The adjustment of the model improves the Adjusted R-squared significantly 
from 59 per cent in Table 5.37 to 64 per cent in the next Table 5.38. 
Table 5.38 - MR multiple regression (multi-collinearity, and Radiology tests threshold) 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
          Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
          Inpatients discharged 9.81E-06 7.47E-06 1.313749 0.1983 
Radiology tests -1.04E-05 1.63E-06 -6.391999 0.0000 
(Radiology tests)   2.65E-12 4.51E-13 5.880683 0.0000 
C 8.939640 1.415319 6.316342 0.0000 
          R-squared 0.670992     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.640147     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.929667     Akaike info criterion 2.796459 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     






 (ii) Model 1 - Breakpoints (Inpatients discharged) - Observations. With 
considering the Inpatients discharged breakpoints (1985, 1990, and 1996), Table 5.39 
suggests that there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable MR and 
the two independent variables (Inpatients discharged and Radiology tests) only in the 
period 1990-1995.  
 
Table 5.39 - MR multiple regression (multi-collinearity, and Inpatient discharged breakpoints) 
Dependent Variable: MR  | Method: Least Squares with Breaks 
Break type: Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially determined breaks 
Break selection: Trimming 0.15, Max. breaks 5, Sig. level 0.05 
Breaks: 1985, 1990, 1996   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
Inpatients discharged 0.001177 0.003801 0.309670 0.7595 
Radiology tests -0.002467 0.004042 -0.610472 0.5473 
(1979 - 1984  -- 5 obs) C 1075.366 1326.688 0.810564 0.4256 
     
Inpatients discharged -7.48E-05 9.83E-05 -0.761297 0.4539 
Radiology tests 8.90E-06 3.98E-05 0.223834 0.8248 
(1985 - 1989  -- 5 obs) C 18.16563 7.935547 2.289147 0.0312 
     
Inpatients discharged -6.71E-05 1.56E-05 -4.311421 0.0002 
Radiology tests -3.94E-05 6.87E-06 -5.730057 0.0000 
(1990 - 1995  -- 6 obs) C 45.32744 7.841161 5.780705 0.0000 
     
Inpatients discharged 9.35E-07 4.40E-06 0.212382 0.8336 
Radiology tests -6.52E-08 1.51E-07 -0.431723 0.6698 
(1996 - 2014 -- 20 obs) C 3.449559 1.136331 3.035698 0.0057 
     
     R-squared 0.935809     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.906388     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.474167     Akaike info criterion 1.606689 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
      
Secondly - Model 2 Multiple Regression (Laboratory tests, Review visits) - 
Observations. The following Table 5.40 shows an insignificant relationship between MR 
and Review visits and a negative significant relation with the Laboratory tests 
independent variable.  
 







Table 5.40 –Model 2/MR multiple regression (multi-collinearity) 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     Laboratory tests -1.46E-07 2.79E-08 -5.256548 0.0000 
Review visits 6.61E-07 7.32E-07 0.903282 0.3729 
C 7.006198 0.961742 7.284900 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.571300     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.545318     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 1.045006     Akaike info criterion 3.005578 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000001    
     
     
 
 (i) Model 2 - Switching Regime (Review visits) regarding two side of 5 per 1,000 
MR - Observations. The relation between MR and Review visits is featured by the 
presence of a switching regime regarding the two sides (before 1990 and after 1989) of 
the 5 MR per 1,000. The specification shown in Table 5.41 below represents a significant 
relationship, only when the values are higher than 5 per 1,000. 
 
Table 5.41 - MR multiple regression (multi collinearity and Review visits switching) 
Dependent Variable: MR  
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 36 
          Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
          Laboratory tests -4.35E-08 2.73E-08 -1.592954 0.1210 
Review visits (MR<5) -1.51E-07 5.49E-07 -0.275546 0.7847 
Review visits (MR>5) 1.26E-06 5.40E-07 2.334277 0.0260 
C 5.364213 0.755344 7.101686 0.0000 
          R-squared 0.782552     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.762166     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.755791     Akaike info criterion 2.382336 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
      







(ii) Model 2 - Threshold (Laboratory tests) - Observations. The specification 
shown in the following Table 5.42 considers the presence of a significant threshold 
regarding Laboratory tests and insignificant relationship between MR and Review visits. 
Table 5.42 - MR multiple regression (multi collinearity and Laboratory tests threshold) 
Dependent Variable: MR   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36 
          Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
          
Laboratory tests -6.21E-07 1.05E-07 -5.906358 0.0000 
(Laboratory tests)   9.59E-15 2.08E-15 4.614549 0.0001 
Review visits 2.69E-07 5.82E-07 0.462985 0.6465 
C 12.77963 1.462217 8.739902 0.0000 
          R-squared 0.742591     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.718458     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.822312     Akaike info criterion 2.551045 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 (iii) Model 2 Threshold (Laboratory tests) and Switching Regime (Review visits) 
- Observations. Table 5.43 shows a significant threshold at 10 per cent regarding 
Laboratory tests, and insignificant relationship between the Review visits (either side of 
the MR 5 per 1,000 line) and MR. 
Table 5.43 - MR multiple regression (multi-collinearity, Laboratory tests threshold, and Review 
visits switching) 
Dependent Variable: MR    
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 36 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
          Laboratory tests -2.96E-07 1.40E-07 -2.112795 0.0428 
(Laboratory tests)   4.52E-15 2.46E-15 1.834712 0.0762 
Review visits (MR< 5) -1.07E-07 5.30E-07 -0.202540 0.8408 
Review visits (MR> 5) 9.08E-07 5.55E-07 1.634300 0.1123 
C 8.543936 1.880124 4.544348 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.803851     Mean dependent var 4.763056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.778542     S.D. dependent var 1.549763 
S.E. of regression 0.729308     Akaike info criterion 2.334806 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
      






(iv) Section Summary. The Least Squares Multiple Regression Models are 
summarised below: 
Table 5.44 - Summary - Least Squares Multiple Regression Models 
MODEL OBSERVATIONS 
Model 1 – Inpatients 
discharged/Radiology tests/MR 
Significant (0.54) for Inpatients discharged 
Significant (0.023) for Radiology tests (at 10% level) 
Model 1 – Inpatients 
discharged/Radiology tests (with 
Threshold)/MR  
Significant (2.65E-12) for the square of the Radiology tests  
Insignificant for Inpatients discharged  
Model 1 – Inpatients discharged with 
Breakpoints/Radiology tests’ 
threshold/MR  
Significant and negative relationship for the two independent 
variables only in the period 1990-1995.  
 
Model 2 – Laboratory tests/Reviews 
visits/MR 
Insignificant for Review visits   
Significant (-1.46E-07) for Laboratory tests   
 
Model 2 – Laboratory tests/Review 
visits switching regime/MR  
Significant (1.26E-06) for Review visits only when MR>5 
 
Model 2 - Laboratory tests (with 
Threshold)/Review visits/MR  
Significant (-6.21E-07) for Laboratory tests  
Significant (9.59E-15) for Laboratory tests’ threshold  
Insignificant for Review visits 
Model 2 Laboratory tests (with 
Threshold)/Review visits with 
switching regime and MR >, <5  
Significant (-2.96E-07) for Laboratory tests 
Significant (4.52E-15) for Laboratory tests’ Threshold  
Insignificant for Review visits 
5.8 Chapter Summary  
This chapter consists of a statistical analysis to estimate the efficiencies and quality 
performance of a sample of twenty hospitals operating in the KSA between 1979 and 
2014, covering four major phases in management and operational regimes.  
As mentioned before in 1.4, there is a gradually increase from less to more 
corporatisation, and then returning to a decreased level of corporatisation in the last phase. 
The Comprehensive System phase is considered fully corporatised and closer to 
privatisation than the two preceding phases, where the New Public Self-Operating System 
phase is considered less corporatised than the Comprehensive System phase. 
The analysis cannot confirm causality, only that there is an observable and 
significant association between changes in relative efficiency and the various system 
phases. 
Table 5.45 below provides a high-level summary from the DEA and SFA analyses. 


























DEA-Average Relative Efficiency Score 
over whole sample 0.79 0.77 0.856 0.861 
DEA-% Reduction of Inputs to become 
efficient 35.82 34.73 26.1 27.81 
(VRS) IRS 8 (40%) 8 (40%) 6 (30%) 4 (20%) 
(VRS) DRS 2 (10%) 4 (20%) 4 (20%) 5 (25%) 
DEA-Average Relative Efficiency over 
inefficient hospitals by phase 0.64 0.65 0.74 0.72 
SFA-Average Efficiency by phase  0.43 0.45 0.48 0.52 
 
To conclude this chapter the empirical results are considered against the three 
hypotheses. 
Firstly - H1 - Performance in terms of efficiency may differ under the different 
forms of corporatisation. 
(i) The DEA Results. The Comprehensive System exhibits higher relative PE than 
the New Public Self Operating System phase, as follows: 
• There is a different between the relative efficiency over the whole sample. 
• There is a different between the reductions required in inputs.  
• Although there is no difference between the first two phases for IRS of hospitals 
and between the second and the third phases for DRS, generally, there is a different in the 
VRS results over the whole sample.  
• There is a different between the average relative efficiency scores over inefficient 
hospitals by phases. 
(ii) The SFA Results. The New Public Self Operating System exhibits higher PE 
than the Comprehensive System phase, as follows: 






• The average efficiencies (such as DEA average relative efficiency) show that 
there is a difference over the whole sample. 
Although there is no difference between the first two phases for IRS of hospitals 
and between the second and the third phases for DRS, generally the results suggest that 
H1 is fully supported within the confines of this study. Though the scale of changes in 
relative efficiency between different phases (in all cases) may be small, there are 
statistically significant changes (DEA and SFA analysis).  
Secondly - H2 - Corporatisation will be positively associated with efficiency. 
(i) The DEA Results. The Comprehensive System exhibits higher relative PE than 
the New Public Self Operating System phase, as follows: 
• Although the highest relative efficiency was in the last phase compared with the 
other phases, the difference between the last two phases (0.005) is a minimal.  
• The lowest reduction required in inputs was in the Comprehensive System phase.  
• The VRS results suggest that the numbers of hospitals benefiting from the 
Comprehensive phase are greater than those benefiting from the last phase (and vice versa 
in case of DRS). 
• The average relative efficiency scores over inefficient hospitals show an increase 
in relative efficiency in the first three phases as movement towards privatisation, through 
greater corporatisation, is achieved. Subsequently the New Public Self Operating System 
phase, which is a movement away from privatisation, shows a comparative decrease in 
relative efficiency.  
(ii) The SFA Results. Althogh the differences in the production of each output are 
to some extent related to external factors -random shocks outside the control of hospitals- 






,as represented in Appenix (5.E), the New Public Self Operating System exhibits higher 
PE than the Comprehensive System phase, as follows: 
• Although the highest average efficiency (or less variation) was in the New Public 
Self-Operating, average efficiency increases through the whole study period, where the 
efficiencies on output variables increase when moving from the first two phases (less 
corporatised), to the Comprehensive System phase (fully corporatised).  
• The efficiencies on output variables increase when moving from the fully 
corporatised, to a less corporatised system for only three of the four variables.  
 The contradictions between these two sets of results suggest that H2 can only be 
partially supported within the confines of this study. 
Whilst RQ1 (Have different forms of corporatisation generated the gains that may 
be associated with the movement of reforms towards privatisation?) is associated with 
H1 and H2, the RQ2 (Have HC quality considerations (or effectiveness) modified 
conclusions relating to the efficiency of different HC governance systems?) is associated 
with H3 as follows: 
Thirdly - H3 - Fully corporatised hospitals will perform better in terms of quality 
than partially corporatised hospitals. 
(i) The DEA Results. The Comprehensive System exhibits higher relative PE than 
the New Public Self Operating System phase, as follows:  
• The lowest reduction required in inputs was in the Comprehensive System phase 
(Most corporatised phase). 
 (ii) The Panel Estimation Results. The New Public Self-Operating System phase 
exhibits higher relative PE than the Comprehensive System phase, as follows: 






• Tables 5.15 and 5.16, show that (according to the system phases that had a 
significant effect on outputs compared to the baseline) if everything else is considered 
equal, the transition to the Comprehensive System phase is associated with decreases in 
the Radiology results for relative efficiency by 11 per cent, while the transition to the 
New Public Self-Operating System phase is associated with decreases in the Radiology 
tests by 21 per cent, and with increases in the number of Inpatients discharged by 14 per 
cent from the baseline.  
This means that the later phase has higher relative PE than the most corporatised 
Comprehensive phase (i.e., in term of increasing outputs volume, as opposedto providing 
quality performance effectiveness, see 5.4.2 (ii)). Changes in levels of corporatisation, by 
phase, have no significant association with the other two output variables.  
(iii) The Regression analysis. The Comprehensive System exhibits higher PE than 
the New Public Self Operating System phase, as follows:  
As specified in the theoretical model (Chapter 3) performance consists of 
efficiency, effectiveness and quality considerations. Efficiency results did not predict 
which phase would provide the best performance, so quality aspects of outputs are 
considered through regression analysis. 
• For Inpatients discharged, three breakpoints were identified and tested. Table 5.24 
demonstrates that the overall performance (efficiency, effectiveness and quality aspects) 
within the Comprehensive System phase for this particular variable is better than other 
less corporatised phases (as it is significant and negative in the period 1993 - 2002 at the 
1 and 5 per cent levels and also has a lower standard error).  
However, the first two years in the New Public Self-Operating System phase may 
be due to the lagged effects of the previous phase (see Appendix 5.Y and 5.Z). This result 
was confirmed when considering the Inpatients discharged’ breakpoints in addition to the 






Radiology tests variable (Table 5.39), where the relation with Inpatients discharged is 
only significant and negative in the period 1990-1995 (part of the Comprehensive 
Operating System phase).  
Decreasing Inpatients discharged might mean that hospitals were more efficient in 
the most corporatised phase as compared to the last phase, where they decreased 
inpatients admitted and therefore decreased inpatients discharged, instead of depending 
on costly inpatient care which implies that the hospitals were providing better services as 
the population was getting healthier, as represented by decreases in MR. 
• For Laboratory tests a threshold is identified (30 million Laboratory tests per 
annum) and breached in the latter stages of the Comprehensive System phase (1997) and 
more recently in the New Public Self-Operating System phase (2009 onwards). This 
suggests that performance (effectiveness) when related to outcome quality increases as 
corporatisation increases, but decreases when corporatisation levels are subsequently 
reversed.  
The multiple regression results show that the Laboratory test variable is 
insignificant only when considering the switching regime in the Review visits without 
consideration of its threshold (Table 5.41). 
• For Radiology tests a threshold is also identified (1 million Radiology tests per 
annum) and breached in 2006 (New Public Self-Operating System phase). This suggests 
that performance (effectiveness) decreases compared to the fully corporatised 
Comprehensive System phase.  
This has been confirmed by the multiple regression results as the Radiology test is 
always significant except when the Inpatients discharged’ breakpoints are considered 
without consideration of its threshold (Table 5.39).  






All these results suggest decreases over all periods compared with the fully 
corporatised phase, 
• For Review visits, the results of this variable apply in a similar manner to the last 
two phases. It is only after 1989 that significant results are indicated (Table 5.31), but 
when adding the Laboratory tests to the model (Table 5.41) the effect of Review visits 
became significant only before 1990.  
While this variable is significant in relation to the MR (Table 5.30), Figure 5.11 
shows that this variable achieved the highest annual figures in the Comprehensive System 
phase, and decreases after 1999 (in the New Public Self-Operating System phase). 
Although, the empirical results supporting H3 are complex as summarised below 
in Table 5.46, the threshold breaches in the New Public Self Operating System phase for 
Laboratory tests and Radiology tests (with respect to MR acting as proxy), might indicate 
further gains in efficiency without any association with effectiveness on MR. Therefore, 
H3 is supported to some extent when taking into account the full meaning of HC 
performance (efficiency, effectiveness and quality aspects), showing that the most 
corporatised phase (Comprehensive Operating System phase) generally performs better 
overall than lesser corporatised phases as identified within the scope of this study and its 
sample data.  
 
Table 5.46 - H3 Hypothesis analysis - Summary 
 Comprehensive Operating System 
(1988-1999) 





Most corporatised phase Lesser corporatised phase 
DEA - % Reduction 
of Inputs required 
to become efficient 
26.10 27.81 
SFA - Average 
Efficiency by phase  
0.476 0.522 






Panel Estimates Decrease the Radiology test by 11 per 
cent. 
Increases the number of Inpatients 
discharged by 14 per cent  





- Trend: highest volumes per 1,000 
- Breakpoint 1993 - insignificant 
- Multiple breakpoints - significant 
between 1993-2002 (-2.84) 
- Adding Radiology tests to the model - 
significant between 1990-1995 (-6.71E-05) 
- Trend: lowest volumes per 1,000 
- Breakpoint 2003 (and Multiple 
breakpoints) – insignificant since 
2003 
- Adding Radiology tests to the 
model – insignificant between 
1996-2014 
Laboratory tests - Trend: lowest and highest volumes 
per 1,000  
- Threshold breached 1997                     - Threshold breached 2009 onwards 
                        - Significant threshold (4.97E-06)   
- Significant threshold (9.59E-15) when adding Review visits to the model 
- Significant threshold (4.52E-15) when considering Review’ switches 
Radiology tests - Trend: lowest volumes per 1,000 - Trend: highest volumes per 1,000 
- Threshold Breached in 2006 
onwards 
- Significant threshold (0.003775) 
- Significant threshold (2.65E-12) 
when adding Inpatient discharged 
to the model 
Review visits - Trend: highest volumes per 1,000      - Lowest volumes per 1,000 
- Switching regime 1990 
                          - After 1989 (MR <5) - significant with Switching (0.026127) 
- Before 1990 (MR>5) - significant  
with Switching (1.26E-06) when  
adding Laboratory tests to the model  
                           - Insignificant with Switching when considering the Laboratory 
tests’ threshold 
MR - 1988=5.37 Deaths per 1,000  
- 1999= 3.8 Deaths per 1,000 
- 2000 = 3.74 Deaths per 1,000   
- 2014 = 3.53 Deaths per 1,000 
 
Chapter 6 will now discuss further the results and findings of this chapter, with 










CHAPTER 6   
Discussion and Interpretation of Results 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 presented the results from a number of quantitative tests investigating the 
relative performance of MoH hospitals in the KSA, 1979-2014. In this chapter, the results 
are discussed within the context of the theoretical and empirical literature, and will 
contribute to the conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 7. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. This section provides the context.  
The discussion in Section 6.2, contextualised against the literature previously 
reviewed, focuses on the various efficiency results recorded in Chapter 5, which are key 
in answering   
RQ1 - Have different forms of corporatisation generated the gains that may be 
associated with the movement of reforms towards privatisation? 
RQ2 - Have HC quality considerations (or effectiveness) modified conclusions 
relating to the efficiency of different HC governance systems? 
Section 6.3 concludes and summarises this chapter. 
6.2 Discussion 
This thesis investigates the components that are associated with performance 
(efficiency, effectiveness and quality aspects) related to hospital corporatisation across 
the phased changes in management and control, covering a sample set of 20 public 
hospitals in the KSA over a 36-year period (1979 to 2014). Over these decades the KSA 
has experimented with a number of approaches and management structures to achieve 
movement from a fully public hospital environment towards a privatised form through 
different approaches to corporatisation. Four phases are identified which indicate 






different management and operational frameworks, each adopting different components 
of ‘Corporatisation’, which is defined by the actions taken as a precursor to partial or full 
privatisation. Corporatisation separates ownership and management, where the 
government retains full ownership, but transfers various degrees of management of the 
hospital to the private sector. In KSA hospitals, it has been argued that the Comprehensive 
System Phase (1988-1999) can be seen as the most corporatised phase (Figure 1.1) in the 
study period. Since 2000 the New Public Self-Operating System phase has been the 
dominant framework, where both management and operation of the hospitals provide a 
less corporatised environment in comparison with the Comprehensive Operating System 
phase.  
As identified in Chapter 3, which defines this study’s theoretical framework, no 
phases within the sample period for this study can be considered as either full or partial 
privatisation and only fit within the definition of corporatisation. Preker and Harding 
(2003) suggest that effective corporatisation appears to be an institutionally intensive 
organisational reform that necessitates a sustained, complex, and politically challenging 
role for government agencies and officials. This view is supported by the theories of 
Markets and Hierarchies, developed from the works of Coase (1937), Williamson (2005), 
and Ouchi (1980). Chapter 2 of this study considers the economic theories of the SCP 
paradigm (reviewed by Boru and Kuhil, 2018) associates a concentrated structure (e.g. 
monopoly) with profits in a concentrated industry, restrictive conduct and inefficiency, 
and implications may be argued for a health service owned and managed by a State 
ministry. However, the SCP paradigm has been criticised for disregarding the threat of 
competition identified by Contestable Markets Theory (Baumol, et al., 1982). In turn, this 
theory has been criticised for its assumption of costless entry. Contestability in theory 
exhibits “incompatibility with inefficiency of any sort” (Baumol, 1982, p.6) but Baumol 






was more concerned with persuading governments to regulate large firms to promote free 
entry and contestability than supporting nationalisation (i.e., the opposite of privatisation 
which is economically costly). At the same time, he preferred such regulation to 
privatisation, since appropriate regulation to reduce entry barriers “…can do more to 
promote the public interest than privatization, which often results in replacement of a state 
monopoly by a private monopoly” (Baumol and Lee, 1991, p1). In other words, the SCP 
paradigm may be argued to favour privatisation as a means of breaking up (State) 
monopolies, while Contestable Markets Theory would favour regulation and lower entry 
barriers as a means of increasing competition. With its focus on privatisation, this study 
bases its hypotheses on the SCP perspective, given that it can be argued that Contestable 
Markets imply regulations that reduce entry barriers, enabling private firms to enter, or 
threaten to enter the industry, without the privatisation of State assets.       
Clarke, et al. (2005) considers reforms short of full privatisation, and argues that 
partial privatisation or corporatisation both leave the Government as the dominant 
shareholder, which may result in those firms performing poorly by conventional 
accounting measures. Megginson and Netter (2001) take a HC-specific view and consider 
that most privatisation theories are not applicable to HC, but further suggest that even 
ineffective privatisation might be preferable than keeping a government-controlled 
system which is working ineffectively. In contrast, Evans (2006) proposes that health 
service delivery can be more efficient if some of the logic of the marketplace is 
introduced, while still recognising that the public health framework has many attractive 
characteristics that should be retained. After reflecting on this extensive debate, this study 
hypothesises that:  
H1 - Performance in terms of efficiency may differ under the different forms of 
corporatisation. 






The theoretical framework in Chapter 3 identifies a number of components that are 
important in assessing the efficiency of different phases of corporatisation. In particular, 
incentives are affected by the Decision Rights component which may facilitate movement 
towards full or partial privatisation (Harding and Preker, 2000), so that performance may 
differ according to whether the hospital is fully corporatised, or less so (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001). This study hypothesised that:  
H2 - Corporatisation will be positively associated with efficiency. 
Increasing the Decision Rights component of a corporatising organisation, achieved 
through actions and activities that will decrease governmental controls, allows increased 
autonomy at the hospital level. Focusing Residual Claims on local organisations 
complements decentralised Decision Rights in incentive provision. 
 Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 identifies that the Comprehensive System phase is 
judged to display the highest level of autonomy of all the phases within this study. 
Furthermore, Table 1.1 identified that, within the Comprehensive Operating System 
phase, a single service management company (contracted to the MoH) was responsible 
for Hospital non-medical and medical services. Within this study those hospitals in the 
Comprehensive Operating System phase are considered fully corporatised. A positive 
association between corporatisation and efficiency would be generally consistent with the 
theory of incentives, where individuals with appropriate incentives reveal private 
information and create optimal outcomes (Holmström, 1979), and public choice theory 
(Niskanen, 1971, 1975; Buchanan, 1969). Furthermore, a positive correlation would also 
be consistent with the moral hazard in relation to the principal-agent problems inherent 
in bureaucratic structures, because of assymetric information and the separation of 
ownership and control (as outlined in Chapter 2). We hypothesised that:  






H3- Fully corporatised hospitals will perform better in terms of quality than 
partially corporatised hospitals.  
In less corporatised firms, public managers are constrained by the extent of the 
control retained by the government. In fully corporatised firms the balance of control 
changes to provide greater autonomy and decision Rights increase, and residual claims 
are retained by the local organisation, rather than the central public purse, which may use 
it “to increase bureaucratic perquisites such as cars, bigger offices, travel, conferences” 
(Adams, et al., 2006, p.386). Thus, if the performance (efficiency) of the firm improves 
with an increase in decentralises decision rights and residual claims, then it may be 
hypothesised that a more fully corporatised firm will be seen to perform more efficiently 
than a less corporatised entity.  
6.2.1 Measuring Performance 
There are a number of ways to measure hospital performance, ranging from 
regulatory inspections and assessments, public satisfaction surveys, and statistical 
indicators. According to Shaw (2003), the effectiveness of measurement strategies relies 
on several variables including their objective, the domestic culture, how they are applied, 
and how the results are used hired. This study focuses predominately on gathering 
statistical information to discover information concerning changes in management 
structures (Table 1.1), through different degrees of corporatisation. Therefore, a note of 
caution is raised. Firstly, statistical studies work best on large data sets. This study only 
covers 20 hospitals in the KSA. Secondly, the appropriateness of the chosen variables to 
assess operational performance in its totality should be considered, rather than being 
totally based on data variables that were available for this exercise which is looking at 
one particular aspect of hospital performance across a wide time period. 






6.2.2 Input and Output variables as components of efficiency 
The level of economic efficiency, identified through the analyses of the hospitals’ 
input and output variables, is a key factor when assessing and comparing the wider 
performance of different phases of hospital corporatisation. As stated in Chapter 4, a 
number of data variables were used to test for efficiency. The first sets of variables were 
output quantity variables. These included the numbers of Inpatients discharged, 
Radiology tests, Laboratory tests, and Review visits. These four variables were used as 
the dependent, output quantity variables to measure hospital efficiency.  
Table 6.1 below summarises the conclusions from Chapter 5. Whilst the 
determination for H1 (‘efficiency’ in this case is measured as the average relative to other 
hospitals under the same forms of corporatisation), is robust and easily demonstrated by 
the empirical results, the interpretation of H2 is slightly more problematic. H3 is 
supported when taking into account the full meaning of HC performance (efficiency, 
effectiveness and quality aspects). 
Table 6.1 - Summary conclusions from Chapter 5 
H1  Performance in terms of efficiency may differ 
under the different forms of corporatisation. 
H1 is fully supported within the 
confines of this study 
H2  Corporatisation will be positively associated with 
efficiency. 
H2 can only be partially supported 
within the confines of this study. 
H3  Fully corporatised hospitals will perform better in 
terms of quality than partially corporatised 
hospitals.  
H3 is supported to some extent within 
the confines of this study. 
 
From chapter 5, more hospitals became more efficient during the New Public Self-
Operating System phase, which is supportive of Hastings and Levie’s (1983) belief that 
the enhanced efficiency is gained more easily from within the public-sector environment, 
as a greater level of control was returned to the MoH in this phase. However, the lowest 
‘average reduction in input required’ (to become efficient) is achieved in the (most 
corporatised) Comprehensive Operating System phase than at any other time in the study. 






While higher profits in not-for-profit organisations could conceivably be used for other 
sources of managerial utility, i.e., perquisites, this result suggests that retained financial 
surplus may have acted as an effective incentive to raise efficiency in the most 
corporatised phase (see 1.4) with better utilisation of non-financial inputs. While the 
Comprehensive Operating system was applied to a not-for-profit organisation, dependent 
Key Performace Indicators (KPIs) may trigger some financial surplus to be allocated to 
higher wages or bonuses for staff, which may have acted as an effective incentive to raise 
the efficiency. This implies that Agency problems (based on the assumption of managers’ 
pursuit of self-interest) may in this study be more relevant in lesser corporatised phases. 
If this theory is not appropriate, any financial surplus may be spent on extra doctors, 
nurses, etc. 
(i) Inputs. Within this study, the findings from the input-orientated two-stage DEA 
models show that the hospitals included in this study’s sample set have, on average, 
higher efficiency levels in the New Public Self-Operating System phase (Table 5.7) which 
is supportive of hypothesis H1. However, 55 per cent of the hospitals were not associated 
with changes in all phases and, the changes in efficiency over time are relatively small 
across phases. As previously stated by Olajide (2005), in 2.3.1 there is little theoretical 
support for the prediction that corporatisation will improve firm performance and for 45 
per cent of hospitals there is a change in efficiency across phases, all of which showed 
some level of corporatisation.  
Inputs for Hospital Beds, Doctors, and Nurses show a sharp increase in volumes in 
the Comprehensive System phase. The trend for Allied personnel shows a steady increase 
over the whole period. The increase in Hospital Beds may reflect substantial capital 
investment in physical infrastructure and, if so, could be strongly related to a similar 
increase in Doctors and Nurses.  






The substantial capital investment in physical infrastructure may also be reflective 
with the size of the MoH budget particularly in the period 1984 onwards to 1993 shown 
by the infrastructure investment strategy in KSA 3rd Development plans onwards 
(Ramady, 2010). After this date, the MoH budget shows a substantial increase year-on-
year, not reflected back in the number of non-financial inputs.  
During the 7th development plan, in 2000, as a result of rapid growth of the oil 
sector, the GDP grew up and the budget deficit turned into surplus (see section 1.3.3). It 
should be noted that this key event may be relevant to the different experiences and 
changes in policies for health progress towards privatisation. For example, the year 2000 
coincided with the reversal away from full corporatisation, and a decline in the year-on-
year variations on expenditure is seen in the previous phases (Figure 5.3). This view is 
supportive of Feignenbauem and Henig’s (1994) political underpinning of privatisation 
theory as a short-term solution to address immediate financial problems and can be shown 
within the 7th Development Plan (2000-2005) (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2000, 
p.171) being aimed at reshaping the role of the MoH in the operation and management of 
service providers at that time. More recently data transparency in the MoH has improved 
(Ministry of Health, 2019), however it is noted that historically data was either not for 
general distribution due to financial restrictions, inaccessible or featured non-existent 
documentation. 
 (ii) Outputs. The Panel Estimation Results (Table 5.19) show that (according to 
the system phases that have a significant association with outputs compared to the 
baseline), if everything else is considered equal, changes in levels of corporatisation, by 
phase, has a significant association with the efficiency of Radiology tests and Inpatients 
discharged output variables. 






Recently (Al-Debis, 2017) there has been a growing realisation within the KSA and 
the MoH that the current financing method for HC needs to refocus on outputs, rather 
than inputs, to ensure the provision of incentives to provide high quality services without 
loading the citizen with any additional costs. 
It is noted that the outputs show both between-phase and within-phase variations. 
This raises the issue of whether it is the inputs that strictly generated the observed outputs, 
or some external factor, poor operational management and whether similar results are 
being observed across a wider timeframe (1979-2014) and larger sample of hospitals (20) 
than considered in this study. This view is supported by El-Seoud (2013) whose small 
study of 20 hospitals (for the year 2011 only), suggests that low efficiency is due to either 
internal production, or external (environmental) factors, or both, where the public HC 
sector reform requires government credibility with regard to policy uniformity, stability, 
and strict coordination between policy design and implementation. 
(iii) Timing Effects. The overall indication that emerged from the SFA analysis 
(Table 5.13) suggests that the aggregate average relative efficiency of outputs amongst 
the hospitals has improved progressively over time (from 0.43 to 0.52). However, within 
the detail of this average efficiency of outputs result, a different picture emerges as seen 
in Figure 5.1. Of particular interest, here is using Radiology tests as an output for 
measures of PE (i.e., in terms of increasing output volume, as opposed to providing 
quality performance effectiveness), which is seen to decline over the time period, rather 
than increase, as shown by the other three output variables. 
 In order to take the timing issue into account, various specifications of stochastic 
frontier production function models for panel data are estimated in Chapter 5, covering 
the entire period and controlling for changes in management and operation of the 
hospitals. This allowed direct investigation of the relative association between changes in 






management and operation of the hospitals and public health MR and efficiencies. Both 
time-invariant and time-varying inefficiency models are estimated. With the inclusion of 
control variables, the Tobit model shows that they are positively significant related to the 
CRS relative efficiency scores of the hospitals across the four different management and 
operational phases. However, the increasing level of local population growth caused by 
improving birth and death statistics, and internal and external migrations, is seen to be 
associated with increases the CRS relative efficiency in all phases, except the New Public 
Self-Operating System phase, and is supportive of the view that increased PE may be 
associated with greater levels of corporatisation.   
(iv) Size of City. The analysis showed that the size of the city (measured by the total 
local population of the area where the hospitals are located) has a significant association 
with CRS efficiency across the hospitals, and this association varied across the periods of 
the management and operations. As stated in 4.5.1 above, the majority of the cities (60 
per cent) where the hospitals are located were classified as big cities in the KSA, whilst 
the majority of the hospitals (80 per cent) in the sample set for this study were located in 
semi-urban and urban areas.  
Compared to the hospitals located in large cities, the Tobit model results show that 
hospitals located in medium-sized cities always have higher average CRS efficiency 
scores than those located in small cities (apart from the New Public Self-Operating 
System phase where small hospitals have an insignificant association with efficiency) and 
that might not be because of inefficiency, but because those hospitals do not get enough 
patient visits. Furthermore, compared to the hospitals located in rural areas, the hospitals 
located in semi-urban areas show higher average CRS efficiency scores than those in the 
urban areas in all phases. This observation questions the supposed benefits of economies 
of scale as identified by Coase (1937) who suggests that larger firms (in this case, 






hospitals) may initially be advantageous, but decreasing returns may eventually prevail. 
Walston, et al. (2008) note this particular challenge of scale, with particular respect to the 
KSA where referrals to large urban MoH hospitals may suffer from perceptions of poor 
quality, with increased costs of centralised, specialised hospitals and rapidly growing 
population, changing demographics, and increased demand for HC services generally in 
the Kingdom. This assertation is supported by Dittman, et al. (1991) in America who 
found hospital efficiency may well hinge on the regional or local labour market, the 
competitiveness of HC services’ providers in the market, and the service area’s 
demographics. 
Rebba and Rizzi (2006) show scores of low efficiencies were attributable to either 
internal (management) or external factors (politics) which were not fully controlled by 
the management of the hospital. In particular, the low total efficiency scores of public 
hospitals could be mostly explained by the former policy decisions made on the size of 
the hospital or their role within the regional HC service. Considering this association in 
KSA, Walston, et al. (2008, p.6) suggests that the move to a privatised model of HC 
would “dramatically change the motivations and incentives of providers”, with both 
positive and negative association with efficiency and services provided. Within the UK 
there is a perception that private hospitals “pick the easy cases” that afford more 
profitability (Plimmer, 2018, p.2). However, experimentally and practically, providing 
the HC services through the public sector is more efficient than private sector from both 
the USA and European Union (Dittman, et al., 1991). 
Interestingly this tie in with Rawls (1971) view on social equity and equality as the 
dispersion analysis shows that the New Public Self-Operating System recorded fewer 
inequalities (lowest average variance) between the hospitals for all output variables (apart 
from Radiology tests), as identified by the SFA analysis (Table 5.13). Lowest average 






variance in the New Public Self-Operating phase may be due to a lack of facilities in rural 
areas in the past. The government states that “rural areas are not as attractive to the private 
sector as urban centres, it is envisaged that the former will remain dependent to a large 
extent on government health services” (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2010, p.69). 
In fact, one of the key challenges noted in the 9th Development Plan (2010-2015) is to 
limit the differences in the effectiveness and quality of the health services and ensure 
comprehensive coverage in rural areas. However, the evaluation within the Plan suggests 
that monitoring and evaluation are needed in the rural cities in KSA, and that management 
structures may need attention in this area in the future (see section 1.3.2). This suggestion 
seemingly contrasts with the efficiency results found in this study, where, compared to 
the hospitals located in rural area, the hospitals located in semi-urban areas show higher 
average CRS efficiency scores than those located in urban areas (Table 5.5), where as 
mentioned above, that may be related to the huge referrals to large urban MoH hospitals, 
increased costs, rapidly growing population, and changing demographics (Walston et al., 
2008). 
 To conclude this subsection, the answer to RQ1 (Have different forms of 
corporatisation generated the gains that may be associated with the movement of reforms 
towards privatisation?) is that although significant variations exist, there is no consistent 
evidence that any theory consistently predicts changes in efficiency.   
 This answer is based on evidence (results) that is inconsistent in the early stages of 
the analysis using DEA and SFA techniques, referred to in more detail below. Moreover, 
when applying additional tests in Chapter 5, no theory consistently predicts the test results 
achieved. This does not refute the theories, just highlighting that the results provided no 
consistent evidence to support the theories.  
When comparing SFA and DEA, the results were contradictory and showed no 






consistent alignment with the hypotheses and this result is expected where a number of 
empirical studies have been inconsistent (e.g., Lawanson and Novignon, 2017). A 
common cause of this inconsistency is that the DEA model accounts only for direct inputs 
to the HC sector, while, the SFA is accounting for both direct and indirect inputs (see 
section 4.6.2). Grigoli and Kapsoli (2013) as cited in Lawanson and Novignon (2017) 
observed that the more control variables (which reduces the size of the error term) in the 
model, the more efficiency estimates there are. However, although the efficiency scores 
vary between the two approaches, the general trend for both is to increase the efficiency 
scores over time (see section 5.8). On balance, the DEA results were considered more 
relevant since a hospital “…is inherently a multi-input, multi-output production process, 
a standard production function with one output and multiple inputs, and is not flexible 
enough to provide sufficiently comprehensive benchmarking” of hospitals (Kuchler, 
2013, p.10). DEA assumes that there is no statistical noise and that the production 
functions consist of only the inputs and outputs used for measuring PE. As such, there is 
no assumption of a deterministic production frontier. The DEA analysis can also provide 
the requirements for an inefficient hospital to become efficient (see 4.6.1). Whilst the 
SFA results assume the existence of a parametric function relating outputs to inputs and 
the existence of random shocks outside the control of firms which can affect output (see 
4.6.2).  
It is concluded that the parametric SFA involves assumptions about underlying 
statistical distributions in the data, therefore requiring several conditions for validity 
(strong assumptions as to the form of the frontier) that may introduce bias in the results, 
while DEA requires fewer conditions of validity and unlikely to pose a threat in testing 
governance theories since the data is considered robust (numeric and verified by the KSA 






authorities). In addition, nonparametric models have an advantage because they assess 
the median rather than the mean, where the mean is not always the better measure of 
central tendency in a sample. Parametric tests can analyse only continuous data and 
outliers can overly affect findings. Moreover, according to the central limit theorem, the 
greater the size of the sample, the closer it is to the variation of society, and the 
distribution can be considered normal when the sample size is thirty and above (Chin and 
Lee, 2008), while in this study it is twenty. However, it is not possible to apply parametric 
statistics to non-parametric data (less than thirty).  
6.2.3 Output and outcome variables as measures of quality and effectiveness 
This subsection of discussion is concerned with the quality of care provided by the 
MoH hospitals sampled across the different phases of corporatisation in response to RQ2 
- Have HC quality considerations (or effectiveness) modified conclusions relating to the 
efficiency of different HC governance systems? This study measures relative efficiency 
(inputs and outputs) and quality outcomes (MR as proxy for quality). Combining 
efficiency, effectiveness and quality observations, utilising the processes and conceptual 
framework defined in Chapter 3, and applying the methodologies outlined in Chapter 4, 
provides the multifaceted perspective needed to achieve greater understanding 
concerning the overall performance of hospitals within different phases of corporatisation 
considered.   
Much like the definitions of corporatisation and privatisation, the definition of 
‘quality’ within a HC is ambiguous. The U.S. agency for HC research and quality 
(AHRQ, 2002, p.1) suggests that “…although quality assessments based on 
administrative data cannot be definitive, they can be used to flag potential quality 
problems and success.” Critical to this study is the understanding that information on all 






aspects of quality (not just efficiency) allows stakeholders to make informed choices 
about different corporatisation or privatisation regimes (Institute of Medicine, 2006) and 
may modify conclusions relating to the efficiency of different HC governance systems. 
Generally, it can be said that HC quality is not considered a sub-definition of efficiency, 
rather efficiency is just one of the six domains of HC quality mentioned in 2.6.1 above 
(i.e., Safety, Effectiveness, Patient-centred Experience, Timeliness, Efficiency, and 
Equity) (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Effective services refrain from providing services 
to those not likely to benefit, whereas efficient services avoid waste. This study considers 
both the effectiveness and efficiency of output quality as these indicators are considered 
vital where quality cannot be measured directly (AHRQ, 2018).  
(i) Outputs. According to Statsoft (2018), the regression analyses allows the output 
variables to be compared to the dependent variable (in this case MR outcome) using Least 
Squares, to learn more about the relationship between efficiency, effectiveness and 
quality aspects in response to Research Question 2.   
(ii) Outcomes. IOM (2006) suggests that the more that output procedures (as inputs) 
are correlated with an improved outcome, meaning that the higher volumes of procedures 
(being Laboratory and Radiology tests as output variables) are associated with lower MR 
(which this study has used as a proxy for quality) cannot be supported. The results in this 
study suggest that although there have been improvements in the MR quality indicator 
over time, this is not associated with the increased volumes of tests in all cases or phases. 
However, this is not saying that if different (test) variables were chosen, the 
measurements of quality effectiveness of the tests would still be the same.  
  Looking at the wider picture, the work of The Economist Intelligence Unit 
Healthcare (2014) considers global comparisons of HC systems, providing an interesting 
benchmark whereby each KSA phase can be associated with an improvement in outcomes 






as it moves through different degrees, highlighting decreases the MR as life expectancy 
rises and disease profiles shift from communicable diseases to chronic illnesses resulting 
in a transition from low-cost to high-cost care. According to the Economist Intelligent 
Unit Healthcare (2014), In a 166-country comparison according to health outcomes and 
cost, KSA was classified as one of the countries higher for outcomes than for spending, 
where the health spend per head was US$ 813 with an outcome index 80.5 per cent 
compared with US$ 9,216 expenses in the USA with an 85.5 per cent outcome. Moreover, 
while the rise in life expectancy is considered as a “good” outcome, this means that 
noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are becoming the main causes of death. The KSA 
assessed that NCD deaths under the age of 60 were 40 per cent, compared to 55 per cent 
in UEA. However as stated in Chapter 3, MR cannot be used simply as an output quality 
variable for the hospitals, because other factors could also have contributed to the 
observed changes in MR of the local population per 1,000. For example, (external to 
hospital outputs) Immunisation programmes within the KSA over the past 35 years may 
have had an impact on the MR of the local population per 1,000 (on a national basis this 
measure decreasing from 104.7 per 1,000 in 1979 to 12.9 per 1,000 in 2014 for Under 
5’s) and is, therefore, a factor unrelated to hospital efficiency.  
Nevertheless, MR outcomes are considered a key indicator of hospital quality, both 
globally and within the KSA (CBAHI, 2015 and AHRQ, 2018), associated with the 
inefficiency or effectiveness of the output’s variables (as inputs). However, alternative 
quality measurement indicators were not formally considered until the start of the New 
Public Self-Operating System phase (2000), which was associated with benefits in 
efficiency scores solely under MoH control (see 1.4 (iv) above). Therefore, using the MR 
outcome as a dependent variable (despite its known flaws, it is included in the WHO 
(2018, p.22) HC indicators list. Quality aspects of the sampled hospitals outputs are 






examined through the regression analyses which outline the associations with this 
outcome and how they are affected by Laboratory tests, Radiology tests, Review visits 
and Inpatients discharged output variables, across the four phases, in response to RQ2 
(Have HC quality considerations (or effectiveness) modified conclusions relating to the 
efficiency of different HC governance systems?).  
(iii) Inpatients Discharged and MR. the relation between these two variables 
suggests that quality considerations measured by MR do modify conclusions relating to 
the efficiency of different HC governance systems in this instance. As previously 
determined, there is a significant association between efficiency and corporatisation 
phase as follows:   
The decline of Inpatients discharged per 1,000 (which would potentially increase 
the total number of Inpatients admitted to a hospital, see 5.8 (iii) the regression analysis) 
since 2003 (Figure 5.6) seems an unusual movement relevance to the growth in 
population and the decline in MR at the same time. The Inpatients discharged variable 
has not been significantly associated with the MR since 2003 (even when tested in 
combination with both Radiology tests and considering the breakpoints identified in the 
Inpatient discharged results (Table 5.39)), which is especially relevant when considering 
the relation of output quantity with MR outcomes, if it is assumed that an increase in 
output efficiency (quantity) is in some way related to an increase output quality (Farrell, 
1957). 
 A possible explanation is that the number of Home HC Patients has increased from 
100 individuals in 2009 to 28,000 in 2013 (MoH, 2013), suggesting that any deaths at 
home may not be attributed to this quality measure being totally related to hospital 
efficiency. Figures from the MoH (Ministry of Health, 2013, p.33) show one-day surgery 
figures rising from 0 per cent in 2005, 2 per cent in 2010 to 46 per cent in 2013 on a 






national basis, which would not be counted as Inpatients admitted. The view is supported 
by a UK study (Alderwick, et al., 2015) which examines the large efficiencies gained 
(both financial and otherwise) by carrying out procedures such as Day Surgery, versus 
carrying out procedures as an admitted Inpatient.  
   (iv) Laboratory Tests and MR. the analysis of these two variables suggests that 
quality considerations do modify conclusions relating to the efficiency of different HC 
governance systems in this instance. 
Although the New Public Self-Operating System showed the highest score overall 
for Laboratory Tests (Figure 5.4), the quality proxy does not support this conclusion, as 
the significant threshold (Table 5.26) breaches in the latter years of the study period (2009 
onwards) have no positive association with the MR that would account for the continued 
decline in MR outcomes. Simply said, this suggests that earlier efficiency measures based 
on quantity alone are no longer acceptable as tests over the threshold indicated may be 
unnecessary production. Mufti (2000) suggests that the direct ordering of laboratory tests, 
the number of tests ordered by residents (especially with the beginning of the cooperative 
health insurance system with a royal decree 10 of 1/5/1420 A.H. (National Center for 
Archives and Records, 1420) which was part of providing treatment for individuals 
citizens or foreigners and their families, in government health facilities, and re-admission 
testing may contribute to the threshold breaches. This view is supported by Al-Oufi 
(2017) who further suggests that the trend toward privatisation may require patients to 
undergo additional and unnecessary examinations and laboratory tests in order to earn 
more money, again consistent with agency problems.  
However, the results, shown in Table 5.42 (adding Review visits to the model) and 
Table 5.43 (which considers the switching regime in Review visits) suggest that the 






threshold is still significant. Looking forward, Al-Oufi (2017) sees the MoH as the 
primary monitor for quality to ensure that the patient should not be overloaded with 
unnecessary tests. Thresholds defined in terms of the regression analysis are breached, 
i.e., carrying out tests with the objective of reaching peak efficiency or for other reasons, 
whilst potentially having no value-added contribution on or association with quality 
(effectiveness) output, loads additional and unnecessary costs (for example, MoH budget 
and increased Insurance fees) into the system and is irrational in these terms.  
(v) Radiology Tests and MR. the analysis of these two variables suggests that 
quality considerations do modify conclusions relating to the efficiency of different HC 
governance systems in this instance. 
Of particular note, here is the observation within the KSA 8th Development Plan 
which suggests a change in disease patterns in 2005, with increasing incidence of non- 
communicable diseases including cancer (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2005), 
with the relationship between more radiology tests and increases in instances of cancer 
increasing being undeniable. Whilst there is no breakdown of types of Radiology Tests 
being carried out, recent studies (e.g. Mulcahy, 2016) suggest that the over-diagnosis of 
breast cancer, via mammography screening, can result in unnecessary surgeries without 
defined benefits for this health demographic. Similarly, Mufti (2000) suggests that routine 
chest x-ray on admission and re-admission testing could contribute to the over-use of this 
service, however medics (Hendee, Becker, Borgstede, Bosma, Casarella, Erickson, 
Maynard, Thrall and Wallners, 2010) suggest a level of caution should be applied to 
negative studies which do not always acknowledge the medical value of x-rays, although 
within the radiological medical community there is an acceptance that over-utilisation is 
a real concern in some instances. Elsewhere (Abdullah, 2008), indicates there is a belief 
that the existence of medical insurance leads to a significant increase in unnecessarily 






medical services such as - MRIs, X-rays and CAT scans, yet again raising the possible 
relevance of agency problems, and this consistent with Institute of Medicine (2003) 
mentioned above in 2.5.3, where uninsured patients are less likely to incur yearly 
expenses than their counterparts who have coverage in the USA. In this case, it is relevant 
to note that the Insurance regime became compulsory in the KSA in 2005 for all non-
Saudi nationals working in the country.  
In 2006, the significant threshold for Radiology tests was breached (Table 5.28) 
with the results in Table 5.38 suggesting that the threshold for Radiology tests continues 
to be significant after adding the Inpatient discharged variable to the model which means 
that there is no positive association with the MR that would account for the continued 
decline in MR outcomes. Tests for non-life-threatening ailments by definition do not 
associate with MR. This is not to say that these tests are irrelevant as they could result in 
treatment that improves the wellbeing and quality of life of the population. However, this 
is not what is being considered in this study. 
(vi) Review visits and MR. the analysis of these two variables variable suggests that 
quality considerations do modify conclusions relating to the efficiency of different HC 
governance systems in this instance. 
          Review visits per 1,000 of the local population have shown a downward trend with 
a large fluctuation. The highest number of visits is recorded in 1999 (Figure 5.11) at the 
end of the Comprehensive Management Stage (1988-1999) and is considered significant 
and associated with MR (Table 5.31). This increasing seems as an unusual movement 
compared to the whole time period. A possible explanation of more Review visits might 
be attributed to the spread of some epidemics around 1999-2000 such as Dengue virus 
(Fakeeh and Zaki, 2003), Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (Al 
Yousef and Taha, 2016), Alkhurma hemorrhagic fever (AHF) (Saudi Gazette, 2018), 






invasive meningococcal (Memish, et al., 2013), and that coincided with the beginning of 
the cooperative health insurance system (mentioned above in 6.2.3 (iv)). Note that Hajj 
and Umrah religious mass assemblies hosted by the KSA (see section 1.3.2) involve a 
substantial influx of visitors. This can aid the transmission of infectious diseases. In 
addition, in 1999 the number of traffic accidents increased by 3,446 from the previous 
year (Ministry of Interior, 1999). 
However, when adding the Laboratory tests to the model (Table 5.41) the Review 
visits became significant only in the first two phases (before 1990 when the MR > 5). 
When considering the threshold in the Laboratory tests (Table 5.43), the Review visits 
became insignificant represents no association with the MR. On this basis, it could be 
considered that a sharp increase in Review visits might be orientated towards addressing 
profit maximisation rather than output efficiency or MR quality outcome considerations. 
For example, for Review visits specifically, it considers whether the sharply increased 
figures for Review visits are in any way related to the decreasing figures noted for 
Inpatients discharged and MR, again supporting the views of Alderwick, et al. (2015, 
p.49) who discuss overuse of services which leads to “unnecessary tests and treatment, 
and overutilisation of low-value clinical interventions.” 
In summary, this section has looked at how quality considerations can be applied 
to the four tangible output variables. Relating quality to efficiency is problematic when 
considered at a broad level, as the discussions and considerations for each output variable 
are discrete and complex. The relations between MR and the other output variables 
examined in the regressions may be used to investigate the relationship between quality, 
quantity, and efficiency.  
          However, the regression results actually show something very different to the 
earlier tests of DEA and SFA results. When MR outcomes are related to the outputs 






individually, the results show that the relation with MR breaks, so there is weakening of 
the relationship with the outputs observed, as the curve flattens, swiches, or breaks. This 
is abnormal as theory (Farrell, 1957) expects output quality to follow the quantity of 
outputs in an agricultural context, which has some similarities with HC (Ram, 2014). The 
global health situation is affected by agricultural products which may be associated with 
bad health that reduces the performance of work, income, and productivity. Thus, HC and 
agriculture are together accountable for life expectancy around the world, where 
miscalculations in agriculture might lead to polluted food products and HC mistakes 
might lead to death (James Lind Institute, 2019).  
           More recently, Sheiner and Malinonvskaya (2016) show that applying traditional 
measures of productivity growth to HC can result in problems if an inappropriate input is 
chosen, and the variation of the input is not taken into account. In the traditional approach, 
the output is the HC service provided (e.g., a physician’s appointment, prescription or 
hospital stay) but these services may be better viewed as intermediate inputs to satisfying 
the consumer need, which is improved health. In addition, in HC, the outcomes tend to 
improve over time, so observing prices without reference to increased output quality will 
exaggerate price increases and diminish productivity growth (Sheiner and 
Malinonvskaya, 2016, p.4). However, the challenge for longitudinal studies such as this 
is to find appropriate inputs, outputs and outcomes that cover the whole time period under 
consideration that is recorded across a wide sample set. Nevertheless, in this case, this 
disconnect between quantity and quality aspects, means that there is an increasing number 
of tests (assumed to be more efficient) being carried out with no association with MR 
outcomes. The dates when this change happened can be identified, by applying these 
breaches back to the quantity shown in the trend analysis. Thus, at certain points in time 
the theoretical relationship between quantity and quality is broken and is isolated within 






the phases identified, if the focus of tests is only on avoiding premature deaths, and if MR 
does not account for demographic changes. 
For example, the Comprehensive Operating System phase demonstrates the greatest 
movement towards privatisation (Figure 1.1) despite the threshold breaches in Laboratory 
tests in the last years of the phase (Figure 5.4) which suggests a decrease in quality 
effectiveness as opposed to an increase in efficiency. In contrast, the New Public Self-
Operating System phase has the lowest MR per 1,000 of the local population (Figure 5.5), 
which might be related to factors external to hospital corporatisation -not to hospital 
management regime alone-, such as the introduction of tighter quality controls through 
external quality regulation (which is likely to have benefited whatever corporatisation 
phase prevails, then and in the future), advances in clinical procedures, new technologies 
and infrastructures, and improved training facilities, as well as immunisation programmes 
(e.g., Tufenkeji, 1994; Perbandt, et al., 2018) may be associated with the observed 
improvements to the quality of the KSA hospital outputs in the New Public Self-
Operating System phase. 
To conclude when considering RQ2- (Have HC quality considerations (or 
effectiveness) modified conclusions relating to the efficiency of different HC governance 
systems?) as demonstrated by the discussions above, the quality considerations relating 
to the different hospital governance systems do modify conclusions relating to the overall 
performance of different hospital governance systems within the boundaries of this study. 
With particular attention to PE, the results from DEA and SFA are inconclusive in terms 
of which phase is most efficient. However, the regressions have highlighted a number of 
effectiveness (quality) concerns in the New Public Self-Operating System phase.  
Firstly, where significant threshold breaches in the latter years of the study period 
(2009 onwards) for Laboratory tests, and in 2006 for Radiology tests, have no significant 






positive association with MR can be detected from increasing the quantity produced of 
these variables (Figure 5.4). Secondly, a negative and highly significant (at 1% and 5%) 
relationship between MR and Inpatients discharged between 1993-2002 (Table 5.24) was 
estimated with a lower standard error, and there is a negative relationship between MR 
and both inpatient discharged and radiology tests between 1990-1995 (Table 5.39). 
However, Inpatients discharged becomes insignificant, implying perhaps that there is no 
statistical evidence that hospitalisation is more effective in the New Public Self-Operating 
System phase, as mentioned above by Alderwick, et al. (2015), that clinical interventions 
might have had a low value. In this case, it can be suggested that striving for greater PE 
means that carrying out a greater quantity of tests may not be associated with increasing 
the benefit or quality (effectiveness) of the hospital, and overall performance may be 
negatively influenced. 
Finally, the result achieved for Review visits is similar for the Comprehensive and 
the New Public Self-Operating System phase, where this variable is considered 
significant to the MR (Table 5.31) it is achieved its maximum in the most corporatised 
phase, while it decreased in the last phase (Figure 5.11), where this study analyses the PE 
of hospitals in relation to the output of services.  
6.3  Chapter Summary 
 This chapter discusses the results from Chapter 5, framed within the context of the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The results and discussion are undeniably complex and 
based on varying and contrasting opinions concerning progress towards, or away from 
privatisation. As the hospitals have transitioned to each subsequent phase and moved 
towards or away from privatisation, different levels of efficiency across output variables 
can be observed across the empirical tests.   






For RQ1 - Have different forms of corporatisation generated the gains that may be 
associated with the movement of reforms towards privatisation? the evidence (i.e., the 
results) shows that there is no consistent evidence that any theory consistently predicts 
changes in efficiency, at least in the early stages of the analysis (DEA and SFA) and the 
difficulty in explicitly distinguishing the association between corporatisation and 
efficiency, as opposed to other factors external to the hospital. 
For RQ2 - Have HC quality considerations (or effectiveness) modified conclusions 
relating to the efficiency of different HC governance systems? The overall results from 
the study, finishing with the regression analyses using OLS with MR as the dependent 
variable, show that considering the quality aspects of performance does modify 
conclusions related to the overall performance of different HC governance systems within 
the boundaries of this study.  
Where the results have identified a disconnect between the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the output variables related to changes in the outcome variable MR, the 
conclusion is modified because, when considering PE, increased outputs suggest that the 
New Public Self-Operating System is the most efficient. However, when considering the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the hospital systems which are associated with 
quality effectiveness, it is shown that the increases in PE (output) do not improve the 
overall performance of the hospital system.  
AHRQ (2002, p.2) suggests that volume (quantity) indicators are “…proxy, or 
indirect, measures of quality. They are based on evidence suggesting that hospitals 
performing more of certain intensive, high-technology, or highly complex procedures 
may have better outcomes for those procedures.” Furthermore, for quality utilisation 
indicators in the AHRQ model, concerns are raised, where the usage varies greatly across 






hospitals, the use may be excessive, incomplete, or that there is a misuse, this view is 
supported by Farrell (1957) mentioned in 6.2.3 (vi) above.  
Table 6.2 - Summary of correlation results 
  Q2 (do quality considerations modify 
conclusions relating to the efficiency 
of different HC governance systems?) 
Reasons (explanation) 
Inpatients discharged Are associated with MR Positive relation (0.76) with MR  
Insignificant since 2003  
Laboratory tests Are associated with MR Negative relation (-0.75) with MR 
Significant Threshold breached  
Radiology tests Are associated with MR Negative relation with MR  (-0.42) 
Significant Thresholds breached  
Review visits Are associated with MR Positive relation (0.48) with MR  
Insignificant with Laboratory tests 
below 5 (after 1989) 
 
To conclude this chapter, the determination of the overall performance of a hospital 
system requires a multi-dimensional examination and nuanced consideration of both 
quantitative and qualitative results.   
When applying traditional theory of efficiency (e.g., Farrell, 1957) across the 
different tests in Chapter 5 it is not considered here consistently predicts the test results 
identified. This does not mean the theory is incorrect, just that results (particularly from 
the DEA and SFA) initially provided no consistent evidence to support the theory. 
However, econometric tests and efficiency results alone do not predict which 
corporatisation phase provides the best overall performance of hospitals. This study has 
built a model which provides a multi-dimensional view of hospital performance, such that 
the quality aspects of the outputs (efficiency and effectiveness) for the sample hospitals 
are also considered through the regression analyses.  
The suggestion (IOM, 2006) that a greater volume of output procedures is 
correlated with a lower MR, cannot be supported, although that is not to say that if 
different variables were chosen the results would still be the same. The results of the 
regression analysis, combined with the results of the earlier DEA and SFA tests indicate 






this is not the case for this study, and have identified areas where the utilisation of the 
outputs is considered problematic, predominately in the New Public Self-Operating 
System phase. The results of the regression analyses identify a breakdown of the 
efficiency relationship with the effectiveness and quality aspects observed in this study’s 
results.  
In addition to empirical results, each corporatisation phase in this study has 
involved different movement away from/towards privatisation, where the Comprehensive 
Operating System phase is seen as the most corporatised phase (Figure 1.1). Applying all 
the results obtained in this study, a detailed assessment of which corporatisation phase of 
the study provides the greatest level of performance can be made. It is on this basis that 
the assertion of H2 (Corporatisation will be positively associated with efficiency) can 
only be partially supported, and is modified by quality considerations. H3 (Fully 
corporatised hospitals will perform better in terms of quality than partially corporatised 
hospitals) is supported to some extent within the confines of this study, meaning that the 
design of incentives, agency, and public choice theories (as outlined in Chapter 2) hold 
true. These theories are to a degree consistent with this study’s results, indicating that 
increasing corporatisation, i.e., moving towards privatisation (see 1.4 above) (Harding 
and Preker, 2000), may be associated with achieving improved efficiency and wider 
quality considerations. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Operating System (fully 
corporatised) phase demonstrates (despite some mixed results in specific tests) better 
performance compared to other phases within this study.  
          Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by providing an overview of the research findings 
identified in this study. On the basis of those findings a number of policy 
recommendations are suggested that may be supportive of future KSA development plans 
for hospital privatisation. 








 7.1 Introduction 
 This final chapter provides a consolidation of estimates of the associations between 
corporatisation and the performance of a selection of MoH-owned hospitals in the KSA 
over a 36-year period.  
The aim of this study was to test for the alleged theoretical benefits of 
corporatisation changes, i.e., a positive association between corporatisation and 
efficiency would be generally consistent with SCP theory (reviewed by Boru and Kuhil, 
2018). While no causation may be implied from any such association, explanations are 
tentatively proposed with theories consistent with the data involving the design of 
incentives, agency, and public choice theories (as outlined in Chapter 2). The study argues 
that changes in management incentives, in different corporatisation phases, may be 
associated with the performance of hospitals. Efficiency is one dimension of hospital 
performance with respect to its inputs and outputs that is considered. MR acting as the 
quality outcome proxy provides additional dimensions in a theoretical model of the 
investigation of the hospital system’s performance.  
The association between corporatisation and performance was investigated by 
testing three hypotheses, which provide for the first time in the KSA a deeper 
understanding and examination of changes across a variation of corporatisation models, 
using quantitative results on hospital performance. Furthermore, the conceptual 
framework (Chapter 3) and methodology (Chapter 4) provide a novel frame integrating 
effectiveness and quality aspects with efficiency results across a number of hospitals 
input, output, and outcome measures, thus providing a balanced inspection in a non-






limiting, two-step approach (i.e., quality and effectiveness aspects examined 
independently of DEA/SFA analysis, through the Regression Analyses, rather than 
making restrictive assumptions to incorporate quality into the analysis of efficiency as a 
residual). It is hoped that the findings of this research will provide additional insight and 
techniques so that the KSA ministries concerned with planning, implementing and 
monitoring hospital corporatisation can continue to make better informed decisions for 
the benefit of the people of the KSA. This makes it important to make clear the limitations 
of the study (e.g., assumptions, choice of variables, etc), see section 7.5. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. This section provides an introduction. 
The findings in Section 7.2 suggest that taking into account the efficiency, effectiveness, 
and quality aspects of hospitals performance, fully corporatised hospitals (on average) 
provide better overall performance than those that are not. Section 7.3 presents policy 
recommendations, included future KSA development plans (Vision 2030), quantity, 
quality, agency problems, and incentivisation. Section 7.4 outlines a number of 
observations as suggested guidance for those involved in the design and implementation 
of future stages of hospital corporatisation in the KSA. As this thesis is not without 
limitations, the limitations of study are represented in section 7.5. This chapter ends with 
suggested areas for future research (section 7.6), and then some final conclusions (section 
7.7). 
7.2  Principal Findings 
An array of quantitative analytical techniques was used to examine hospital data to 
determine the relative performance (efficiency) of different phases of corporatisation.  
Looking at each technique, DEA shows that the Comprehensive System phase is 
better (on the criteria adopted) than the New Public Self-Operating System phase, because 






the results identified that in this phase hospitals are generally nearer their PE frontier in 
their use of inputs. The Tobit analysis (Table 5.5) also shows that the Comprehensive 
System phase has superior CRS efficiency scores (except in the intercept which shows 
that the last phase has the greatest improvement). In contrast, the SFA results show a 
higher average PE score for the New Public Self-Operating System phase. The DEA 
results are preferred in this study, and the arguments for this preference are laid out in 
6.2.2. Whilst MR might not be considered an ideal proxy for quality (Sheiner and 
Malinovskaya, 2016), the indicator has been recorded consistently across the study time-
frame (see section 6.2.3 (ii)).  
Moving on, the key results from the panel analysis tests focus on how PE is 
increased via increasing outputs, particularly for radiology tests. Here the PE results were 
inconsistent with decreases in radiology tests in the most corporatised phase. However, 
Radiology test efficiency declined further when moving to the lesser corporatised New 
Public Self-Operating System phase. 
The Regression results have highlighted a number of effectiveness (quality) 
concerns, with efficiency being more evident in the most corporatised phase (see section 
6.2.3 (vi)). 
7.3 Policy recommendations  
7.3.1 Future KSA Development Plans (Vision 2030) 
Looking forward, plans for the corporatisation/privatisation of hospitals in the KSA 
are captured in the Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Program 2020 built upon 
the encouragement of private sector investment in sectors that have been predominantly 
funded and serviced by the Government in the past. Reform of how public HC and related 






services are delivered in the Kingdom is one of the Government’s most important 
priorities.  
According to the National Transformation Program 2020, the MoH plans to spend 
up to SAR 23 billion prior to 2020 to reform and restructure primary HC. Dr Khalid Bin 
Mohammed Al Shaibani, Deputy Minister for Planning and Health and Director of Vision 
Realisation Office believes that there is a hope that by 2030 there would be full hospital 
corporatisation (but still in government ownership) with local autonomy, suggesting that 
this would lower the level at which decisions are made and allow hospitals to become 
more competitive: “We hope that by 2030 it will be left to the decision-makers to decide 
on whether or not to privatise that asset or keep it as a government-owned (corporatised) 
asset” (TBY, 2017, p.1). Kerr (2016, p.1) reports that “…in healthcare, the plan targets a 
rise in the private sector’s involvement from 25 per cent to 35 per cent over the next five 
years. It has earmarked SAR6bn to support the sector’s transformation through the 
funding of health insurance and PPP. One of the country’s ‘medical cities’, which are 
major hospital complexes, will also be privatised.”  
Unfortunatilly, like the term ‘privatisation’, the term PPP is used loosely. There is 
a difference between the PPP in China, and the UK and other Western countries. “The 
essential difference is that PPP was discussed and carried out during the process of 
establishing a market system that was based originally on public ownership. This has been 
quite a different process compared with the West, where private ownership has long been 
recognised as legally enforceable” (Adams, et al., 2006, p.391). In the KSA, the National 
Center for Privatisation (2019) shows that the MOH announced the first PPP project to 
amend and improve medical radiology and imaging services in the Riyadh region, that 
will serve about one million patients and employ around 500 nursing, technical, and 
clinical staff. 






However, details as to the exact intended form of privatisation are not yet evident 
at the time of writing. In a KSA media report (Hazzazi, 2018) it was stated that a holding 
company with five regional companies would be established within the privatisation 
programme starting in 2018, to cover all Saudi regions, started by nine hospitals and thirty 
primary HC centres in the Makkah region and Eastern province. It is expected that 37 per 
cent of hospitals and health centres will be under those new companies by 2020, and that 
would increase the efficiency of the hospitals by 25 per cent by 2021 (Hazzazi, 2018). 
This raises questions about a shortage of the quantity of the HC services in KSA. 
7.3.2 Quantity of Healthcare Services in KSA 
 Despite the great expansion of the health services in the Kingdom, the MoH states 
that there is currently a scarcity of medical services (e.g., long waiting times, and the 
inability to give patients time for psychological reassurance and explanation for the 
congestion of appointments), and that may be associated with the lack of specialised 
hospitals and their limitations in some areas (MoH, 2019, pp.13-18). However, as stated 
by the Asharqia Chamber’s report, “The privatization process will increase the capacity 
of beds in hospitals from 65,000 to 115,000 by 2020, adding an extra 50,000 beds to the 
healthcare system” (Bulatovych, 2018). However, as noted before, the term 
‘privatisation’ is not publicly available in detail at this time and is used loosely by the 
MoH in media press releases. Plans under Cabinet Decree 60 of 1/4/1418 A.H. [August 
6, 1997] for the Supreme Economic Council’s Privatisation Strategy state that 
“Privatisation is the process of transferring the ownership or management of public 
establishments, projects, and services from the government sector to the private sector, 
relying on market mechanisms and competition, through a number of methods including 






contracts for managing, operating, financing, or selling all or part of the government's 
assets to the private sector” (International Business Publications, 2011, p.70).   
 However, more recently the MoH announced a corporatisation approach towards 
hospital privatisation stating that (Al-Oufi, 2017, p.1) “The change into companies is 
aimed at adopting the methods of the private sector in boosting quality, raising 
productivity, reducing waste, expediting the process of decision-making and achieving 
decentralisation. The quality of services will be improved and they will be provided at 
the right time and place”. In this way, the level of corporatisation seems likely to increase, 
as in the Comprehensive Operating System phase. The issue of the quality of service is 
addressed in the next section. 
7.3.3 Quality of Healthcare Services in KSA 
The MoH (2019, p.18) states that improvements in the quality of health services 
will be provided through government companies in preparation for allocation, and work 
to expand the base of beneficiaries of the health insurance system, facilitate more rapid 
access to services, reduce waiting times to access specialists and consultants, and train 
doctors to raise their ability to address and treat chronic diseases. A media report by the 
MoH outlining the future (corporatisation) plans for KSA MoH hospitals reported that 
(Hazzazi, 2018) “The companies will focus on quality and compete with one another to 
provide the best possible services to all groups of residents.” However, the definition of 
‘best’ is currently not defined and precise ‘decision rights’ of such companies are still to 
be determined (MoH, 2019, p.18) although the statement suggests that equity and equality 
will be maintained in line with KSA HC guiding principles to “realize the goal of 
healthcare for all citizens” and “improve the quality of healthcare services” (Hazzazi, 
2018). However, to achieve these goals, there is a fundamental need to limit the moral 






hazard problems as mentioned in 2.4.4, since local employees have more information on 
hospital operations than planners at the MoH.  
7.3.4 Agency Problems  
In 2017, Dr Khalid Bin Mohammed Al Shaibani -Deputy Minister for Planning and 
Health and Director of Vision Realisation Office- stated several things, most importantly, 
as it highlights an awareness in the MoH that it faces a challenge of Agency problems in 
the current model (New Public Self-Operating System phase) implied by the following 
(TBY, 2017, p.1) “Clearly the MOH today has a conflict of interest. It provides care 
through a network of more than 365 hospitals and 2,500 primary care centres. It provides 
care but is, at the same time, the governor, and the regulator.” This dual role is arguably 
indefensible. The KSA has plans in 2018 to separate these processes so that the MoH will 
no longer provide care, and it will focus more on planning, organising, supervising and 
monitoring all health services. The provision of care will be given to multiple SOEs 
companies (see 7.3.3 above). While there is an intention to privatise 290 hospitals and 
2,300 primary health centers by 2030 (Global Health Exhibition, 2019), the initial stages 
will, however, focus on further corporatisation. However, to ensure the success of the 
transformation in the health sector in the Kingdom, incentives must be provided to supply 
high-quality services. 
7.3.5 Incentivisation 
The MoH pointed out that one of the most important factors in the success of the 
transformation in the Health sector in the Kingdom would be to change the way in which 
the financing of HC services is run. The Health Insurance and Health Purchasing 
Programme of the Ministry aims to formulate and implement a new mechanism for 
financing companies through the purchase of services (instead of provision of services 






through direct budget) in accordance with the strategic purchasing methods that guarantee 
the provision of incentives to provide high quality service without generating any 
additional costs for citizens. It is intended that this will be achieved by the reallocation of 
budget and utilisation of reserve budgets, and improvements in efficiency of public 
hospitals by operating them on a commercial fundamental with the support of specialised 
health companies (Hazzazi, 2018), where all citizens will be covered under 
‘comprihinsive coverage’ to obtain fundamental health services, while they can pay to 
get an ‘additional optional insurance’ for complementary health services such as cosmetic 
treatments (MoH, Health transformation strategy, 2019). This policy aim is in line with 
the results that a more corporatised model will provide performance gains as argued by 
this study.  
Within the National Transformation Program, (KSA, 2017), KPIs suggest that 37 
per cent of the total HC income be generated from the private sector by 2020 with 100 
per cent of HC facilities being required to report comprehensive performance and quality 
aspects. 
7.4 Recommendations 
The findings from this research concluded that, taking into account the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and quality aspects of hospitals’ performance, the most corporatised 
hospitals generally perform better overall than those in the least corporatised phases as 
identified within the scope of this study and its sample data (see 5.8 above). However, it 
is unlikely that what is deemed suitable for a large hospital would be equally appropriate 
for a small rural hospital.  
(i) Benefits of autonomy. Increasing the level of autonomy at a local level is a 
theoretical precursor to achieving greater efficiencies. However, this can be abused due 






to Agency problems or lack of experience in managing outsourced contracts. Ensuring 
that the proper incentives and performance controls are in place will limit moral hazard. 
This study demonstrates that the degree of corporatisation is positively associated with 
hospitals’ relative efficiency. Possible explanations for this association include greater 
corporatisation with more local incentives, improved decision autonomy, and 
consequently less moral hazard (see 2.4.4 (ii) and 6.2 (H2) above).  
(ii) Performance Indicators. To measure the movement towards strategic aims and 
objectives, a number of indicators need to be selected to assess whether the necessary 
progress is being achieved. This study used four input variables, four output variables and 
one outcome variable, as well as a number of control variables, to compare different 
corporatisation phases. Such a selection of indicators is unlikely to be appropriate when 
considering the three domains (mentioned in 2.6.1 above) of hospital performance 
(structure, activity and procedural, and outcomes) to assess the overall performance of a 
hospital. The most appropriate set of performance indicators and measures for each of 
these domains must be defined, captured and assessed to inform any adjustments that are 
required on an ongoing basis to meet performance targets.  
The selection of measures must not be too costly to collect, yet must be targeted 
and appropriate to include inputs, intermediate outputs (for internal hospital operations), 
outputs and outcomes, that are considered from an economic, effectiveness and quality 
perspective. To reiterate (see section 6.2.2 (ii)), the current funding method relies on 
inputs rather than outputs and that limiting the incentives to increase output productivity 
and efficiency (Al-Debis, 2017). The new funding method should arguably be driven 
across all domains of HC performance (not only efficiency metrics but also quality of 
care considerations). In addition, with the advent of technological advances, the 
manipulation of large volumes of performance data can now be achieved in a more 






simplified and lower cost manner. For example, very recently (ADAA, 2018), the Saudi 
National Centre for Performance Management, has created a freely accessible 
International Performance Hub (IPH), which draws together information from around 700 
KPIs. Looking forward, a wider selection of KPIs may be appropriate where this study is 
limited by the number of input, output, and outcome variables considered, due to the 
availablility of data over the study time period for the sample hospitals. Looking back at 
hospital performance, it is impossible to capture such wider information retrospectively 
as it does not exist or is unreliable. However, MR (as a proxy for quality) is included in 
the WHO HC indicators list, and it also considered as a key indicator of hospital quality 
(see section 6.2.3 (ii)), both globally and within the KSA.  
(iii) Scale. When comparing the performance of hospitals, location, scale, and 
specialism should be considered as part of the selection criteria so that like is compared 
with like, as the environment of the KSA is not consistent across its domain and localised 
impacts could affect results. The Tobit regression analysis (Section 5.2.2) examined the 
determinants of efficiency differences across a number of variants. In addition, all the 
hospitals selected in the sample of this study are non-specialised hospitals (unlike the 
specialised hospitals such as the ophthalmic or obstetrics hospitals) belonging to the 
MoH. The stability of the model over time was also considered by using information of 
both the variations between hospitals, and the changes over time (Section 5.4.2).  
(iv) Assessment techniques. Techniques to assess the costs and benefits of 
increasing different components of corporatisation (moving toward privatisation), could 
benefit from using both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques that are 
standardised and transparent across all hospitals. The creation of the theoretical model in 
this study has allowed efficiency, effectiveness, and quality aspects to be considered as 






different dimensions of a hospital’s overall performance. Doing so has modified 
conclusions from those just based on efficiency results alone. 
(v) Assessors. Hospitals must have the ability to self-monitor as well as being 
assessed externally. Internal peer review visits are one method of addressing and 
maintaining good safety aspects and best clinical practices as mentioned in 4.3 (iv). 
However, as discussed in 1.4 above, an external quality assurance has been introduced 
from 2000 onwards (Almasabi, 2013).  
(vi) Training. The examination of economic and statistical results, unless carried 
out with some insight and skill, could result in misinterpretation. Awareness training on 
the sampling, manipulation, and examination of indicators is recommended for key 
personnel by this study. HC economics within KSA is a relatively new discipline. The 
ability to manipulate data appropriately is important to standardise outcome metrics and 
accurately measure resource costs and introduce the use of such data into decisions made 
on a daily basis (MoH, 2019, p.22). 
7.5 Limitations of Study  
The chosen positivist methodology may introduce limitations on the researcher as 
outlined in 4.2 in specifying the production process, i.e., the choice of analytic 
technique, model specification, and efficiency assessment; could lead to incorrect 
findings and assumptions. For example, DEA/SFA is specifically concerned with 
measurements of PE, where PE and AE represent static efficiencies at a particular point 
in time. However, investments in HC may not show efficiency benefits until many years 
after the input measurements have been captured. This study merely assesses inputs, 
outputs, and outcomes to derive efficiency results at a static moment of time within each 
phase and assumes that results are immediate rather than lagged. In terms of assumptions, 






both the DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC models have been applied to the study to address 
scalability. Dynamic Efficiency has not been considered due to the constraints in data 
availability in this study, where investments in technical advances in HC may have a 
significant impact on efficiencies over time. 
When assessing the efficiency of HC organisations, the positivist measurement of 
efficiency is further complicated by the need to take into account exogenous influences 
on performance that lie beyond organisational control – i.e., characteristics of population, 
geography, climate, culture, and in particular, size of city. The KSA is a diverse country 
in terms of geography and population distribution. In this study, the majority of the cities 
(60 per cent) where the hospitals are located were classified as big cities in the KSA, and 
80 per cent of the hospitals are located in semi-urban and urban areas (Table 4.2). It is 
impossible to identify definitively all environmental constraints and their relative impact 
on the study’s results. However, DEA assumes that there is no statistical noise which does 
not allow other factors to influence production. In comparison, SFA does consider 
random shocks outside the control of firms as represented in Appendix 5.E; therefore, 
higher efficiency scores for SFA compared with DEA may be due to external factors 
rather than to hospital performance. This represents an advantage for DEA.  
The comparison for the study should have included MoH hospitals, 
private hospitals, and others as well, which would have been a better comparison. This 
limits the significance of the results of the study, especially as they could provide insights 
into the differences between inputs/outputs/outcomes and other characteristics of private 
and public hospitals. 
Another limitation applies to many other HC investigations: this study suggests that 
some caution should be taken in the interpretation of such results at a hospital level 
applied to a wider picture, both in terms of sample size and time horizons, to identify 






general trends, associations of performance and testing of general hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, the results within the study sample have been prepared and rigorously 
examined using a number of different economic tools of investigation. Overall the model 
is deemed to be robust for its purpose to investigate the hypotheses across different tests.  
However, changes in levels of corporatisation may be expected to be associated 
with performance effects in the long term, i.e., not instantly. The implications for this 
research are that these measurements show immediate associations. This does not infer 
causality from corporatisation stages to performance, which requires greater insight and 
contextual knowledge. 
Finally, a limitation could be that the implications of the research findings and 
potential recommendations need to be considered within the local context of the KSA HC 
environment, but could be used for wider benchmarking in assessments relating to other 
global HC systems. It is also possible that the KSA may have corporatised the best 
hospitals first (i.e. “cherry-picking”), thus affecting the measured association between 
governance change and average PE across all hospitals.   
Despite an exhaustive process of data collection and sophisticated quantitative 
analysis, this positivist study of course embraces all these weaknesses. At the same time 
this study represents the first attempt to assess the association between the state reforms 
and the HC performance in the KSA, and subsequent researchers may build on this study 
from alternative methodological standpoints. 
7.5.1 Scope of study 
(i) Variables. Apart from the chosen input, output and outcome variables, there 
were very few other hospital-level measures that could be used that were available across 
the study period. 






(ii) Area or district level data. Efforts were made to obtain a wider data-set from 
relevant sources; however, data is unavailable as noted in section 4.5.1. 
7.6 Suggested Areas for Future Research  
• Investigate the most appropriate Quality Metrics for corporatisation/ privatisation 
of hospitals and align with efficiency measures and cost considerations. 
• Compare the performance of private hospitals in the KSA with public hospitals in 
the more recent environment. 
• Understand the impact of city size on hospital quality and efficiency in more 
detail. i.e., do hospital cities provided better quality or are they just more efficient due to 
scale? 
• Understand the impact and effect that pilgrims may have on individual hospital 
performance. 
7.7 Final Conclusion 
The aim and claimed contribution of this research study has been to empirically test 
and estimate the variations in performance (efficiency, effectiveness and quality aspects) 
of MoH’s hospitals over a 36-year period in the KSA across four levels of corporatisation. 
In particular, the PE of the hospitals was investigated by testing a number of different 
hypotheses reflecting the theoretical benefits of hospital corporatisation. The study 
identified that efficiencies varied over the different phases, reflected by changes in input 
and output indicators. The consideration of quality and effectiveness modified the 
conclusions that were gained from the initial economic analyses. 
Disappointingly, the PE results from the DEA and SFA were contradictory as 
mentioned in 6.2.2 above, however, on balance, it has been argued that the DEA results 
were considered more relevant. On this basis, DEA measures indicate that the most 






corporatised phase (Comprehensive System) was the most productively efficient as 
measured by this study. 
 The Panel analyses show that rising output variables increase production 
efficiencies. However, when the effectiveness of these outputs was measured against the 
MR (as a proxy for quality), this showed ineffective AE where no quality improvement 
was derived from increasing these outputs above certain levels within the data constraints 
and scope of this study.  
The important thing to note here is that the study’s objective was to compare the 
efficiency and effectiveness of different corporatisation models (Figure 1.1). In this way, 
it is shown that the most corporatised system phase results were associated with better 
quality outcomes on AE measures. As mentioned in 6.2.3 (ii) and 7.2 above, whilst MR 
might not be considered the best proxy quality outcome measure (Sheiner and 
Malinovskaya, 2016), the indicator has been recorded consistently across the study’s 
time-frame (see section 6.2.3 (ii)).  
In addition, as noted in 4.4, it is generally believed that hospitals provide three 
essential services, namely inpatient, outpatient, and laboratory services. In this model, 
outputs should reflect these core services, whilst inputs should reflect the resources used 
to generate these outputs (services provided). According to Chansky, et al. (2013), it is 
possible to aggregate these different types of outputs into a single index to indicate overall 
inputs and outputs of the hospital.  
As a final concluding statement, further corporatisation may be supported by a 
standardised set of performance measures (covering both economic efficiency 
measurements and quality criteria derived from a HC perspective). These measures could 
consider inputs, outputs and outcomes across the three performance domains to provide 






a broad insight into performance and inform adjustments to future plans, where it is 
understood that policy changes must take time to be embedded, before the long-term 
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 Appendix 1.B - Key National Performance Indicators 
 
Indicators Statistics  2013 
Statistics 
2017 
Total population (people) 29,994,272  32,612,641 
Population annual growth rate  2.7% 2.52% 
Population density (person / sq km)  15.0 15.6 
Saudi population (people) 20,271,058 * 20,408,362 
GDP growth at constant prices (2010=100) 2.70% -0.86 




Private sector's contribution to GDP at 
constant prices  58.92% 48.22%  
Proportion of private sector growth  5.97% 1.26% 
Proportion of non-oil exports to 
imports  32.10% 38.35% 
Growth of exports of non-oil goods  6.02% 8.88% 
Growth of imports of goods  8.09% -4.0% 
Exports contribution to GDP at current prices (2010=100) 59.76% 32.42% 
The cost-of-living index  126.7 137.2%  
Change in the cost-of-living index (inflation)  3.5% -0.85% 
Unemployment Rate  5.57% 6.0% 
Saudi's Unemployment rate  11.7%  12.8% 
Saudi employment as percentage of population 35.7%  52.1%  
MR (per 1000 of the local population) 3.53  3.45 
Infant MR (per thousand live births)  15.9 4.82 
Gross enrolment rate in primary education  106.40% 101%  
Net enrolment rate in primary education  96.5% 97.90% 
Rate of illiteracy of the population  5.6% 5% 
Sources: https://www.stats.gov.sa/en 












Appendix 1.C - Graphs of overlapped inputs 
 
 






Appendix 1.D - Graphs of overlapped outputs 
 






Appendix 4.A - T test for Equality of Means 
  
T test for Equality of Means  
T df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
SE 
Difference 
95% Cl of 
difference 
Lower Upper  





































Appendix 4.B - Mean values of output variables for all periods 
 
Year MR8 Radiology tests 
Inpatients 
discharged Laboratory tests Review visits 
1979 8.89 27036.95 11360.55 678754.85 77346.05 
1980 8.37 27040.45 11365.90 678759.90 77363.80 
1981 7.88 27057.50 11376.20 678779.50 77403.50 
1982 7.43 27102.35 11429.60 678849.40 77481.20 
1983 7.01 27102.35 11429.60 678849.40 77481.20 
1984 6.62 27102.35 11429.60 678849.40 77481.20 
1985 6.25 27091.00 11397.60 678786.60 77450.70 
1986 5.92 27136.55 11407.25 678806.05 77454.40 
1987 5.63 27148.80 11407.90 678818.30 77456.35 
1988 5.37 27480.90 11813.20 722147.15 83033.05 
1989 5.14 29108.90 12177.70 768241.50 85824.15 
1990 4.93 29291.25 12554.50 817279.95 90191.30 
1991 4.76 30042.75 12943.10 869445.05 95096.55 
1992 4.6 35070.20 9345.80 880663.25 56508.90 
1993 4.45 35969.25 9635.05 933030.55 62114.45 
1994 4.32 36891.70 9933.10 702841.95 65383.60 
1995 4.19 37837.60 10240.22 1060149.10 69825.00 
1996 4.08 38792.75 10557.00 1164385.15 72447.40 
1997 3.97 39802.80 10883.55 1260303.45 76260.40 
1998 3.88 40823.50 11222.55 1340298.45 80274.20 
1999 3.8 41870.25 11567.05 1926327.30 149749.15 
2000 3.74 42943.90 11925.05 1517370.50 88946.80 
2001 3.69 44045.50 12294.20 1580594.65 93628.40 
2002 3.65 45856.65 13763.15 1537657.30 91591.00 
2003 3.63 45959.60 13833.90 1178110.30 93094.20 
2004 3.62 49909.35 14403.15 1160775.00 100991.65 
2005 3.61 48736.30 13627.40 1230295.10 97422.35 
2006 3.61 51911.30 13559.95 1285763.45 98706.80 
2007 3.6 54690.80 13894.00 1352226.30 101803.65 
2008 3.6 58101.35 13595.40 1471380.25 103283.10 
2009 3.59 60541.35 14557.15 1602053.75 105987.35 
2010 3.57 62406.25 14085.55 1660519.35 106886.60 
2011 3.56 67662.20 13701.00 1858876.30 109893.85 
2012 3.45 138909.35 12952.00 1946007.85 95437.80 
2013 3.53 147542.20 12316.65 1928483.10 99762.15 
2014 3.53 151230.40 12722.85 2044191.70 104750.15 
Average 4.76 48256.82 12130.78 1164129.86 88216.87 
 
 
8 MR data available at:  https://data.albankaldawli.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CDRT.IN?locations=SA. 






Appendix 4.C - Mean values of input variables for all periods 
 
Year Beds Doctors Nurses Allied personnel MoHBudget9  
1979 161.00 82.20 163.85 66.90 5,656,400  
1980 163.80 84.45 171.10 69.45 7,709,700  
1981 168.70 86.70 175.90 72.15 8,803,700  
1982 171.85 91.10 179.60 75.05 8,400,800  
1983 171.85 91.10 179.60 75.05 10,742,000  
1984 171.85 91.10 179.60 75.05 8,814,540  
1985 183.10 88.80 176.25 72.25 7,072,933  
1986 194.00 94.05 180.20 74.40 8,333,431  
1987 194.80 95.25 181.55 75.05 7,735,000  
1988 194.80 95.25 181.55 78.10 7,591,590  
1989 243.65 118.75 228.30 81.55 8,168,484  
1990 284.80 139.30 265.85 84.45 9,708,000  
1991 290.95 143.60 268.55 88.30 8,872,800  
1992 290.95 143.60 268.55 92.05 9,928,500  
1993 290.95 143.60 268.55 95.85 8,110,680  
1994 290.95 143.60 268.55 99.90 7,364,772  
1995 297.30 148.30 271.70 103.95 7,335,667  
1996 297.30 148.30 271.70 108.45 10,746,976  
1997 297.30 148.30 271.70 112.95 12,213,699  
1998 297.30 148.30 271.70 117.70 11,339,236  
1999 300.10 152.90 274.50 122.45 11,939,043  
2000 306.15 157.80 277.45 127.85 13,046,528  
2001 306.15 157.80 277.45 127.85 13,740,910  
2002 306.15 157.80 277.45 133.70 13,857,430  
2003 306.15 157.80 277.45 139.35 14,756,350  
2004 310.25 158.05 283.30 142.45 16,870,750  
2005 310.25 158.05 283.30 146.50 19,683,700  
2006 310.25 159.30 283.95 152.80 22,808,200  
2007 310.25 159.30 283.95 154.15 25,220,000  
2008 315.85 160.40 289.40 160.75 27,507,600  
2009 315.85 160.40 289.40 160.75 29,518,700  
2010 316.35 160.40 289.40 160.80 35,063,200  
2011 323.10 165.70 298.80 168.75 39,860,200  
2012 325.40 169.25 308.95 172.35 47,076,447  
2013 325.40 167.50 312.30 175.85 54,350,355  
2014 325.40 169.05 312.30 179.15 61,959,405  
Average 268.618 136.032 251.214 115.114 17,275,215  
 
9 MoH budget is Raw Data per annum 



















tests Laboratory tests Review visits 
1 7 1 . 3.38805 56.8183 . 8335.84 8113.02 782611 0 
2 11 0.852372 13.8683 12.2701 2.57727 . 1623.88 0 173393 25914.9 
3 20 0.334993 47.3449 . 5.2072 2.79225 0 0 124180 1886.74 
4 5 1 92.4479 . 10.2216 4.90947 112.948 1090.9 264070 0 
5 1 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 
6 9 0.960822 . 66.6457 61.6236 . 15837.4 0 6137771 95826 
7 8 1 152.305 . 88.1211 16.6263 0 0 2112740 0 
8 1 1 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 
9 16 0.612717 . 37.0889 9.49885 . 5574.49 0 2938188 22531.1 
10 18 0.388478 . 11.3422 29.777 . 0 857.238 355413 19947.5 
11 10 0.91405 . 35.0245 43.409 . 0 0 995884 13022.9 
12 15 0.62593 . 33.4114 38.9032 . 0 3462.99 715784 0 
13 12 0.725894 . 18.2652 6.05129 . 0 1214.78 1396586 7171.91 
14 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 4 1 . 1.15416 45.4993 . 0 10716.7 141952 23712.7 
16 19 0.369582 . 12.1282 . 0.568394 753.732 5578.47 4409.33 0 
17 17 0.577251 . 24.0533 69.105 . 0 1494.92 838078 0 
18 14 0.663348 . 22.35 57.4148 . 0 586.449 432309 9192.12 
19 13 0.676793 . 2.21189 18.7444 . 0 5853.91 1143860 0 
20 6 1 . 9.62238 49.291 . 0 0 695011 9272.02 
Notes: The reference weights are not reported since they sum to the relative efficiency scores, and to safe space. The full results with the relative efficiency scores are available upon 
request. DMU’s are the decision-making units (the 20 hospitals), Rank shows the ranking of each hospital according to the relative efficiency scores, Efficiency scores are the 
measures of efficiency of each hospital. A hospital is efficient when the score=1, and all the slacks are 0s. A hospital is ‘weakly’ efficient if the score=1, but the slacks are different 
from zero. 



















tests Laboratory tests  Review visits 
1 6 1 . 7.44601 60.4263 . 6997.25 4889.38 818865 0 
2 10 0.868883 . 16.919 . 0.710103 1607.32 0.001189 202909 25910.1 
3 20 0.331722 229.587 . 34.6647 18.011 818.941 . 104032 15742.4 
4 3 1 1502.93 . 244.802 126.24 13329.8 33444.2 23850.3 . 
5 9 0.891304 8.82091 . 1.42831 0.748504 46.6943 . 0 554.296 
6 8 0.93115 . 68.0693 80.1324 . 15213.3 0 5681905 91370.5 
7 7 1 3508.8 . 637.695 302.211 . 51797.3 1664505 175450 
8 1 1 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 
9 16 0.606478 . 37.7907 21.4789 . 5236.09 0 2810922 20095.9 
10 18 0.401169 . 15.4342 33.7317 . 0 726.924 365178 19809.1 
11 11 0.848066 . 36.4758 43.6126 . 0 0 889929 8521.1 
12 15 0.618331 . 34.8743 36.6827 . 0 2321.23 718836 0 
13 12 0.746888 . 15.8942 8.28724 . 0 1082.15 1431841 6657.56 
14 2 1 . 0 0 0 3.64E-12 7.28E-12 9.31E-10 2.91E-11 
15 4 1 . 3.36055 48.3614 . 0 10321.9 159375 22623.2 
16 19 0.36165 . 13.3275 1.52763 . 693.55 5449.79 6667.6 0 
17 17 0.560487 . 26.4113 74.8163 . 0 0 815371 0 
18 14 0.654693 . 21.4785 58.1201 . 0 185.159 446854 8023.8 
19 13 0.664744 371.261 . 75.0629 30.1857 110.784 7598.03 1048218 . 
20 5 1 . 10.1033 51.0096 . 0 0 646420 3507.28 
Notes: The reference weights are not reported since they sum to the relative efficiency scores, and to safe space. The full results with the relative efficiency scores are available upon 
request. DMU’s are the decision-making units (the 20 hospitals), Rank shows the ranking of each hospital according to the relative efficiency scores, Efficiency scores are the 
measures of efficiency of each hospital. A hospital is efficient when the score=1, and all the slacks are 0s. A hospital is ‘weakly’ efficient if the score=1, but the slacks are different 
from zero. 



















tests Laboratory tests  Review visits 
1 13 0.922023 . 17.8768 87.3664 . 5639.86 0 989096 20487.2 
2 6 1 . 39.2038 . 4.0387 5090.02 0 389999 22017.7 
3 20 0.259642 16.5917 . 9.79503 3.47028 967.121 . 132699 12437.5 
4 1 1 . . 0 0 0 0 0 . 
5 1 1 . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 11 0.967481 . 100.318 150.566 . 14476.2 0 7894419 0 
7 8 1 . . 237.496 55.7302 . 4562.45 2369563 . 
8 1 1 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 
9 12 0.932161 . 83.3444 58.8509 . 12406.6 0 6467567 60780.8 
10 19 0.583878 . 32.4189 69.7372 . 0 9526.8 356163 22479.3 
11 7 1 . 66.9697 81.9362 . 5075.52 0 1725022 0 
12 16 0.682679 . 61.0141 59.0524 . 0 0 1090592 1536.13 
13 9 1 . 26.4673 21.7244 . 0 551.05 2776818 7736.82 
14 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 5 1 . 6.48081 67.746 . 0 11641.6 240054 4282.88 
16 17 0.682122 . 41.9045 12.8557 . 753.749 16628.8 1136736 0 
17 14 0.778555 . 59.1515 152.861 . 0 0 1791514 16824.9 
18 15 0.699381 . 35.9233 91.9621 . 0 3173.81 648819 18341.9 
19 18 0.638642 . . 53.0446 13.4476 . 3409.13 1229238 . 
20 10 0.982559 . 20.0183 75.2781 . 0 0 828124 5426.78 
Notes: The reference weights are not reported since they sum to the relative efficiency scores, and to safe space. The full results with the relative efficiency scores are available upon 
request. DMU’s are the decision-making units (the 20 hospitals), Rank shows the ranking of each hospital according to the relative efficiency scores, Efficiency scores are the 
measures of efficiency of each hospital. A hospital is efficient when the score=1, and all the slacks are 0s. A hospital is ‘weakly’ efficient if the score=1, but the slacks are different 
from zero. 



















tests Laboratory tests  Review visits 
1 18 0.69776 . 13.6165 82.6057 . 1662.56 . . 28163.6 
2 12 0.960013 . 38.7463 . 4.39407 2323.14 . 76847.3 34585.8 
3 20 0.21146 20.2309 . 9.54537 4.75097 . 7289.26 13463.8 0.000451 
4 9 1 . . 0 0 . 0 0 1.64E-11 
5 19 0.261887 47.0055 . 27.2583 15.125 1936.6 15867.4 . 1682.62 
6 13 0.952728 . 58.11 128.426 . 12527.1 . 199673 0 
7 1 1 . . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
8 1 1 . . . 0 0 . . 0 
9 11 0.961747 . 43.4613 . 42.7564 8947.33 . 39949.5 57960.3 
10 17 0.725644 . . 5.44603 . . 44250.6 . 26119.5 
11 1 1 . . . . . . . 0 
12 15 0.758812 . 52.3357 . . 180.69 . 11678.8 0 
13 14 0.94805 . . . 34.4386 0 . 74868.7 0 
14 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 . . 0 . . 0 0 0 
16 1 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 
17 10 1 . . . . 2.14E-11 . 0 1.01E-10 
18 1 1 . . 0 0 . 0 0 0 
19 16 0.741059 . . 4.31231 8.64011 0 . 33649 0 
20 1 1 . . . 0 . . . 0 
Notes: The reference weights are not reported since they sum to the relative efficiency scores, and to safe space. The full results with the relative efficiency scores are available upon 
request. DMU’s are the decision-making units (the 20 hospitals), Rank shows the ranking of each hospital according to the relative efficiency scores, Efficiency scores are the 
measures of efficiency of each hospital. A hospital is efficient when the score=1, and all the slacks are 0s. A hospital is ‘weakly’ efficient if the score=1, but the slacks are different 
from zero. 





Appendix 5.E – SFA first set of RESULTS 
 
 
Appendix 5.F - Testing for multicollinearity and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
i_Nurse 14.44 0.07 
i_Allied 11.22 0.09 
i_Budget 2.14 0.47 
i_Beds 1.85 0.54 
i_Doct 11.02 0.09 
Partial operating system 1.94 0.51 
Comprehensive operating system 3.14 0.32 
New public operating system 4.58 0.22 
Mean VIF 6.29   
Appendix 5.G - Testing for multicollinearity after omitted two variables 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Budget 2.03 0.49 
Beds 1.67 0.60 
Doctors 1.29 0.77 
Partial Operating System 1.94 0.52 
Comprehensive Operating System 3.03 0.33 
New Public Self-Operating System 4.48 0.22 





Inpatients discharged Radiology tests 
Laboratory 
tests Review visits 
Location of the Hospitals Coefficient  0.0425832 0.0434223 -0.2143041 -0.0927532 P< |z| 0.574 0.476 0.071 0.074 
Size of the City Coefficient  -0.2815559 0.0077131 0.099102 -0.1198218 P< |z| 0.003 0.932 0.338 0.062 
Number of Pilgrims Coefficient  -0.1535162 0.062853 0.1063775 -0.2347328 P< |z| 0.097 0.595 0.467 0.071 
Gamma 
Inefficiency 0.8169505 0.9999467 0.6184794 0.9990937 
Random  
shocks 0.183049 0.0000533 0.3815206 0.0009063 





Appendix 5.H - Shapiro normality test 
 
 Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data 
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z 
Budget 720 0.73 134.29 9.73 0.00001 
Beds 720 0.96 18.26 6.13 0.00001 
Doctors 720 0.86 68.69 8.57 0.00001 
Nurses 720 0.89 56.48 8.22 0.00001 
Allied Professionals 720 0.82 88.92 9.02 0.00001 
      
Appendix 5.I- Shapiro-Francia test for lognormal data 
  
 Shapiro-Francia test for lognormal data 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Budget 720 0.73 125.59 -1.14 0.87 
Beds 720 0.96 18.45 -1.14 0.87 
Doctors 720 0.86 65.51 -1.14 0.87 
Nurses 720 0.89 53.14 -1.14 0.87 
Allied Professionals 720 0.82 83.54 -1.14 0.87 
Appendix 5.J– Pooled model for Impatients discharged 
 
Pooled model Impatient  
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 8165.69 943.49 0.00 
Budget - 0.00002 0.00003 0.42 
Beds 14.42 3.21 0.00 
Doctors 11.44 2.67 0.00 
Bilateral Operating System Omit   
Partial Operating System - 259.07 1060.97 0.81 
Comprehensive Operating System - 2539.82 972.09 0.01 
New Public Self-Operating System - 495.14 1130.35 0.66 
R squared 0.11   
Adj. R squared 0.10   
Root MSE 7064.10   










Appendix 5.K– Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity  
         Variables  
Chi 
square P_value 
Budget  145.61 0.00 
Beds     
Doctors     
Bilateral Operating System     
Partial Operating System     
Comprehensive Operating System     
New Public Self-Operating 
System     
Appendix 5.L- Pooled model for Log Impatients Discharged 
Pooled model log (Inpatient) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 3.19 0.53 0.00 
Log (budget) - 0.16 0.08 0.83 
Log (Beds) - 0.14 0.08 0.09 
Log (Doctors) 0.63 0.03 0.00 
Bilateral Operating System Omit   
Partial Operating System - 0.01 0.05 0.87 
Comprehensive Operating System - 0.07 0.04 0.10 
New Public Self-Operating System 0.016 0.06 0.27 
R squared 0.41   
Adj. R squared 0.41   
Root MSE 0.31   
F (6,713) 83.29  0.00 
Appendix 5.M- Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Variables  Chi square P_value 
Log (Budget) 280.07 0.00 
Log (Beds)     
Log (Doctors)     
Partial Operating System     
Comprehensive Operating System     
New Public Self-Operating System     





Appendix 5.N- Robust model for Log Inpatients Discharged 
Robust model log (Inpatients) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 3.19 0.45 0.00 
Log (budget) - 0.02 0.06 0.80 
Log (Beds) - 0.14 0.09 0.11 
Log (Doctors) 0.63 0.04 0.00 
Partial Operating System - 0.01 0.06 0.90 
Comprehensive Operating System - 0.07 0.05 0.18 
New Public Self-Operating System 0.02 0.06 0.80 
R squared 0.41   
Root MSE 0.31   
F (6,713) 75.42  0.00 
 Appendix 5.O- Random effect model for Log Inpatients Discharged 
RE model log (Inpatients) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 3.62 0.34 0.00 
Log (budget) 0.01 0.04 0.70 
Log (Beds) -0.07 0.16 0.66 
Log (Doctors) 0.19 0.12 0.12 
Partial Operating System 0.001 0.02 0.97 
Comprehensive Operating System -0.00003 0.04 0.99 
New Public Self-Operating System 0.10 0.04 0.02 
Sigma_u 0.29   
Sigma_e 0.14   
Rho 0.82   
R square: within 0.16   
R square: between 0.46   
R square: overall 0.33   
Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.00   












Appendix 5.P- Pooled model for Radiology tests 
Pooled model Radio 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept -16585.03 4218.84 0.00 
Budget 0.002 0.0001 0.00 
Beds 67.31 14.34 0.00 
Doctors 179.28 11.93 0.00 
Partial Operating System -4134.98 4744.17 0.34 
Comprehensive Operating System -13128.53 4346.74 0.003 
New Public Self-Operating System -26699.04 4346.74 0.00 
R squared 0.59   
Adj. R squared 0.59   
Root MSE 0.32   
F (6,713) 170.86  0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Variables  Chi square P_value 




Bilateral Operating System 
Partial Operating System 
Comprehensive Operating System 
New Public Self-Operating System 





Appendix 5.Q- Pooled model for Log Radiology tests 
 
Pooled model log (Radio) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept -0.55 0.69 0.43 
Log (budget) 0.51 0.10 0.00 
Log (Beds) -0.19 0.10 0.07 
Log (Doctors) 0.98 0.04 0.00 
Partial Operating System -0.04 0.06 0.46 
Comprehensive Operating System -0.12 0.06 0.04 
New Public Self-Operating System -0.21 0.076 0.01 
R squared 0.52   
Adj. R squared 0.52   
Root MSE 0.40   
F (6,713) 128.52  0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Variables  Chi square P_value 
Log (Budget) 92.81 0.00 
 Log (Beds) 
  
Log (Doctors) 
Partial Operating System 
Comprehensive Operating System 
New Public Self-Operating System 
 
  





Appendix 5.R- Fixed, Random Effects, and Hausman test for Log Radiology tests 
         
FE model log (Radio)  RE model log (Radio) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value  Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 0.64 0.48 0.19  Intercept 0.48 0.47 0.31 
Log (budget) 0.56 0.05 0.00  Log (budget) 0.55 0.05 0.00 
Log (Beds) -0.64 0.25 0.02  Log (Beds) -0.68 0.22 0.002 
Log (Doctors) 0.67 0.24 0.01  Log (Doctors) 0.85 0.16 0.00 
Partial Operating  
-0.02 0.03 0.51 
 Partial Operating  
-0.02 0.03 0.45 
System  System 
Comprehensive    
0.04 0.05 0.39 
 Comprehensive    
0.02 0.05 0.71 
Operating System  Operating System 
New Public Self- 
-0.03 0.06 0.68 
 New Public Self- 
-0.06 0.06 0.32 
Operating System  Operating System 
Sigma_u 0.39     Sigma_u 0.37    
Sigma_e 0.20     Sigma_e 0.20    
Rho 0.80     Rho 0.78    
F test that all u_i=0: F (19,694)= 118.830, prob >F=0.000  R square: within 0.37 
  
R square: within 0.37 
  
 R square: between 0.52 
R square: 
between 0.50  R square:overall 0.49 
R square :overall 0.47  Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.00 
Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.26  Wald Chi square 422.37   0.00 
F (6,694) 67.300   0.00      
         
Hausman test between RE model and FE model    
Variable b (fe) B (re) b-B SE    
Log (Budget) 0.56 0.55 0.01 0.01    
Log (Beds) - 0.64 -0.68 0.04 0.13    
Log (Doctors) 0.67 0.85 -0.18 0.18    
Partial Operating  
- 0.02 -0.02 0.003 0.002 
   
System    
Comprehensive    
0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
   
Operating System    
New Public Self- 
- 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.02 
   
Operating System    
Chi square = 2.40        P-value =0.88    
  





Appendix 5.S- Pooled model for Laboratory tests 
 
Pooled model Labo 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 112579.50 152949.10 0.46 
Budget 0.02 0.004 0.001 
Beds 307.93 519.93 0.55 
Doctors 4635.96 432.56 0.00 
Partial Operating System - 46290.19 171994.2 0.79 
Comprehensive Operating System 48186.39 157586 0.76 
New Public Self-Operating System 160506.30 183241.3 0.38 
R squared 0.24   
Adj. R squared 0.24   
Root MSE 1.1e+06   
F (6,713) 38.49  0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Variables  Chi square P_value 




Bilateral Operating System 
Partial Operating System 
Comprehensive Operating System 
New Public Self-Operating System 
Appendix 5.T- Pooled model for Log Laboratory tests 
 
Pooled model log (Labo) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 1.58 0.63 0.01 
Log (budget) 0.32 0.09 0.00 
Log (Beds) 0.26 0.09 0.01 
Log (Doctors) 0.72 0.04 0.00 
Partial Operating System - 0.05 0.05 0.40 
Comprehensive Operating System - 0.08 0.05 0.11 
New Public Self-Operating System - 0.02 0.07 0.73 
R squared 0.49   
Adj. R squared 0.49   
Root MSE 0.36   
F (6,713) 116.24  0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Variables  Chi square P_value 




Partial Operating System 
Comprehensive Operating System 
New Public Self-Operating System 





Appendix 5.U- Fixed, Random Effects, and Hausman test for Log Laboratory tests 
         
FE model log (Labo)  RE model log (Labo) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value  Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 2.66  0.52    0.00  Intercept 2.46 0.50  0.00 
Log (budget) 0.36    0.05  0.00  Log (budget) 0.35    0.05 0.00 
Log (Beds) - 0.30 0.27 0.27  Log (Beds) - 0.24  0.22  0.29 
Log (Doctors) 0.65    0.26  0.01  Log (Doctors) 0.71 0.15  0.00 
Partial Operating  
- 0.02 0.03  0.47 
 Partial Operating  
- 0.03  0.03  0.39 
System  System 
Comprehensive    
0.05  0.06      0.34 
 Comprehensive    
0.03    0.05 0.60 
Operating System   Operating System 
New Public Self- 
0.13    0.07      0.06 
 New Public Self- 
0.10    0.06  0.11 
Operating System  Operating System 
Sigma_u   0.32     Sigma_u 0.31    
Sigma_e | .212     Sigma_e 0.21    
Rho 0.69      Rho 0.69       
F test that all u_i=0: F (19,694)= 72.64, prob >F=0.000  R square: within 0.43                          
  
R square: within 0.43                          
  
 R square: between 0.49 
R square: 
between 0.48                                          R square: overall 0.47 
R square :overall 0.46   Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.00 
Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.12                           Wald Chi square 539.32   0.00 
F (6,694) 86.97   0.00      
         
Hausman test between RE and FE models    
Variable b (fe) B (re) b-B SE    
Log (Budget) 0.36      0.35        0.01         0.01    
Log (Beds) - 0.30 - 0.24        - 0.07        0.16    
Log (Doctors) 0.65       0.71  - 0.06 0.21    
Partial Operating  
- 0.024    - 0.03        0.004         0.003 
   
System    
Comprehensive    
0.05  0.03         0.03         0.02 
   
Operating System    
New Public Self- 
0.13      0.10         0.03       0.03 
   
Operating System    
Chi square = 1.58       P-value =0.95    
  
  





Appendix 5.V- Pooled model for Review Visits 
 
Pooled model (Review visits) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 51872.13 9553.97 0.00 
Budget 0.0002 0.0003 0.50 
Beds 66.72 32.48 0.04 
Doctors 151.07 27.02 0.00 
Partial Operating System -2117.25 10743.62 0.84 
Comprehensive Operating System -11243.45 9843.62 0.25 
New Public Self-Operating System -3098.33 11446.18 0.79 
R squared 0.09   
Adj. R squared 0.08   
Root MSE 71532   
F (6,713) 11.42  0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Variables  Chi square P_value 




Bilateral Operating System 
Partial Operating System 
Comprehensive Operating System 
New Public Self-Operating System 
 
  





Appendix 5.W- Pooled model for Log Review Visits 
 
Pooled model log (Review visits) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Intercept 3.80 0.71 0.00 
Log (budget) 0.12 0.10 0.23 
Log (Beds) - 0.30 0.11 0.01 
Log (Doctors) 0.43 0.04 0.00 
Partial Operating System - 0.01 0.06 0.92 
Comprehensive Operating System - 0.02 0.06 0.75 
New Public Self-Operating System 0.09 0.08 0.24 
R squared 0.18   
Adj. R squared 0.17   
Root MSE 0.41   
F (6,713) 25.27  0.00 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Variables  Chi square P_value 
Log (Budget) 584.04 0.00 
 Log (Beds) 
  
Log (Doctors) 
Partial Operating System 
Comprehensive Operating System 
New Public Self-Operating System 
 
  





Appendix 5.X- Fixed, Random Effects, and Hausman test for Log Review Visits 
         
FE model log (Review visits)  RE model log (Review visits) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P-value  Variable Coef. Std. Err. 
P-
value 
Intercept 3.76  0.56      0.00       Intercept 3.71  0.52     0.00      
Log (budget) 0.15    0.06      0.01      Log (budget) 0.13     0.05 0.02 
Log (Beds) 0.33    0.28    0.24      Log (Beds) - 0.01  0.23 0.98 
Log (Doctors) - 0.43 0.27     0.10  Log (Doctors) 0.08 0.17      0.64      
Partial Operating  
- 0.01  0.03 0.81      
 Partial Operating  
- 0.01    0.03 0.80 System  System 
Comprehensive    
0.01 0.06      0.85     
 Comprehensive    
- 0.02    0.05 0.77     Operating System   Operating System 
New Public Self- 
0.14    0.07      0.05      
 New Public Self- 
0.10    0.06 0.12      Operating System  Operating System 
Sigma_u 0.49     Sigma_u 0.37    
Sigma_e 0.22     Sigma_e 0.22    
Rho 0.84        Rho 0.75       
F test that all u_i=0: F(19,694)= 118.83, prob >F=0.000  R square: within 0.16                         
  
R square: within 0.16 
  
 R square: between 0.18                                        
R square: 
between 0.19                                         R square :overall 0.10                                        
R square: overall 0.05                                          Corr (u_i, Xb) 0.00 
Corr (u_i, Xb) - 0.60  Wald Chi square 129.24   0.00 
F (6,694) 22.07   0.00      
         
Hausman test between RE and FE model    
Variable b (fe) B (re) b-B SE    
Log (Budget) 0.15      0.13         0.02  0.01    
Log (Beds) 0.33     -0.01  0.34         0.15    
Log (Doctors) - 0.43 0.08 - 0.51  0.21    
Partial Operating  
- 0. 01     - 0.01  0.0001  0.001 
   
System    
Comprehensive    
0.01  - 0.02         0.03       0.02 
   
Operating System    
New Public Self- 
0.14      0.10        0.04         0.02 
   
Operating System    


























Appendix 5.Z- Graphs of overlapped outputs (1988-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
